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SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STANDARDS OF LIVING

BY

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PREFACE

This book is the outgrowth of a course of classroom lectures on the subject of *Standards of Living*. The interest of the students in the social aspect of the subject suggested the present historical and analytical interpretation of present-day standards of living.

Many helpful suggestions were made by friends who read the manuscript. I wish to acknowledge my appreciation of the assistance given me by my colleagues, Professor Howard B. Woolston, Professor Allan R. Benham, and Professor William D. Moriarity of the University of Washington; and by Professor William F. Ogburn of Columbia University.

My early indebtedness to my former instructors in the University of Wisconsin, Professor Richard T. Ely and Professor Edward A. Ross, has been increased manyfold. Their encouragement and faith helped to keep me at my task. To them must be credited a large part of whatever virtue the book possesses. Its faults are mine alone.

My thanks are due to those who have courteously permitted me to make brief extracts from copyrighted material.

THERESA S. MCMAHON

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SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STANDARDS OF LIVING

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STANDARDS OF LIVING

During the last decade numerous studies have been made of the standards of living of wage earners. The impetus to the movement came largely from the World War conditions when the claims of the workingmen for higher wages were based on a sudden and marked inflation of prices.

Before the war, budgetary studies were the work of social scientists who were interested in presenting to the public a statistical demonstration of a well-known fact that many families among the working poor were living on a plane below what was generally considered necessary to maintain a health and decency standard. The social scientists saw little opportunity to carry out a program to promote the well-being of the community unless all men were securing a wage sufficient to meet the demands of wholesome living.

At first the problem of minimum standards of living was approached from the social angle alone.

The influence of poverty on family and community life was considered. The physical scientists coöperated with the social scientists in the determination of minimum subsistence levels for the different working groups. Then followed a demand for minimum wage laws which would prohibit employers from paying their normal workpeople less than a so-called living wage.

Later, studies in fatigue and efficiency convinced many employers, as well as the general public, that long hours and low wages were not conducive to a high work output. Cheap labor proved often to be dear labor. The conclusion reached by the scientific investigators pointed clearly to the need for scientific engineers, or employment managers, to determine the wages and working conditions that would secure the lowest cost of production.

But the wage earners were not contented. They believed that the employers considered them only as instruments of production, and retained for themselves the gains resulting from the increased efficiency of the workers. Nothing short of a complete reorganization of industry — a reorganization which would transfer to the employees at least a share in its control — was demanded.

A discontented working force does not lend itself to a whole-hearted coöperation with employers. In many instances the wages of the men were sufficient for them to maintain the physical efficiency of

themselves and of their families. Their hours of work were limited so as to allow time to recover from fatigue of their toil from one day to the next. The sanitary conditions prevailing in the workshops met the demands of established desirable standards. Yet the men were discontented. The causes were mental rather than physical; and although mental unrest was characteristic of the people generally after the war, its accentuation among the workers caused no little alarm to their employers.

Dr. Carlton Parker struck a sympathetic note with the general public and many employers and employees, when he called attention to the fact that many workers, under our modern industrial system, did not have normal outlets for the expression of their innate tendencies. For instance, it is becoming increasingly difficult for a wage earner to possess a settled habitat where he can assume the responsibilities of family and community life. As a result, balked instincts seek expression in activities considered often detrimental to the community's well-being. Hence, the problem before the employers, as well as the public, was to supply wholesome avenues of expression for the natural instincts of men. This necessitated the consideration of the *social* man as well as the *economic* man.[1]

Here was a new field of scientific research which called for the coöperation of the psychologists.

[1] Parker, Carlton H., *The Casual Laborer and Other Essays.*

The chemists and the physiologists had determined the food properties and the quantity needed to sustain man. The dietitians translated this knowledge into family budgets. The psychologists were to perform a similar task for the mind. They were called upon to diagnose the psychological man; to discover his mental ailments, and to suggest means of bringing him to a normal state of mind.

But the psychologists have not yet decided which human characteristics are instinctive or acquired; which are inseparable from the man himself; and which are merely a reflection of the social institutions of which he is a part.

Meanwhile, a greater voice in the control of industry has been delegated to a few of the more aggressive and able of the workingmen. Greater attention has been given to the upbuilding of the community life outside of the workshops, and constructive educational policies are followed to train men along lines which afford them better avenues of expression for their native talents.

Among the lower animals, biological survival is the aim and end of life itself. With man, the ultimate goal of life's activities is not so evident. If the purpose of his actions was clearly a biological one, the gratification of his physical wants would be his only problem, and his chief concern in life would be to procure those economic goods essential to the physical well-being of himself and of his family.

But with the development of civilization man becomes increasingly conscious of his social wants, until they press with greater vigor than the purely physiological ones. It is then that his work activities seem to be directed primarily to the gratification of social wants.

In a well-organized industrial community few men starve, even though they contribute nothing in the way of economic service to the community. They can be, and often are, fed, clothed, and housed by organized charities or sympathetic neighbors. In very few instances is force so effectively exercised as to make men self-supporting. The experiences of workhouses and almshouses are cases in point. Therefore, it is not the physiological desire to survive that makes men toil, but their self-respect, which prevents them from accepting that which the community holds to be not legally theirs. Self-respect is personal approval gauged by the accepted standards of conduct, and is primarily a social reaction rather than a biological one.

When we reach the higher levels of wants we find, on their analysis, that they are in their very nature *social* wants. That is, they are the wants, in the nature of their expression, suggested by environmental conditions; and their gratification brings a desirable social repute. So closely related are the social and physiological wants when translated into standards of living that it is impossible

to separate the two in the consideration of family budgets.

All men — employers and employees — seek to attain, as a rule, some social goal. Their desire to merit the respect and admiration of other men prompts them to make efforts to attain these goals, which alone gratify their desire for emulation. The form which men's ambitions assume depends upon the existing standards of social valuation. They may be standards of achievement in the various fields of work activities. More often they are standards of conspicuous display of wealth, and are reflected in the standards of living of people. The latter represent an historical development, influenced by environmental conditions and the innate characteristics of men.

The employers, upon the whole, think of the workingmen's standards of living as purely economic ones, and they think of them in terms of profits. That is, they think the standard of living which should be encouraged is that which is conducive to the greatest work output. Even when the employers take into consideration the social wants of their men — the wants calling for conspicuous personal display — they tend to think of them in economic terms. The workers, on the other hand, think of their standards of living as ends in themselves, and their forthcoming wages as means to the attainment of these social ends. In this respect, their personal

reactions to their standards of living are similar to those of their employers. The latter are concerned in their profits in so far as they desire the realization of the social standards of living of *their* class. The social interests of the two classes — using social in the narrow sense of reflecting class superiority — are antagonistic; necessarily so, since the desire for emulation in personal display rests on a desire for social inequality.

Interest in the standards of living of workers, then, is prompted by one of two motives; namely, the motive of the men and the motive of the employers. Neither can be wholly wrong, for in the final analysis of our social and economic life it must be conceded that the economic productivity of men not only determines the possibility of the biological survival of a people, but determines the amount of surplus wealth which makes possible the development of a progressive civilization. When we examine the *social* standards of living of a people we find a material expression of the existing type of civilization.

The question then is, what social and economic standards of living should be upheld by the community so as best to promote the progressive development of society? Were an ideal standard accepted by the most enlightened of the people, two obstacles to its realization would present themselves. First, are the economic resources, as to raw materials and labor power, sufficient to allow the general realiza-

tion of this standard? Second, assuming that no economic problem presents itself, are social standards of living amenable to control? It is one thing to subscribe to a desirable standard of living. It is quite another to impose it upon a people who are guided in their conduct by social institutions which are the products of the past as well as of the present. Therefore, it seems desirable to take into consideration the natural proclivities of men, the environmental conditions, and the historical antecedents which make up present-day social and economic standards of living.

CHAPTER II

LOW STANDARDS OF LIVING AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

In current discussions of standards of living, it is generally conceded that a high standard not only involves a considerable financial outlay, but assumes that the expenditures are made in conformity with a plane of living characteristic of the so-called higher social classes. People of wealth, however, often eliminate from their budgets articles whose main justification for existence is their expensiveness; and people of but moderate incomes at times confine their expenditures largely to these same articles of luxury for the social reputability they afford. The latter are credited with enjoying high standards of living, for in terms of social measurement the expenditures made conform to those which carry with them enviable social repute.

Expensive standards of living are not necessarily high standards of living. For instance, there are people who can maintain an enviable social plane on incomes which prove inadequate for others even to enjoy what Professor Ogburn terms "a comfort standard." Lack of thrifty habits may be at fault, and financial outlays may be made without in any

way contributing to the physical or even social well-being of the family. Money disappears as if it were spirited away, leaving no trace of its previous possession. Apparently there is an absence of knowledge of the values of economic goods. A knowledge of the current social valuation of economic goods seems likewise lacking. In fact, from any criterion of measurement the conclusion is reached that the expenditures made illustrate a long list of errors in judgment, and the nature of these expenditures places their victims in the low-standard living group.

There are some comparatively low-income groups in modern industrial communities which contain individual members who are unduly sensitive to social valuations and so arrange their budgets as to emphasize expenditures which have a social importance. This is often done at the expense of important foods which are essential to the physical well-being of the family.

That the families in question are giving expression to their conception of high standards of living is not doubted; for high standards of living are generally conceded to be conventional standards. It is true, however, that when measured in terms of intelligent understanding, high standards of living posit physical efficiency as their first requisite, and according to scientific classification would fall within the category of simple standards of living. The

time may not be far distant when people in general will accept simple standards as high standards; but from the present outlook precedence is given to current valuations assessed on conspicuous expenditures. As a rule, the social status of an individual is determined by his economic status in spite of the fact that numerous exceptions may be found.

Low standards of living are generally significant of poverty, a poverty which allows only the gratification of the instinctive wants, and then often in only the most elementary way. For instance, the inhabitants of the frigid zone live in an environment which, up to the present time, has not admitted the possibility of the realization of more than the minimum of subsistence. An economic surplus is practically unknown, and the state of culture enjoyed by the people is most backward and unprogressive.

The standard of living of the people inhabiting the frigid zone is not very dissimilar to that prevalent among peoples of the tropics who live in affluence, when measured in terms of the advancement of the industrial arts and the general progress of the people. We are told that struggle is essential to progress and that the absence of an incentive to struggle offers no hope for the advancement of a people. Some stimulating force must be introduced into the group life from the outside to create a spirit of discontent with existing conditions.

Explorers and tradesmen present descriptions of people who show little responsiveness to newly suggested wants. Their lives are governed largely by customs and traditions, and their surplus wealth is utilized in increased leisure, a leisure spent in idleness. Not until hunger spurs them on to effort, do they engage in work, and then only sufficient to meet their immediate physical demands.

In Mexico "it is somewhat questionable whether higher daily wages would permanently benefit the peon unless at the same time his standard of life rose. The experience of railroad companies and other employers of labor in Mexico has been that higher daily wages increase idleness, and if the wages for a day's work be doubled, the working days will be halved."[1]

Wherever such conditions prevail little progress is made, and the general supposition is that the absence of wants, or the lack of sensitiveness to new wants is responsible for the fact that these communities remain among the low types of civilization. Irrespective of the criterion of measurement, they fall short when compared with peoples displaying a degree of ambition in their social endeavors.

"Among a custom-bound people the problem of exploitive government is simple. So long as they do not threaten the laboring man's customary comforts, the ruling classes can absorb all the rest of

[1] *Bulletin, U. S. Dept. of Labor,* 38, p. 48.

the social income without exciting a revolt. With railroads, mines, plantations, and factories, they may multiply the national output by three, yet cede the masses no share in the new prosperity. Such, generally speaking, is the technique of exploitation in the South American countries. On the other hand, where the working classes have become discontented, outreaching and ambitious, it is necessary for the ruling class to concede them a share in the increase of social income. Discontent and restlessness and striving to better one's condition, penetrating society to the very bottom, is the only adequate guarantee for the permanence of democratic government."[1]

Wherever national groups — or groups within a nation — are cut off for a few generations from economic and social contact with other peoples of varied standards of living, there exists an apparent indifference to the higher material wants. To create wants where they do not exist, or to stimulate them where they are seemingly dormant has brought into the sphere of national trade an increasing application of psychological laws. The primitive wants — which are often primarily instinctive — are appealed to in order to create a demand for foreign manufactured goods. "The building up of a foreign market," — an expression commonly used in the modern industrial world — means often the creation of a

[1] Ross, Edward A., *Social Psychology*, pp. 264–265.

demand for products where the demand formerly did not exist.

It is the missionary and the merchant who awaken dormant wants and create in time — although indirectly — a tendency to uniformity in world standards of living. The apathy of peoples toward the demands common to western types of civilization may shortly be a condition of the past, so rapidly are inroads being made by ambitious foreign traders into new unexploited markets.

In modern industrial centers the incomes of the poor leave many of them struggling below the poverty line, and these unfortunates accept in many instances low standards of living as their common and unalterable lot. Low standards of living in these instances are generally cheap standards, although there are instances — many of them, if we accept the conclusions of social investigators — where higher standards could be realized were expenditures for intoxicating liquors eliminated. Mr. Hobson would have us believe that the drink habit itself is the expression of a desire for a fuller life. "The yielding to drink is not mere brutality. Brutes do not drink. It is in some part the response to an instinct to escape from the imprisonment of a narrow, cramping environment which affords no scope for aspiration and achievement. It may indeed be said that the drinker does not aspire and does not achieve. He is doubtless the victim of an

illusion. But it is a certain dim sense of a higher freer life that lures him on. 'Elevation' is what is sought."[1]

In so far as low standards of living are the results of poverty, their elimination is possible when society is convinced that their elimination is desirable to promote the progressive development of a nation. The fact that there still exists the desire to reach a higher goal of endeavor on the part of many of the poor, affords a basis for the progressive evolution of a class, when once economic pressure has been partially removed so as to allow expression to the higher stimulated desires. The satisfaction of higher desires nearly always involves a large element of waste when no social control is exerted by the educational forces in the community. The task of rejection and selection is left to the inexperienced, who necessarily err in the social importance attached to the new range of consumption goods within their reach. Even if no social error were made in the appraisal of consumption goods, the element of waste when measured by simple standards would persist, for "the standard of living of any class, so far as concerns the element of conspicuous waste, is commonly as high as the earning capacity of the class will permit — with a constant tendency to go higher."[2]

[1] Hobson, J. A., *Work and Wealth*, p. 127.

[2] Veblen, Thorstein, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, p. 112.

The problem assumes a somewhat different aspect when low standards of living persist within the group in spite of the stimulating influences which, under ordinary circumstances, would be productive of desired results. When progressive social institutions must count outside the pale of their influence a class indifferent to their suggestions, and yet persisting as examples of social retrogression, the problem becomes a serious one. An example of this type most commonly cited is the people of the South living in mountain communities, and known generally as "mountain whites." The poverty of the economic resources of their immediate environment, the absence of educational facilities, and the lack of initiative which would lead them to break with their traditional surroundings are all held to be responsible. The revelation of the existing illiteracy among the people of the South was a result of the recent Conscription Act, which showed that 200,000 Americans in the first draft could not read their orders in any language. "In the North and the West, illiteracy is largely a problem of the foreign born, in the South of the negro and the mountaineer. The net result is that there are 8,500,000 denizens more than ten years of age, in the United States, who cannot read the English language."[1]

The mountain whites of the South are accepted as part of the country's liabilities and considered in no

[1] *World's Work*, April, 1919, pp. 617–618.

sense social assets. Another group of importance are the members of the working class designated as "work-shy"; those who pass under the names of "hoboes," "rounders," "blanket-stiffs," etc. — in short, the down-and-outs. These seem apparently outside the pale of the influence of high standards of living. Their numbers are increasing in all modern communities, and their aggressiveness in defying existing social institutions presents a disturbing factor, if not a revolutionary one, to those economists and sociologists who see the need of accepting as economic and social laws, fundamental principles in harmony with a progressive social program. Were the underlying causes for the existence of this class wholly economic, a persistency in high wage rates would offer a possible solution, but we are led to believe by Professor Lescohier that high wages result in increased idleness and are directly responsible for a considerable degree of the increased turnover of labor in industrial plants within the last few years. "Instead of taking advantage of the higher wages to improve their economic position, many workers have preferred to work a smaller number of days, earn approximately the same amount per week as formerly, and absorb the benefits of higher daily wages in increased idleness rather than a larger income."[1]

The explanation offered is as follows: "When

[1] Lescohier, Don D., *The Labor Market*, p. 94.

any one's income exceeds his *standard of living*, his incentive to work is removed. He has nothing to work for. The distinction between *standard of living* and *scale of living* must be carefully recognized. One's *standard of living* is in his mind. It is his conception of the way he wishes to live. It is the embodiment of his desires. One's *scale of living* is the way he lives; not the way he wants to live. If one who is living in a tenement wants to own a home; if he patronizes movies when he wants to go to operas; if he walks when he craves an automobile; if he toils six days a week when he wants to spend the winter traveling in Europe, he has a standard of living far above his scale of living. A marked increase in his income would be absorbed in bringing his scale of living nearer to his standard. Higher wages will make him work harder, and the probabilities are that his standard will keep rising as his scale of living rises, thus giving him a continuing incentive to work harder and harder.

"But one whose standard of living rises no higher than satisfying his stomach with 'something that will fill up,' or who has no abhorrence for the crowding of the tenement, is happy when he has a bottle and some cigarettes, and is content with clothes from the second-hand store, has a standard of living quickly attained. He will see no reason for working as long as he has some money in his pocket."[1]

[1] Lescohier, Don D., *The Labor Market*, p. 95.

People of low standards of living can be divided roughly into three classes: (1) Those who are the hopeless poor. The causes may be wholly economic. That is, the wage rate for unskilled work may be continually so low as to convey not even the slightest ray of hope for larger real incomes under the existing economic conditions. Ambitions, once entertained for a future change of their social status, have become atrophied for want of encouragement from environing conditions. Apparent hopelessness, if not indifference, is noted among them in time, and it is safe to say their standards of living and their plane of living are the same. The point of view held is entirely consistent, for the man who aspires to attain a goal that is held by his associates to be wholly Utopian is thought to be at least impractical if not *queer*. The immediate causes for the low income received may be purely physical. Lack of physical strength, a low grade of mentality, or other forms of subnormality may be the direct antecedents of the necessarily low standards of living. If no other reason existed, the hopelessness of changing their economic status might alone be responsible for the lack of ambition. It is acquiescence in the *status quo* which kills the spirit of progress.

In many of the industrial and commercial centers of Europe one can see daily this type of miserable humanity — unwashed and unkempt and clothed in

dirty rags — trudging along the main thoroughfares. Marriage, births, deaths, and poverty in their tragic sequence seem to have seared their souls into a numbness which reflects itself in their blank, dull features.

(2) The second group embracing low standards of living may possess those inherent qualities of mind which, if properly stimulated, would urge the individual to greater social effort. Shut off from contact with the higher social classes — as is common in Europe — and surrounded by people whose present environment and antecedent background are the same as their own and have produced a common social outlook, a spirit of contentment or indifference permeates the social atmosphere of the entire community.

When a surplus income is available, as was common during the Great War, it was more often used in feasting or in other ways expressive of their idea of a "hilarious good time." When peace times returned, with widespread unemployment and the accompanying cut in wages, the same old household furnishings, indicative of deep-seated poverty, the same shabby clothes, and wooden-soled shoes were still in evidence. There were no savings at hand, in many instances, but in their place was safely lodged the memory of a good time — such a time as had never before been experienced. Isolated groups of peasantry, or of farm laborers, are often likewise

outside the pale of the stimulating influences which suggest a wider range of wants of an accepted higher import.

Among the itinerant workers in America there are many who travel from the Atlantic Coast to the Pacific in their search for work. They are isolated as a social group as effectively as if they were confined within narrow geographical barriers. They are made conscious of an apparent unfriendliness of the social institutions of the community in which they make their temporary homes, and feel they have little in common with the people who have made their permanent home in the vicinity. The plane of living of these workers is often determined by the industries in which they work. That modern conveniences and comforts are not afforded them is due, it is claimed by many employers, to the fact that they would be wasted or misused. That the only way to attract the workers is to provide for them a plane of living in conformity with their customary habits of life, is a further assertion. In some instances this claim can be fortified. The presence of bathing facilities does not necessarily mean that the men bathe regularly, nor does a convenient laundry assure the washing of soiled clothing. But on the other hand, as many instances show, the persistence of these accommodations has stimulated their use. In other words, the social stimulation to higher standards comes

often from within the industry itself and creates a desire for their realization.

(3) The problems involved in the raising of the standards of living of the inefficient poor, or of the groups whose social ideals do not conform to those commonly upheld, are simple in comparison with the problem presented by the third group, made up of the men and the women whose earning power is higher than their standards and who seem deaf to stimulating social appeals. They are often indifferent to both church and state. Family ties are considered handicaps in their chosen life, so they seldom marry, or if they do, they are likely to accept the tie lightly — to be broken at convenience. The separation of husband and wife seldom causes an appeal to the divorce court. There seems little advantage to be gained by a legal separation where the responsibilities of the home are accepted so lightly. Social usages are considered superficial barriers to be disregarded. Their indifference to prevailing standards of living is not due to ignorance nor to isolation. Many of them have moved within the higher social circles and possess educational training of no mean order, boasting at times of college degrees. Most of them are widely traveled — often not accepting national boundaries as limits to their itinerary. They possess, by virtue of their wide experience, a philosophy of life having little of the narrowness evident in settled community life. They

admit they are parasites, but in response to the accusation hurled at them they point to individuals and classes of individuals who stand high in social esteem who have contributed nothing to society to justify their incomes. Among these they point to the inheritors of wealth, the coupon clippers, the recipients of the unearned increment of land, and the possessors of political preferments in the forms of grants and franchise privileges. The wealth that these consume is far in excess of the mere pittance asked by the man-of-the-road. Besides, many of them recall an early life of unrecompensed toil as a justification of their present form of life. To live without work is far easier than to live by toil. The one leads to the road with its various attractions, the other to the workshop with its unsanitary surroundings, long hours, and low pay. As they see it, it is freedom *versus* slavery, and the road to the former is one of indifference to the surrounding social institutions which impose upon man responsibilities and restrictions that make of him a slave to the existing order. The responsibilities and restrictions consist of an ethical code which demands of every man that he live up to the expectations of the community of which he is a part. These expectations involve social and economic relations, restrictive in their influence when the question of the larger freedom is involved, thus making life one round of struggle.

Free from any incentive to struggle — other than for mere subsistence — and thoroughly reconciled to a life of parasitism, this class accepts a low standard of living as most conducive to the realization of their aim in life. This aim is an effortless existence, free from all restraints on the gratification of desires, and implying individual freedom closely akin to that of an anarchic state.

Begging cannot be classified as an effortless activity, but it affords a variation in scenes and experiences not afforded by the monotonous routine of factory life. It is, in fact, possible that better food and clothing can be obtained with less effort and under more interesting and stimulating circumstances by begging or petty criminality than is afforded by work in economic society. The realization of this, coupled with the call of the road in the springtime, attracts away from the customary routine an ever increasing number who are willing to trust their fate to the generous responses of the households along the roadway.

The minority report of the Poor Law Commission of Great Britain stresses the fact that a large percentage of the unemployed under normal conditions are "work-shy." Some are physically unfit, it is true, but many of them are victims of habit not in accord with a life of continuous toil. Their services to society are spasmodic, and in many instances they refuse to work as long as their savings last.

The simple fare on which they are willing to live makes possible periods of idleness of greater or of lesser duration.

Some employers of casual workers in Washington complained that after the passage of the prohibition law the men showed less willingness to return to work after pay day. The absence of liquor eliminated one of their chief sources of expenditure, and Monday morning found them with a part of their week's earnings still intact. This fact proved a strong incentive to continued idleness which would not have been possible if the desire for drink had been gratified.

To the employers, these employees are inherently lazy, lack ambition and self-respect, and are outside the influence of a normal community life. To attempt to reform them through our social agencies is wasted effort. The demand of the men for a new economic order in which they should share equitably in the surplus wealth of the community with those of the higher social ranks who, like themselves, have contributed little to this world's goods by productive efforts, is looked upon as a revolutionary demand to be dealt with as any other movement which seeks to undermine the fundamental principles of American economic institutions.

There are others who are not financially concerned in the problem, but are interested from a social standpoint solely, and who are convinced that

within our industrial system itself lie the causes for the development of an unsocial group of men whose very intelligence is a menace to existing conditions. Seasonal industries and the absence of an organization of the labor market leaves many workers to be victimized by general work conditions. The itinerant workers have come into existence through the demand of industry itself, which encourages the development of a type of labor generally known as *casual.*

To uphold some ideal which acts as a motive force for struggle seems essential to progress. When this ideal is absent, retrogression is inevitable. Government workshops, farm colonies, and unemployment insurance prove to be no more than temporary economic palliatives, without in any way bringing the offenders and victims, who have lost step with the social order, back to habits of work. To reëstablish social relations so that these will act as an incentive to further endeavor has proved a discouraging task. The number of economic parasites is steadily increasing in spite of efforts made to stem the tide and direct it into wholesome social channels.

There are, it is true, some cases of reclamation which have proved permanent. The Salvation Army is noted for its excellent and successful work among the "down-and-outers." To the religious colonies established by the churches must be credited a large share of the success attained by the farm colonizing

movement. The secret of the success of the efforts of religious orders is probably due to the fact that they have succeeded in reëstablishing social standards of living. The new social relationships established, it is true, at times are wholly spiritual, and the guiding influence on conduct is not the social class just ahead, but the spiritual hierocracy of the church.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL PROGRESS AND HIGH STANDARDS OF LIVING

While it is generally conceded that low standards of living imply social stagnation, if not actual retrogression, no common conclusion has been reached as to the efficacy of universally high standards of living. In fact, students of social progress tend to divide into three camps: first, those who advocate high standards of living as a means of stimulating the development of a people; second, a much smaller group, those who insist that high standards are in no way related to the progressive development of a community, but are merely materialistic expressions of the financial rewards bestowed upon men of unusual ability; and third, those who maintain that increased standards of consumption beyond the point of physical efficiency involve a misdirected use of society's economic surplus which might be far more advantageously used in the promotion of education and the development of a high grade of workmanship. Progress, measured in terms of human well-being, depends directly upon human achievement and a wide diffusion of its benefits.

Before approaching the subject in hand from an

historical viewpoint it is desirable to present the arguments currently accepted in justification of the respective conclusions as to the social significance of high standards of living.

Judging from the emphasis placed by social scientists on the need of stimulating the wants of the poor as a means of education, we must conclude that by far the larger number of people subscribe to the theory that high standards of living stimulate progress, and that their wide diffusion is essential to the highest possible social development. High standards of living are accepted as necessarily preceding high standards of achievement, and are a safe measurement of the progress of a people. For instance, we have seen that communities of uniformly low standards of living are examples of low cultural development and arrested industrial progress. Wants are few and often comparatively easily satisfied. An economic surplus accelerates the birthrate or invites an indulgence in idleness until felt wants again press on the means of subsistence. On the other hand, those nations which are accepted as the vanguards of progress maintain a comparatively liberal fare for the lower income groups, and a relatively high plane of consumption for the middle and upper classes.

While the majority of the people subscribe to the statement that high standards of living and social progress are closely related, they are not in accord

as to the means of promoting the commonly accepted goal. Some hold that present-day high standards of living represent an evolutionary development, and only those who have attained a high degree of cultural development can give adequate expression to the symbols of the higher æsthetic tastes. Others maintain that high standards are the result of stimulating influences which suggest a wider range of wants. The gratification of these wants results in a broader outlook on life and may make possible a wider range of social contacts. When the plane of living of the upper classes is realized by the members of the lower social strata, the standards of living of the latter often give them access to the circles of the well-established upper classes. Under these circumstances the mental outlook of each is necessarily enlarged.

The latter point of view is generally accepted by social scientists, while the former — that high standards suggest an evolutionary cultural development — counts among its chief exponents men and women whose inherited traditions, like their wealth, find them entrenched in the precincts of the upper social classes. Many of them really believe that if the working poor were made the inheritors of comfortable incomes they would expend them in expressions of low cultural tastes, and in so doing would accentuate the prevailing wasteful consumption. To expect a people to bridge the gap from low to high

standards is to invite retrogression, if not actual elimination. The American Indians are cited as cases in point.

A complete change in habits of life, which the adoption of new standards implies, results at times in an antipathy toward the new and a reaction toward the old. It is claimed that experiments made to bring the American Indians within the influence of the Anglo-Saxon civilization have resulted in some cases in their extermination and in others they have deserted the ways of the white man and have returned to the mode of life which, in the modern sense, affords little or no comfort.

The Eskimos also respond slowly to the stimulating influences of modern civilization; and the American Negro finds himself confronted with almost overwhelming arguments as to why his social status must inevitably be a low one.

Even if we assume that the inability of the individual or class to respond to the stimulating influences of higher standards of living is not due to inherent qualities of inferiority, but to the tyranny of institutional life, the results are the same. The customs and traditions of a class are well established habits, and they are as effective in their control over human conduct as if they were the laws of the land. For instance, in primitive communities the individual who departs widely from the institutional life of his community brings upon himself an isola-

tion little short of social ostracism. Social institutions are conservative forces which hold him in leash and act against suggested changes. Hence men cannot alter their habits of life to any marked degree without first changing their social environment. This often means migration to new communities. The antagonism shown toward members of a community whose habits of life depart widely from those that are customary is visited with accelerated force on strangers who venture into the community. They are looked upon as enemies until they succeed in winning the patronage and protection of those in authority. It is evident that the prevailing social forces in a primitive community tend to bring about and to maintain a comparatively high degree of homogeneity within the group. "Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt in order to get them out of the collision between their *mores* and those of the Egyptians," we are told by Professor Sumner; and his explanation for the failure of Christianity among the Jews is that "the revolution in the *mores* which it called for was too great; it was, in reality, a Hellenistic world philosophy and a treason inside Judaism."[1]

In modern society, especially under the prevailing industrial system, the processes of assimilation work less tardily than under conditions of national and race isolation. And yet the difficulties involved in

[1] Sumner, W. G., *War and other Essays*, pp. 133–134.

the assimilation of peoples of widely different cultural habits are suggested in the difficulties presented in attempting the Americanization of peoples of non-Anglo-Saxon origin. This difficulty applies to the southern and eastern European as well as to the Oriental. The northern Europeans and their descendants are brought into direct contact in industry with the southern and the eastern Europeans. Their respective religious institutions present the extremes of Protestantism and Catholicism; their familiarity with the industrial arts is likewise diverse, for the latter come from lands where primitive industrial methods prevail, while the former and their descendants know the industrial arts in the highest stage of development. The one group tends to be illiterate; the other is the product of a free public school system. Little wonder that there is an apparent feeling of hostility between them which cannot be attributed to wholly economic causes.[1] This has led to the

[1] Commons, John R., *Races and Immigrants in America*, pp. 69–70. "A line drawn across the continent of Europe from northeast to southwest, separating the Scandinavian Peninsula, the British Isles, Germany, and France from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey, separates countries not only of distinct races but also of distinct civilizations. It separates Protestant Europe from Catholic Europe; it separates countries of representative institutions and popular government from absolute monarchies; it separates lands where education is universal from lands where illiteracy predominates; it separates manufacturing countries, progressive agriculture, and skilled labor from primitive hand industries, backward agriculture, and unskilled labor; it separates an educated, thrifty peasantry from a peasantry scarcely a single generation removed

acceptance of the statement that the southern and eastern Europeans are inherently inferior to the Anglo-Saxons; that their infusion into American national life will, if their numbers are not restricted, result in the deterioration of the people who now stand in the front rank of the most enlightened. The absence of scientific proof for the above contention does not militate against its acceptance on the part of many people. The gradation of nations in the progressive march of men holds as surely as the gradation of individuals in their respective class affiliations. The evolutionary development of the individual and of his class or of his nation can be traced in the evolutionary development of standards of living. The latter are causes rather than effects. That is, the standards of living of a people react on their mental outlook by stimulating them to an appreciation and enjoyment of the higher cultural wants. These in their gratification make for wider social contacts, which in turn tend to broaden the intellectual vision of those who experience the realization of the new standards.

Not all the people who believe that high standards of living should be encouraged subscribe to the

from serfdom; it separates Teutonic races from Latin, Slav, Semitic, and Mongolian races. When the sources of American immigration are shifted from the Western countries so nearly allied to our own, to Eastern countries so remote in the main attributes of Western civilization, the change is one that should challenge the attention of every citizen."

theory that high standards of living can be attained only through an evolutionary process. In fact, the majority of them have discarded the evolutionary premise and maintain that the adoption of high standards is a matter of stimulation. The advocates of an even distribution of wealth assume that were their program of wealth distribution followed, general well-being would be considerably increased, and so the progressive development of a nation directly promoted. A labor program, whether communistic or socialistic in its intent, implies an appreciation on the part of the present-day dispossessed similar to that of the so-called upper classes. An increasing number of intellectuals are accepting the above premise with the acknowledgment that the higher appreciation can be learned in a comparatively short period of time. Professor Pigou presents this point of view when he says, "The root of the matter is that, even when, under existing conditions, the mental constitution of poor persons is such that an enlarged income will at the moment yield them little benefit, yet, after a time — more especially if the time is long enough to allow a new generation to grow up — the possession of such an income will make possible the development in them, through education and otherwise, of capacities and faculties adapted to the enjoyment of the enlarged income. Thus, in the long run differences of temperament and taste between rich and poor are over-

come by the very fact of a shifting of income between them."[1]

Social workers admit that their work among the poor foreign immigrants consists largely in teaching them to live better,—to raise their standards of living to the American level. They not only encourage them to want more things, but to translate their wages into purchases significant of a higher standard of living. And as a result it often happens that the social workers through their settlement house activities succeed in welding together into a homogeneous group a mass of strange customs and traditions wholly un-American in their origin. The change is effected through the adoption of American standards of social valuation — a desirable social standard of living. Even though the social standard adopted is in itself of questionable value in terms of general well-being, nevertheless its acceptance is essential to the promotion of a *consciousness of kind,* which is followed by a recognized like-mindedness.

Consciousness of kind plays an important part in human relationships. In order to maintain peace of mind it is desirable that the individual should not run athwart the habits of his group. He can be different in spirit; he may even entertain ideas wholly out of accord with those prevailing within his group, but let him differentiate himself from others by his

[1] Pigou, A. C., *The Economics of Welfare*, p. 54.

habits of dress and he is immediately conscious of an isolation which adds far more to his discomfort than an unsatisfied desire for food. Insufficient food might impair his physical efficiency, but to be too poor to dress in the customary way of his class subjects him to a personal humiliation which ultimately leads to his withdrawal from the group. In America it is important that he should not fall below the standards of dress of his class. To rise above it challenges the admiration of others, if it does not actually pave the way for his admission to the ranks of the social class just ahead. The class test is neither educational nor cultural, but is rather the ownership of the symbols of wealth. That the wealth is actually possessed does not necessarily follow, nor is there great risk of an exposure of fraudulent social claims in an age when much wealth is of an intangible nature. When the national standard of social valuation is of a material nature, its adoption calls alone for skill in imitation. An appreciation of the cultural values is learned more tardily. For instance, a goodly percentage who pay somewhat liberally for the privilege of viewing works of art, of listening to musical programs or lectures which presuppose academic training as a background, are men and women so deficient in their ability of appreciation as to transform the privileges into onerous social duties. Nor can they afford to be honest in their discussion of these privileges. To do

so would mark them as new recruits to the class, and so they pretend to experience the same emotional and intellectual reactions as those who have learned to appreciate the merit of the art or lecture. In time, repeated experiences of the same nature result in a genuine appreciation. Thus genuine appreciation of the higher cultural tastes is learned through repetition of experiences. On the other hand, where lower standards are accepted, the individual not only becomes associated in his own mind, as well as in the minds of others, with a lower social class, but his potential wants become atrophied for want of stimulation.

While the vast majority of the people subscribe to the premise that high standards of living reflect the progressive development of a people, irrespective of whether there is a common agreement as to the method by which this end has been attained, there are some few who see no relationship whatsoever between high standards of living and social progress. Progress is attained through individual or group achievement, and this makes possible a wider range of consumption goods. That a large share of these goods fall to a comparatively few is due to the fact that men of unusual ability receive a large share of the wealth produced as a reward for their contribution to society in the form of achievement. Whether this wealth is used in the enjoyment of high standards of living, stored away savings, or invested in

industrial enterprises, it does not necessarily follow that the method used in its disposal impedes or stimulates further achievement, while the reward or the absence of a reward may have such an effect.

Men are not equal in ability. Little wonder then that men of unusual ability find themselves the favored ones in the distribution of wealth when they exert themselves to attain a high standard of workmanship. So confident are some people that the present distribution of wealth rests upon the value that society places on the individual's contribution to the work accomplished, that they see little advantage in a more even distribution of wealth through legal devices unless some provision be adopted to prevent the wealth from again concentrating into the hands of a comparatively few. Otherwise, the former wealth inequalities will again arise as a reflection of the natural inequalities in individual ability. Furthermore, if the wealth earned by men of superior talents falls to their children who possess only mediocre talents, they soon dissipate it unless restricted in its use by far-sighted parents. If the mediocrity persists in the following generation, the wealth finds its way back into the channels leading directly to men and women of applied superiority; and the inefficient heirs of position and fortune fall shortly to their natural economic level. They not only lose the fortunes accumulated by their ancestors, but find the social honors, which are the symbols of

wealth, burdensome when they are unable to retrieve lost fortunes.

The same process of selection, it is held, takes place within the ranks of the lower social classes. Just as within the recognized social aristocracy where there is a tendency for the higher qualities of character to be transmitted to their children, so also the low level of ability among the poor is transmitted to future generations as a class inheritance. There are exceptions of course. Some few men of the lower social classes rise to positions of honor in recognition of their noteworthy abilities. They enter the ranks of the social aristocracy, being granted titles in England as a just reward for their contribution to their country's well-being. In America they become men of wealth, and their social origin does not militate against their admission to the ranks of the higher social classes.

The members of the third group differ fundamentally in their conclusions, as to the influence of high standards of living on the progressive development of a people, from those who hold that high standards are socially beneficial and therefore should be encouraged, and from those who maintain that the enjoyment of high standards of living merely expresses the high reward merited for services. This third group believes that high standards of living do not promote social progress; in fact, that they more often militate against the possibility of human

achievements. Social progress must be measured in terms of human achievements and the extent of the diffusion of their benefits. High social standards may actually defeat the attainment of the desired goal. The explanation is as follows: The ownership of wealth makes possible the enjoyment of high standards of living. It also makes possible the enjoyment of leisure. At times when the amount of wealth possessed is sufficient, both high standards of living and the enjoyment of leisure are possible. But at other times one must be sacrificed to the other. Where the choice falls on high standards, the individual's efforts must be directed to the pursuit of a desirable money income. On the other hand, where leisure is chosen, with its economic security, the time can be employed in the pursuit of education in developing talents and in making higher achievement possible in the future.

That is, in order to promote the greatest possible degree of human achievement each individual member of society should be trained to the limit of his capacity so that lack of education will not stand in the way of the expression of his talents. Education implies leisure to study and freedom from economic pressure, hence the leisure must represent an economic surplus lest energy be consumed, while idle, in looking for work. An army of unemployed has leisure without economic security. The latter is essential to the best intellectual efforts.

When leisure is consumed in the accumulation of wealth to be used in material display, the innate talents of men lie dormant for want of training, and the surplus energy and wealth are used up in the production and the consumption of unnecessary economic goods.[1] It is thought that there is really no relation between high standards of living and social achievement, — using *social* in its broader sense, — but that both are significant of an economic surplus; a surplus finding expression at times in a high standard of living and a high standard of achievement when the wealth at hand is sufficient to make possible a relatively high plane of expenditure and to afford at the same time sufficient leisure for study and experimentation. The two are the results of the same economic surplus, but are in no way dependent one upon the other. Indeed, when the economic surplus, over and above minimum subsistence, is not sufficient to enable its owners to enjoy a high standard of living and at the same time follow educational pursuits, the one is often

[1] Ward, Lester, *Applied Sociology*, p. 214. Professor Ward, the eminent sociologist, believed, "it was the classes that were economically independent that yielded the greater part of the men of eminence. Surely it was not simply wealth, money, goods, that caused this. What then was the real influence? It may be said that it was leisure. Very true. But leisure might be and often is spent in idleness. Leisure is only a means, but it is an effective means. It enables its possessor to apply himself undisturbed for prolonged periods to preparation for usefulness. But this preparation is education."

sacrificed to the other. For instance, many students live on a minimum plane of consumption in order that they may acquire a higher education. On the other hand, all are familiar with examples where standards of living have tyrannized over people to such an extent as to push into the background educational ambitions. This does not imply necessarily that those affected by the latter situation are less appreciative of the advantages of education or that they possess less intellectual curiosity than the former, but rather that they are more sensitive to those environmental influences suggestive of higher standards of living which, after all, are criterions of social valuations. Men and women less sensitive to the social drive of material wealth have in the same surroundings forged ahead and gained repute for their intellectual accomplishments.

This train of thought has caused some few to adopt the simple standard of living as alone conducive to the social development of the country — again using the word *social* in its broader sense. Simple standards free men from the tyranny of habits of consumption which add nothing to their physical or spiritual well-being, but divert their attention and energies from the more desirable and profitable activities. In other words, it is maintained that plain living and high thinking go hand in hand.

Irrespective of the differences in conclusions as to the importance of high standards of living in the

progressive march of peoples, one must admit that the common consensus of opinion is that high standards of living, widely diffused, are expressive of a high and enviable national development. But before a new synthetic philosophy can be set forth it is necessary to study the forces instrumental in the establishment of our present social and economic standards of living. These are numerous and so interrelated as to tempt one into the field of sociological and economic speculation.

Meanwhile, it is desirable to examine the historical origin of standards of social valuation. Early history reflects the rise and the development of social class barriers, and affords an excellent background for the study of modern social usages. In the light of these data the real significance of our standards of living in the progressive evolution of civilization will be more intelligible than if we dealt with the question as a wholly modern social problem.

CHAPTER IV

THE ORIGIN OF MODERN EUROPEAN SOCIAL STANDARDS

Except under favorable climatic conditions early people were constantly conscious of the pressure of population on the means of subsistence, and knew of no way of meeting the problem of increasing the food supply other than by migration to new unexploited lands or by the invasion of the territory of their economically more fortunate neighbors. Every community was face to face constantly with two economic dangers, the danger of starvation as its numbers increased and the danger of invasion from its foes. The development of the industrial arts was so slow that the increase of wealth by exploitation of natural resources to the degree practiced today was unknown, and wealth increased generally by land acquisition, often at the expense of the less warlike people. The latter were destined to extermination if unable to increase their economic resources in some way. Naturally, under such circumstances, social institutions, the outgrowth of a policy of predation, persisted as a social inheritance for generations, and these embodied mental attitudes and habits of life in conformity with the group's

interests. The group's interests implied an acceptance of a centralized authority.

At first such interests of the individual as were contrary to the interests of the group of which he was a member were suppressed, and this condition resulted ultimately in the suppression of all interests, individual or group, that were antagonistic to the interests of the governing few. Thus a policy, established as a protective measure against enemies, and most conducive to the community's survival, proved a check, at least temporarily, upon individual variations. Individuals who depart from the well-beaten paths, demonstrate the efficacy of new ways of doing things, or evince superior adaptability to environmental conditions. Their survival in the struggle for existence in a biological sense, or the survival of their ideas in a social sense, leads the way to racial variations. These qualities of variation were essential to the progressive development of a community, as is shown by later industrial evolution, but for the time being they were suppressed; perhaps to become active at some future time and to bring about sudden innovations in a conservatively organized community.

A fear of the military authority of those who by virtue of their military control had acquired power within the group was substituted for the fear of the foreign enemy. Class lines tended to become fixed, and the régime of caste was accepted without

serious question. There were, however, forces within the community destined to bring about changes, — changes not out of harmony with those influences which tended to establish uniformity when mass action was needed. One of these forces was the economic, brought about by changes in the industrial arts. Another was the geographic influence of a new environment when the group migrated; and last, but not least, social changes within the group. No social group stands still for any length of time. Progress or retrogression is inevitable, but the change effected may be a change affecting all alike, or, if variations appear, they are not of sufficient importance to impair the compactness of the group.

As soon as the societal group showed a tendency to depart from migratory habits and there followed periods of respite in warfare, conventional courtesies arose among them, and the social intercourse thus established made apparent the different usages of each group and enlarged imitation. Undoubtedly the habits of life of those in authority underwent changes, for the paraphernalia most effectively emphasizing social prestige were imitated and adopted. In addition, the self-assertiveness of men led them to adopt new forms of adornment as a means of stimulating the admiration and envy of others. Self-assertiveness finds its expression so generally in warfare and personal adornment that it suggests an element of conformity in the habits of thought

of the people. That is, men must realize a human background against which to reflect their personal greatness, and therefore are guided in their choice of avenues of expression by the range of the understanding of the audience.

Conquests often brought about changes in the habits of people, although the successful combatants were less likely to imitate the conquered than the conquered were to adopt the institutions and costumes of their conquerors. Ancient history offers us many examples of the conquerors accepting the civilization of the conquered, if not wholly, at least in part.

Early historical documents give many descriptions of the splendor of the court life of a neighboring or distant state as reported by royal messengers. The exchanging of gifts, as offerings of good will, was equally suggestive of different methods of life and had a stimulating effect on the social ambitions of the recipients. Anxious to impress on their subjects the wide divergence between their social positions, the rulers welcomed any change in court paraphernalia which more effectively emphasized their superiority. There may have been another reason for the imitation of foreign court life. The splendor of it may have afforded a greater satisfaction to the desire for conspicuous paraphernalia, a trait so common as to be still almost, if not wholly, universal.

The new elements injected into the social life of

the ruling class, all other things being equal, should have been instrumental in breaking down social barriers opposed to change, and should have filtered on down through the lower classes. In short, the tyranny of fixed habits would tend to collapse; for no new material changes can be injected into the social life of a people without causing a mental reaction, so generally do people think in terms of customary behavior.

But as long as the survival of a state or nation depended upon its successful combativeness in its interstate and international conflicts, the desirability of a strong centralized authority was recognized. Wherever there exists such an authority it is generally found that it involves more than strictly political relations. It involves economic activities of a people as well, on the supposition that the political forces of a social group rest on an economic basis.

Some see in the control exercised over the economic institutions an arbitrary exercise of authority. Social control is equally important. In fact, it was social control in its last analysis which was felt to determine the stability of a centralized authority. Even if the subjects of a ruling class were ready to welcome change in the manner of living, the centralized authority guiding their political destinies would interfere with any social advance in the plane of living, as this would tend to lessen the differ-

ence between the ruling class and the ruled. As a greater social likeness between the various classes became apparent, there would arise a disposition on the part of the ruled to challenge the social infallibility of their superiors. This has actually occurred. For notwithstanding the general policy of suppression adopted by the ruling classes, there are instances in which concessions had to be made in order to obtain the desired support of a few who were unwilling to grant the *desiderata* without some form of social recompense.

If changes in the habits of life depended alone upon the sanction of the socially superior, the lower social classes would have retrograded before they were allowed to break away from tyrannous traditions and customs. "Everywhere and always," says Spencer, "the tendency of the inferior to assert himself has been in antagonism with the restraints imposed on him; and a prevalent way of asserting himself has been to adopt costumes and appliances and customs like those of his superior. Habitually there have been a few of subordinate rank who, for one reason or other, have been allowed to encroach by imitating the ranks above; and habitually the tendency has been to multiply the precedents for imitation, and so to establish for wider classes the freedom to live and dress in ways like those of the narrower classes. Especially has this happened as fast as rank and wealth have ceased to be coincident

— as fast, that is, as industrialism has produced men rich enough to compete in style of living with those above them in rank. Partly from the greater means, and partly from the consequent greater power, acquired by the upper grades of producers and distributors; and partly from the increasing importance of the financial aid they can give to the governing classes in public and in private affairs, there has been an ever-decreasing resistance to the adoption by them of usages originally forbidden to all but the high born."[1]

While the governing forces encouraged stratification, changing physical conditions called for constant adaptation. They were in the nature of droughts and storms or other climatic changes affecting the food supply disastrously. The migrations of peoples brought them in contact with a new physical environment. Where it could be done, old habits of life were adapted to the new conditions, but where this was not possible, a change in habits to suit the new conditions was essential, if not for actual survival, at least for the profit expected from the migration. Migrations were of two kinds, voluntary and compulsory. The one was prompted generally by a desire to better the economic conditions of a people; the other was often the result of an unsuccessful war. The defeated either departed from their homes or submitted to enslavement. The

[1] Spencer, Herbert, *Principles of Sociology*, II, pp. 213–214.

victors claimed the lands of the defeated foes, and often enslaved the men among the vanquished or demanded their most attractive women as part of the spoils of war.

Tarde sees as a result of intercommunication between different groups a diffusion of useful knowledge. Undoubtedly the spread of information received a marked impetus from the adoption of foreign women into the tribe. They practiced their own industrial arts and undoubtedly brought with them new methods of doing necessary things, or introduced entirely new arts which had been developed among their native people but were unknown to their conquerors.[1]

If a tribe had two methods of doing the same thing, the least irksome and most efficient would in time be adopted. At first the new methods would be used by the incoming women, who undoubtedly would possess a similar aversion to change of habits as the women of the conquering tribe. In time the conflicting methods of doing things would result in the adoption of the most improved.

Undoubtedly the progressive evolution of the industrial arts received stimulus from without the tribe. Likewise the contact of peoples belonging to different social organizations must have resulted in new and more effective ways of satisfying instinctive wants. The latter, modified in their method

[1] Parsons, E. C., *Tarde's Laws of Imitation*, p. 325.

of expression by the influence of external stimuli, brought about changes in habits of life which were directly reflected in new and higher standards of living.

Too great emphasis cannot be placed on the importance of the instinct of self-assertiveness as a directing force in the development of higher standards of living. The love of personal prestige reflected in the emulation accorded prompts men to undergo great privations and to face imminent danger. The struggle for physical survival gives place repeatedly to the innate desire to command the submissiveness of others by virtue of one's superior accomplishments.

The recognition of the superiority of others presupposes an appreciation of the achievements accomplished. A Beethoven could not command even a place secondary to that of the barbaric warrior in a primitive stage of culture. The achievement must come within the range of the existing social mind. If the prevailing conception of greatness involves a spectacular display of personal adornments, there is little incentive for the creative energies of men to find their expression on a higher intellectual plane. The instincts of men are often held in leash by the customs of the group, or are directed in their expression by institutional forces which may be on a higher spiritual plane than if left to their spontaneous expression. But the

reverse may be equally true, depending upon the social directing forces in the community's life.

The economic and social considerations prevailing among the ruling classes and preventing the filtration of ideas to the lower social strata were lacking at the bottom, so that, other conditions being favorable, the only check to a wider diffusion of ideas was the force of tradition and custom. These were not impregnable. Thus the elements of change were quietly and unsuspectingly working among the lower social strata and in time were of sufficient significance to change the destinies of entire peoples. Stimulating influences, suggestive of a higher plane of living, created a wider vision on the part of the recipients, and led to a wholesale questioning of, and discontent with, their status as fixed by a custom régime.

The importance of land ownership in the social as well as in the political organization of ancient and medieval Europe rested on the fact that practically all wealth outside of the towns was in the form of land. As land was limited in its supply, its transmission from one generation to the other made it possible to build up an aristocracy, the social precincts of which were not easily invaded by successful merchants. The financial needs of the aristocracy alone afforded an avenue of access.

The masses of the people — the serfs — were attached to the land in a semislave relationship in

medieval times, and their social status was determined by their economic status. Feudalism marked the culmination of a structural organization of agricultural communities. The various social strata represented economic gradations, each group within the organization having a distinct function which was apparently essential to promote the security of the whole group. The feudal lord assumed the responsibility for the security of the community against invasions, and the tillers of the soil provided their feudal lord with the means of subsistence in return for this protection.

When the political jurisdiction of the feudal lord became merged with that of the larger political unit — the state or the nation — his usefulness to the smaller unit — the manor — was considerably lessened. His authority persisted by virtue of his ownership of the land, and the relationship between him and his tenants expressed largely the economic weakness of the latter and the economic and, hence, social importance of the former. As the mutual benefits of the alliance became questionable, elements of disintegration entered into the manor. A growing restlessness became apparent which at times merged into a spirit of antagonism. The serfs were no longer contented with their lot. This was due in part to their increased bargaining power. The demand for men in arms to carry on aggressive wars successfully, and the fatalities resulting from

epidemics of disease, had decreased the number of men available to till the soil.

The need of men to serve the feudal lord or king in his aggressive expeditions introduced the paid retainer. He "would look out the likeliest and the most adventurous of the youth of all ranks, and employ them in his army with good pay and prospects of plunder and ransom."[1] The introduction of the paid soldier, who was rewarded in proportion to services rendered, militated against the traditional military system under which service was a matter of ordinary feudal duty.

The need of money for the promotion of wars resulted in the substitution of money payments in place of feudal service, and the serf became a tenant in the modern sense when his relationship to the land was terminated at his will, rather than at the will of his feudal lord. In many instances the economic interests of the larger landholders were better served by liberalizing the terms of tenancy.

In later centuries the great plague, sweeping away large masses of the working population, enhanced labor's importance and gave impetus to the revolutionary forces, changing the economic as well as the social status of the laborers. The surplus wage thus afforded over and above the customary plane of living was not used in the gratification of increased sumptuary wants, but in the acquisition of land.

[1] Rogers, J. E. T., *Work and Wages*, p. 68.

Land was valued as a means of affording a livelihood. Its ownership implied economic security, but it had a further significance of equal, if not greater, importance than the economic. The extent of landownership determined the individual's social prestige, for the recognized social aristocracy based its social claims on extensive landownership. It is true that the early acquisition of the land by specific families implied a recognition of military service, and in its transmission the new owners in many instances pointed to the military achievements of their ancestors to fortify their claims to their social titles. In the course of time the inheritance of large landed estates carried with it the implication that ownership of the land resulted from individual achievement. Under the circumstances it is not strange that the social standard of living of the upper classes should rest directly on landownership rather than on a conspicuous consumption of newly acquired wealth.

The large landowners of late medieval times found the cost of the cultivation of the soil increasing at the expense of their financial returns. In addition to the higher wages paid workingmen, they had to meet the increased price of all farm implements, for the labor cost involved in their manufacture was immediately reflected in the higher market values. On the other hand, the decreased population — due to the plague — lowered the demand for farm

products. The economic burdens of the changes taking place fell most heavily on the landlords, who found it necessary to put the land to more profitable uses, as was done in England by the raising of sheep, or to relinquish their holdings, or at least a part of them, to small purchasers.

The development of small holdings either under a system of tenancy or individual ownership tended to stimulate individual initiative and offered an outlet for social ambitions. Since landownership carried with it social prestige, the landowner was placed in a social class distinct from those workers who were attached to the land in some form of villeinage. If the ownership of a few acres of land carried with it social prestige, the ownership of considerable acreage was more desirable. Therefore, the desire for land outranked other materialistic desires and took precedence over those wants whose gratification meant increased physical well-being and increased physical comfort.

As a rule individual landownership for the agricultural workers promotes a diligence greater than that shown under a system of tenancy or of wage payments. Yet at times the increased efforts put forth, which should, other things being equal, result in a greater production, were offset by the absence of the necessary capital to purchase the most effective farm implements. The current ignorance as to the most scientific uses of the land undoubtedly

played an important part in preventing the small landowner from realizing the greatest possible returns for his efforts. Under such economic conditions stagnation or retrogression often followed the development of small holdings.

An economic surplus above bare subsistence is necessary for the expression of desires. Desires become starved out of existence for want of avenues of expression, and the progressive social results possible under a changed economic order are not forthcoming. In their stead come into play the retrogressive forces thought to be applicable only to the previously existing undesirable economic conditions. In fact, the absence of an economic surplus forestalls peaceful intercommunal relationships resting on the basis of an exchange of products.

Life in typical agricultural villages in England is described by Rogers: "The houses of these villages were mean and dirty. . . . The better class of yeoman had timber houses . . . built on a frame, the spaces being either lathed and plastered within and without, or filled with clay, kneaded up with chopped straw. The floor was the bare earth, though it was sometimes pitched with split flints. The sleeping apartments under the thatched roof were reached by a ladder or rude staircase. A few chests were ranged about the walls, the bacon rack was fastened to the timbers overhead, and the walls of the homestead were garnished with agricultural implements.

The wood fire was on a hob of clay. Chimneys were unknown, except in castles and manor houses, and the smoke escaped through the door or whatever aperture it could reach. Artificial light was too costly for common use, for the hard fats were four times as dear as the meat of animals, and a pound of candles could only have been procured at nearly the price of a day's work.

"The floor of the homestead was filthy enough, but the surroundings were filthier still. Close by the door stood the mixen, a collection of every abomination, — streams from which, in rainy weather, fertilized the lower meadows, generally the lord's several pasture, and polluted the stream."[1]

But if, under the conditions described above, the small landholder did not progress, it is also clear that the evolution of tenancy was not always conducive to a progressive development. The substitution of money payments for services resulted finally in the establishment of terms of rent. They were fixed by the custom of the times, as were the prices of commodities.

A customary rent rewarded the greater diligence and efficiency of the tenant if there was a surplus product over and above that of previous years. The advent of competitive prices, emerging with the expansion of the markets, affected the level of rents; and as economic returns from land increased,

[1] Rogers, J. E. T., *Work and Wages*, p. 67.

rents generally increased in like proportion. The inexorable law of rent led in time to the discouragement of effort on the part of the tenant. Naturally there was a tendency toward the stratification of rural economic life and the reëstablishment of the customary social status. ". . . Good husbandry, which seems an obvious duty of the tenant, was discouraged by raising rent on the sitting tenant, to use a modern phrase, in proportion to the excellence of his husbandry, the eagerness with which he adopted improvements in the process of his art, and the difficulty he had of extricating his capital from his holding on its termination."[1]

The break-up of the feudal régime tended to transfer the center of industrial activities from the manor to the town. The development of town economy and the advent of the Industrial Revolution called for new adjustments in the community's social as well as in its economic organization. Classes as well as individuals at times made these new adjustments on higher social levels. On the other hand, the transitions in industrial life often brought in their wake a heritage of human wastage.

[1] Rogers, J. E. T., *Work and Wages*, p. 54.

CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EUROPEAN SOCIAL STANDARDS

Europe affords many examples of arrested rural development, both economic and social. They represent the counterpart of the progressive development of small holdings which have lifted their owners from the social status of dependence in serfdom to that of economic and political independence, engendering feelings of self-respect and of social importance.

The apparent inflexibility of all medieval social and economic institutions was a reflection, in part, of a state of mind not welcoming change, but accepting custom rule unquestioningly; and yet there were economic forces within the manor making for change. They grew out of such industrial arts as spinning and weaving, and the making and mending of household and farm implements, and fell to the individuals possessed of innate skill in the industrial employments, the performance of which brought within their lives physical and social influences of which the agricultural workers were ignorant. Many of the industrial tasks necessarily implied a freedom

of intercourse which disturbed the worker's customary routine of thought as well as routine of action. His social contacts with the entire community as a mender or maker of tools destroyed much of that native timidity of thought which is characteristic of peoples whose associations were restricted within narrow limits.

In the manor "there were few handicrafts men, for probably common carpenter's work was undertaken by ordinary farm hands, as we know it was by the small farmers four or five centuries later than the thirteenth. The most important artificer, indeed, was the smith; but it is plain from the records which have been preserved, that the smith's work, even on the demesne estate, was not sufficient to maintain a smith in any manor, and that the same person served the needs of three or four."[1]

As a cultivator of the soil the serf would be at one with his people in his slavish adherence to the traditions and customs surrounding him; but as an industrial worker on the manor his new impressions came into direct conflict with the old and created a restlessness of spirit which often sought an outlet in the freedom of a near-by town. Here he followed his trade when he had gained admission into the guild. That this was not a common practice is evident by the town's attitude toward strangers. They, as of old, were accepted as at least undesirable mem-

[1] Rogers, J. E. T., *Work and Wages*, p. 46.

bers of the community, if not as enemies. The main reasons for this unfriendliness were twofold. First, past experience had proved that men not attached to some community had been expelled because of their undesirable qualities of character, or their criminal tendencies. Second, strangers attempting to enter a craft guild were deficient in training, and if allowed to practice their trade would impair the customary standard of workmanship. Hence, only the more aggressive or the more skilled industrial workers in the manor were able to establish guild membership.

In the towns people lived in more compact groups, with a sufficient diversity of occupational interests to bring about dissimilarities in point of view, and at the same time develop a consciousness of a new economic relationship. This relationship was epitomized in the guild organization allowing greater individual initiative and demanding a higher degree of voluntary coöperation than was possible in a strictly military organization, and yet at the same time retaining much of the disciplinary power of the army. Herein the medieval guild organization differed fundamentally from the democratically organized industrial groups of ancient Egypt and Assyria. While distinctly industrial organizations, the merchant and the craft guilds developed a discipline within the groups not wholly out of accord with the discipline of a military organization.

The guilds, in their industrial beginnings, were primarily democratic. Each worker entertained the hope of setting up a shop for himself upon the completion of his apprenticeship. Uniform interests existed to this extent, and whatever difficulties arose between the master and his apprentices, they did not necessarily involve the journeymen. Class distinctions were temporary, theoretically at least.

The workingman owning his shop and employing journeymen and apprentices must have had a different outlook from that of the workingman attached to his lord's demesne. Safely within the protection of his guild, he was no longer willing that the guild barriers should be removed in order to allow others to enter who had left the manor in order to escape its jurisdiction. It became increasingly difficult for strangers to enter a trade, so well organized was the guild in the interests of its members.

"The more industry developed, the more grasping were the privileged artisans, the more anxious the nonprivileged seemed to be to enter the combination, and the more hostile the guilds seemed to become to any effort on the part of outsiders to pursue their professions individually or form new associations."[1]

The successful shop owner in the exercise of his function as a producer was able to accumulate

[1] Wergeland, A. M., "History of Working Classes in France," *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. xii, p. 232.

sufficient wealth to increase his stock of capitalistic goods. He enlarged his sphere of industrial activities, and his importance as a merchant soon outranked his importance as a master in his shop. The growing importance of the merchant-capitalist tended to enlarge the radius of competition, extending in time outside the town limits and embracing an ever widening area. The increase of general wealth which followed made possible its wider distribution among merchants and prosperous tradesmen. Their growing financial importance was reflected in their social life. They were in a position now to imitate the well established social classes in their expenditures. The restrictions which might have been imposed upon them by their social superiors, were they near by, lost their force in the towns. It became increasingly easy for the rich merchant to set up social pretensions, fortified by the ownership of material wealth.

The extension of the markets not only enhanced fortunes, but brought within the range of many consumers a greater diversity of consumption goods. The successful merchant first became conscious of a wider range of wants and the importance of gratifying them, for by so doing he was able to demonstrate to the general public his financial status.

Industrial wealth was less in evidence than landed wealth; besides, the owners of industrial wealth were a new economic class on the social horizon,

and consequently lacked the inherited prestige that landownership in the Middle Ages implied. Where this inherited prestige — symbolized in titles — was lacking, it was occasionally purchased from an impoverished political régime, or secured through social alliances. Material wealth of plebeian origin was exchanged for the accoutrements of an impoverished landed aristocracy.

The adoption on the part of the merchant class of a high standard of living did not result in a sudden innovation in their habits of life and thought. The change which had taken place in their economic status was a gradual one. In fact, they had broken away from the tyranny of custom and tradition imposed upon them as agricultural workers, and developed a versatility in adaptability and aggressiveness which made it possible for them to take advantage of economic opportunities. They showed a similar versatility and aggressiveness in the adoption of the paraphernalia of the social class ahead of them whose standard of expenditure now came within the merchant's economic means.

The merchants' attitude toward social and economic institutions that interfered with their ambitions was somewhat iconoclastic. They were the real innovators in a conservative society, and their actions were prompted solely by self-interest and self-aggrandizement. To them must be given credit for social pioneering against the landed

aristocracy, and for establishing a new standard of social values. It is true that this standard was an industrial one and carried into modern times the unsavory odor of plebeian origin. But in terms of social value its importance is unquestioned. In fact, wealth gained in industry and trade has often been converted into land holdings. Time has hallowed the ownership, and the social recognition formerly denied their possessors has become established.

Not all men who left the manor and migrated to the towns were successful. Those who came later received their main impulse to do so from the disintegrating manors. Where enclosures were established the need of farmhands declined, and there was little choice left to the agricultural worker other than to seek a livelihood in a near-by town. Having no trade, and having been shut out from the guilds, most of these were unprepared to meet the vicissitudes of their new environment. They swelled the number of unemployed in the towns and necessarily added to a rapidly growing pauper class, for many of them were not able to bridge the gap between their former economic relationship, with its implied paternalism, and the new economic régime of industrialism of the rapidly growing monopolistic guilds.

Some of the men having initiative and industrial ability, clandestinely pursued their trade and by so

doing became in time effective competitors of the guild members; but those less fortunate lost step at the beginning. They adequately demonstrated the socially retrogressive possibilities of great and sudden changes in environment and in habits of life. Their ensuing pauperism widened and deepened the stream of human failure inherited by succeeding generations. Sir Thomas More aptly describes the fate of many agricultural workers who, with the extension of enclosures, were forced into the towns. "Miserable people, both men and women, married and unmarried, old and young, with their poor but numerous families (since country business requires many hands), are all forced to change their seats, not knowing whither to go; and they must sell for almost nothing their household stuff, which could not bring them much money, even though they might stay for a buyer. When that little is at an end, for it will be soon spent, what is left for them to do, but either to steal and so to be hanged (God knows how justly), or to go about and beg? And if if they do this, they are put in prison as idle vagabonds; while they would willingly work, but can find none that will hire them; for there is no more occasion for country labor, to which they have been bred, when there is no arable ground left."[1]

It is possible that environing conditions may not have been alone responsible. The unsuccessful

[1] More, Sir Thomas, *Utopia*, World's Great Classics, p. 13.

might have been the least fit under earlier conditions. They may have possessed little energy beyond that of supplying their immediate needs, and hence they were not able to adapt themselves to the social and economic influences of their new environment.

Economic changes which require a readjustment of the habits of a lifetime often bring in their wake human wastage, for there are always a number of people who are ill adapted to existing conditions, and who would sink to a lower level of efficiency if it were not for the props afforded them by the economic and social organization of which they are a part. Let the latter change and they lose all sense of economic and social security and become a part of that class known as the parasitic.

In many instances the handicap of the individual in meeting the new economic conditions is his lack of trade training. He is one of the many unskilled; one of a group far in excess of the demands of industrial life, too old to be apprenticed to a master were one willing to apprentice him, and his very helplessness encouraging the application of the division of labor to industries outside the guild regulations. Such a laborer soon mastered the simpler tasks and, because of the lower wage cost involved, his employer was able to use him to undersell the guildmen. In seeking a market for his goods outside the radius of the guild's jurisdiction, the merchant, who was able to reach down and utilize

the labor of the unskilled, created a wider market for the sale of his goods. His market was a competitive one, just as his labor represented competitive labor. It was only a question of time when custom price had to give way to a competitive one.

The change from an industrial condition under which prices were fixed by custom to one where prices were fixed by competition involved social changes as well. Prices became lower, and in addition the number and variety of commodities increased and came within the financial reach of many whose consumption had been in the past determined largely by custom and tradition. A wider range in consumption on the part of an increasing number of the working population helped to break down traditional social barriers, and at the same time afforded the necessary social stimulation to the expansion of wants. The awakening of ambitions to improve the workers' lot paved the way for the disintegrating powers which made possible a revolution in the social order. Narrow social barriers had to give way as did the narrow economic ones, and in their stead came economic and social units larger in their sphere of influence.

The early eighteenth century found the civilization of western Europe undergoing an evolutionary change brought about by a conflict between the traditions and the customs of the past and a new economic order. The older order, clung to long

after its usefulness had been served, gave way gradually to a new conception which engendered a philosophy of freedom from restraint, both economic and social, as expressed in the *laissez faire* policy which in theory at least became a guiding ideal of the time.

The change brought about by this new idea of competition met with tenacious opposition which proved a more or less effective retarding influence in modern industrial development. In general, in each community, the entire strength of the existing social institutions was pitted against any attack upon the usages of the past, for all innovations were looked upon as inimical to the community's welfare. This fear of change had its roots in the distant past; a past which stressed conservatism in the promotion of economic security. So strong was the feeling that suffering would inevitably result from a wide departure from the ancient régime, that social or economic novelties were accepted reluctantly, and within each social unit reactionary tendencies hardened and crystallized.

The mercantilist's philosophy of the preceding century, so generally accepted by the English statesmen of the period, encouraged the idea of keeping the standards of living of workpeople on a low subsistence level. In other words, the labor power of the community, including that of women and children, should be utilized at the least possible

cost so as to release more goods for foreign export and by so doing increase the amount of gold shipped into the country. Gold was considered the real wealth of the community. To further the accumulation of the nation's gold, consumption must be kept at a minimum level, and therefore it was essential to protect the masses of the workers from those stimulating influences that were conducive to the increase of wants.[1]

Thus the importance of the standards of living of working people in determining wages was conceded before the era of modern industrialism. It was the economist, Ricardo, who later formulated the so-called *iron law of wages*. He insisted that wages would inevitably fall to the minimum of subsistence which would represent the customary plane of living of the working people. Were wages temporarily raised, the increase of population would force the wages down again to the minimum subsistence level. The only way in which labor could increase wages would be through a rise in the customary plane of living which would fix a new but a higher minimum subsistence level.

The modern factory system had its incipiency in England. As early as the first part of the fourteenth century a large number of Flemish weavers came over to England "at the invitation of the king, induced by the high wages and ample employment offered,

[1] Furness, E. S., *The Position of the Laborer in a System of Nationalism.*

and settled in London, Kent, Yorkshire, Lancashire, and other places. Successive English kings, down to the time of Henry VIII, pursued a like policy and encouraged the immigration of skilled artisans of all classes, such as armorers, cutlers, brewers, miners, and shipbuilders, the principal workmen employed by the Court being Flemings and Germans.

"When Edward VI came to the throne, it was no longer necessary to hold out inducements for foreign workmen, persecuted for their faith, to come and settle here; the sympathy had been established, and skilled labor flowed to England of its own accord . . .

"In the reign of Elizabeth persecuted Protestants arrived in still larger numbers, landing naturally on those parts of the coast nearest to France and Flanders, namely, at Dover, Deal, Sanwich, Harwich and Yarmouth . . ."[1]

Speaking of the dissenters, Lecky says, "no country owes more to her toleration than England. For nearly two centuries a steady stream of refugees . . . poured into her population, blending with English life, transmitting their qualities of mind and character to English descendants, and contributing immensely to the perfection and variety of English industry."[2]

"Cloth makers from Antwerp and Bruges, lace

[1] White, Arnold, *The Destitute Alien in Great Britain*, pp. 21–22.
[2] Lecky, W. E. H., *History of England*, vol. i, p. 237.

makers from Valenciennes, cambric makers from Cambray, glass makers from Paris, stuff weavers from Meaux, potters from Delft, shipwrights from Havre and Dieppe, silk manufacturers from Lyons and Tours, paper manufacturers from Bordeaux and Auvergne, woolen manufacturers from Sedan, and tanners from the Touraine were all plying their industries in England."[1]

In order to maintain a diversified industry, the country's future depended upon the exchange of manufactured goods for additional food and raw materials. The exchange of products as an industrial policy paved the way for a wider exchange of ideas; the latter as rich an issue as the former, and playing as important a part in the development of her civilization.

The possession of mineral resources and water power promoted England's industrial well-being, but these advantages alone could not afford her markets. So important was the quality of goods produced and so strong was the influence of custom in price fixing that to establish competitive conditions the economic advantages had to be demonstrated to the consumer. This was done in part through the establishment of local markets where goods were sold to the highest bidders. The substitution of a competitive price for a customary one speeded the increased use of capital and the introduction of

[1] Lecky, W. E. H., *History of England*, vol. i, p. 239.

the division of labor. The latter with its lower wage cost brought about the realization of new markets, attracted by the lower prices which were advertised by the merchants. The social and economic gains to England of new methods of production and a wider consumption of commodities were offset in part by the human misery in their wake.

"The beginnings of the factory system were indeed grounded in social misery, and no one who has not read the harrowing details as set forth in the scores of 'blue-books' containing the records of numerous investigating commissions during the first half of the nineteenth century can comprehend the depth of injustice and degradation into which English labor was plunged by the rise of the modern mill and workshop." [1]

If the entire wealth of England had been evenly distributed at the beginning of the eighteenth century — so limited was it in quantity — the share falling to each individual would have been distressingly small and much of the poverty would still persist.

An appreciation of the need of stimulating production led to the adoption of an economic philosophy which took little account of the human factors involved in its application, although Adam Smith, in his advocacy of *laissez faire* as applied to

[1] Ogg, F. A., *Economic Development of Modern Europe*, pp. 371–372.

industry, thought that the competition between producers would redound to the benefit of the consumers in the form of cheaper, better, and more abundant goods.

The emphasis placed on the desirability of increased wealth overshadowed the great disadvantages of the exploitation of the labor factor in production. The *laissez faire* policy was with a fair degree of consistency applied to capitalistic activities; no interference was interposed except where attempts were made to maintain certain rules of trade in restraint of monopoly. Under great provocation limitations were imposed on the use of child labor. Labor as a whole was denied an equal right with capital in the furtherance of its economic interests, for not until 1824 were the laws against labor combinations repealed, and even then the freedom thus vouchsafed was more nominal than real.

Social changes followed in the wake of the economic changes. These were equally revolutionary. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the serf was driven into the towns when sheep raising was substituted for diversified farming. He became a city man not through choice, but through necessity, and in so doing became later a competitor of women and children in the routine of factory work. Hunger drove him to the industrial centers and made him an easy prey of industrial exploitation. His new economic status alone was sufficient to bar him from

the enlightening influences that the social institutions of his new environment afforded and to produce a bewildered state of mind rather than a receptive one. Naturally he sought refuge among the people of his own class, and helped swell the number of those whose competitive wage was already pitifully small.

The unskilled workers were now victims of a competitive régime which looked upon labor as a commodity to be bought in the cheapest market, yet effectively restrained from exercising its power of collective bargaining as a means of self-protection.

Undoubtedly the adverse industrial conditions under which the unskilled workers toiled, checked the evolution of this class of workers, if it did not actually speed their social retrogression. Many see in the so-called "submerged tenth" of London the nation's inheritance from its early factory system.

Even if the unskilled workers in England in the eighteenth century had represented the best the rural communities afforded, the question arises as to whether in their struggle to adapt themselves to industrial conditions markedly different from those to which they were formerly accustomed, many of them would not have found the transition to be made too great to be accomplished successfully in a short period of time. Having had no previous industrial experiences of a distinctly related nature — they were agricultural workers, for the most part, and not

handicraft men — and having accustomed themselves to a form of paternalism which did not stimulate or develop self-reliance, they had little chance of avoiding social disaster when confronted by an entirely different economic order of things.

On the other hand, much human misery might have been averted had the state attempted to conserve her human forces to the same degree as she did her material. That all the wreckage could have been avoided assumes on the part of all an adaptability that they did not possess, for paternalism either when practiced by an economic class or by the state has never proved an adequate substitute for that self-reliance which is the outcome of a long line of experience based on the exercise of individual initiative.

It was the skilled workers of the town, and not the former agricultural laborers, who resisted the depression of the customary standard of living. The skilled workers had in their immediate past come in contact with social and economic influences which had lifted them out of their traditional grooves and made them aspirants for standards of living beyond their earlier experiences. When these same workers were later organized in labor unions, they included in their ranks many of the semiskilled and unskilled workers.

The labor market presented an almost chronic oversupply of unskilled workers, and the places of

the striking unskilled workers could be more readily filled than the places of the striking skilled workmen. Yet a part of the blame for the lack of success of these early labor organizations can be attributed to the fact that the unskilled possessed an added weakness which led in part to their defeat in their struggle with their employers. They were unaccustomed to that protracted self-discipline which makes possible consistent mass action for any considerable length of time.

Where the semiskilled or unskilled workers were in considerable numbers, strikes were apt to be revolutionary in their emotional demonstrations and of short duration. The skilled workers alone were able to meet successfully their employers in preventing the latter from depressing their wages.

There were two factors instrumental in defeating the unskilled in their efforts to prevent a lowering of their wages: (1) their economic weakness due to an excessive number of unskilled for the work in hand, and (2) their lack of training in organized activities. To these can be added possibly a third, a standard of living too low to incite great effort to raise it. The standards of living of the unskilled workmen were likely to be at the level of minimum subsistence. When wages were not adequate to meet the physical demands of their low standards, they were supplemented by "poor relief" funds. With the skilled worker, a depression in his cus-

tomary wage meant the lowering of his standard of living and a vital blow to his self-respect. Hence, he showed greater tenacity in the struggle to maintain his wage standards, for upon these depended his social status as well as his economic.

The Webbs say, "It is not among the farm servants, miners, or general laborers, ill-paid and ill-treated as these often were, that the early trade unions arose. We do not even hear of strikes or ephemeral combinations among them. The formation of independent associations to resist the will of employers requires the possession of a certain degree of personal independence and strength of character. Thus we find the earliest trade unions arising among journeymen whose skill and standard of life had been for centuries encouraged and protected by legal or customary regulations as to apprenticeship, and by the limitation of their numbers which the high premiums and other conditions must have involved."[1]

The early history of the English labor union movement clearly demonstrated the weakness of the attempt to prevent the depression of their standards of living on the part of a large group of workmen organized loosely as a class rather than by crafts. In their early conflicts with their employers they were defeated, and the leaders of the men admitted

[1] Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, *The History of Trade Unionism*, pp. 37–38.

that the underlying causes of their disastrous defeat were, in part at least, the ignorance of the rank and file, and the dissimilarity of their economic and possibly their social interests.

An educational propaganda was carried on by the labor unions. Libraries were established for the use of the workers, and the economic and social questions of the day were repeatedly under discussion in the labor meetings with the idea of promoting an intelligent class consciousness. Here men learned to discuss and to act dispassionately, a feat accomplished in the strike field only after years of disciplinary action. This educational discipline proved of inestimable value in their struggle to better their conditions of work and of life in general, whether by means of collective bargaining or through parliamentary action.

It is true that the leadership was undertaken by men and women outside the labor ranks, most conspicuous among these leaders being the greatest humanitarian of his age — Robert Owen. Few, indeed, are the reform movements in history which must not acknowledge a debt, if not of leadership, at least of guidance, to men and women inspired by altruistic motives rather than by motives of self-interest or class interest.

Those whose financial incomes did not suffer by virtue of the factory régime were beneficiaries as consumers. A larger variety of wants could be

satisfied at less cost than formerly, and the number of commodities within the reach of the artisan class had increased so as to embrace many articles regarded as luxuries a few years earlier.

One of the problems of the merchant class was the stimulation of wants on the part of the person whose consumption of goods had in the past been guided largely by custom and who responded slowly to suggestions tending to create a wider range of wants. The socializing influence of the trade union undoubtedly did much to create dissatisfaction with the existing plane of living and aimed constantly to provide an increased wage necessary to meet the growing wants of its members. These, in part, were inspired by the democratization constantly preached by the leaders.

To assume that all the men within the union ranks responded in a like degree to the enlightening influences in their midst would be erroneous, as is amply demonstrated by the action of the unions themselves when they established an emigrant fund in the hope that the oversupply of labor in the respective industries would be thereby checked. It was thought that such a policy would be an inducement for those least fortunate in obtaining employment to emigrate to the colonies, or at least to leave the immediate community which offered them so little in the way of a livelihood. Naturally the unemployed would be those least efficient in their

respective trades, and they received work only when abler men were not to be had. The expectations of the unions were not fulfilled. The least desirable workers of the unemployed, if they migrated at all, went only short distances and soon returned, while many of the trade union men who by virtue of their initiative and courage were the backbone of the trade union movement sought their fortunes by emigrating to America or Australia. Their loss to the English trade union movement was recognized as being irreparable.

The migrant policy was soon discontinued when it was recognized that it afforded no solution for the unemployment problem, or for that of the depression of wages. The unions could ill afford to part with their most aggressive members.

Outside the pale of trade union activities were over a million workers whose plane of living had been depressed below the poverty line. They were the unskilled men, women, and children who were too weak industrially to organize into labor unions because their places were so easily filled, often at a lower wage, from among the unemployed.

This group of workers, upon the whole, presented a wretched mass of humanity powerless to change its lot. They had little in common outside their wants, for they represented the human waste, as it were, sifted from out the various industrial and agricultural groups. The revelation made by Charles

Booth in his investigation of the extent of existing poverty in London verified the claims of those *doctrinaires* who advocated a complete change in England's industrial system. They were constantly calling attention to the existing poverty as a justification of their program.

From this time on a change took place in the public's attitude toward the existing social evils. Slowly there was a marshaling of the public's interests and sympathies, which expressed themselves in forms of organized action. The public, for the first time in England's industrial history, came to the rescue of striking workmen who were too weak to win alone against their employers. Their victories were won through the support of the general public. The great dock strike of 1889 and the matchmakers' victory of the same year were won by public support. "It was a new experience for the weak to succeed because of their very weakness, by means of the intervention of the public."[1]

The formation of an aggressive public opinion on subjects outside its immediate experiences and interests introduced a new social phenomenon into the country's industrial life. Heretofore, the industrial activities of the nation were considered the affairs of those immediately involved, and interference on the part of parliament should be only conservatively exercised. It is true that several

[1] Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, *History of Trade Unionism*, p. 389.

decades previously parliament had assumed in a small degree some of the paternalistic functions exercised in an earlier industrial stage by the guild officers. But the deliberate intervention on the part of the public — outside of ordinary legal channels — clearly showed the rise of a social conscience which in time led to attempts at social control of economic relationships.

The formation of an aggressive public opinion had an added significance over and above its influence upon the working conditions of the helpless poor, in that it gave promise of a new type of organized control which might prove an excellent substitute for a rapidly waning military control. In other words, because of its voluntary and spontaneous nature, there was a promise in this rise of public opinion as a force in the economic life of the nation, of the possibility of national unified action, when need arose, more effective than control resting on a basis of force. While it is true that a military organization based on centralized control proves most effective in short-time actions, the tenacity shown by deliberately organized voluntary groups has been known to succeed more often. England offers a case in point. Conscious social control interfered with standards of living only when the plane of living fell below a recognized poverty line.

The standards of living of those city workers whose wages were in excess of minimum subsistence

showed the influence of modern industrial conditions. The economic surplus was expended in the gratification of new wants through suggestive advertising by merchants who sought to enlarge the market for their goods. Then, too, the social respect commanded by the merchant class by virtue of their wealth inspired an imitation of their standards of living.

The economic development of modern Europe brought about an increase in wants and a possibility of their gratification because of the increase of production. At the same time the organization of industrial workers created a consciousness of common interests and a common standard of living on a higher plane of consumption.

The new class standards were not realized immediately. In fact, the efforts of organized labor were directed at first to the maintenance of the customary plane of living in the face of the competition of the unskilled workers. Nevertheless, the social stimulation afforded by the new industrial contacts established new wants and suggested their realization through common aggressive action against the employers.

The evolution of the workingmen's standard of living was a progressive one in the sense that the men learned to want and to demand more things. The rise of standards of living was stimulated undoubtedly by labor organizations, by the merchant

and manufacturing classes when seeking wider markets for their produce, and by the influence of public opinion which sanctioned without reservation the workingmen's claims to better living conditions. It was thought by men and women interested in the progressive development of the nation that a rising standard of living of workingmen's families was conducive to the promotion of this end.

CHAPTER VI

THE ORIGIN OF AMERICAN STANDARDS OF LIVING

America's standards of social valuation are not only unlike those of Europe, but are so distinctly dissimilar as to suggest a different origin. The one is the product of the evolutionary development of European civilization. The other, while it appears native to American conditions, is not wholly free from European influences, for the early immigrants to the new land were not able to leave behind them the traditions and customs of the homeland.

To understand American standards of social valuation the problem must be approached from two different angles. The one involves a careful consideration of the character of the people who first migrated to our shores. The other must take into account those environmental conditions which determine the nature of the industries of the country. Wealth plays such a large part in most social valuations that the nature of a country's resources cannot be neglected in determining the forces responsible for a nation's ideals.

In all social groups there are a few individuals who invariably stand out from the rest as innovators,

inventors of a new order of things. Their counterpart is the large majority whose function is largely that of adaptation to existing conditions; but conditions constantly change, and react even on the most phlegmatic. That the response to changing environment should vary conspicuously among members of a community where all live under similar conditions is due to individual variations in temperament and nervous energy.

Some are discontented with the old and willing to try the new at all hazards. They come to the front as leaders in any disturbance of the existing social conditions with apparently unlimited initiative and energy in their struggle to interpret in action, as they see them, the new dynamic forces in their midst. We must concede that they are the people of vision whose outlook is invariably that of the nonconformist. Persecuted at home, they often seek refuge in new lands of greater economic freedom.

It is from this source that America receives many of her present-day immigrants who can look backward over a long line of predecessors who found in America an outlet for their energies in the construction of a new economic and social order, freed, as they thought, from the political, economic, or religious tyranny of the homeland.

But the early immigrants little realized that they brought with them, as important elements in their character, the traditions and customs of Europe.

It is true that many of their traditions and customs came into direct conflict with their new geographical conditions, and were necessarily remolded in the process of adaptation to new environmental conditions. But even then the colonists remained essentially the product of many past social and economic forces. In fact, their standards of living in the new land for some time clearly reflected a reaction to European standards, influenced somewhat, of course, by their new surroundings. The force of the latter depended upon the friendliness or hostility of their adopted land.

Of some, little change was demanded; of others, mere survival called for a degree of adaptation which seemed wholly to submerge earlier influences. We are told by Professor Turner that, "The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization. The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick; he shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion. In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for

the man. He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so he fits himself into the Indian clearings and follows the Indian trails. Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe. . . . The fact is, that here is a new product that is American."[1]

Whether the early colonists migrated from Europe for political, economic, or religious reasons, they came as protestants against their native land, and undoubtedly were the immediate products of the stimulating influences which later shook Europe out of her lethargy. These were the folk who helped people the colonies with discontented, restless souls. Among them were exiles from their homeland because of trade union activities; others were victims of the English poor law. They came in groups, representing not only the different nationalities of Europe, but the different religious creeds and the various social strata of a great society. Never before in history was a country settled by such a cosmopolitan people. It was as if all the variables in character, the resultants of geographical, racial, economic, and social conditions of Western Europe, were brought together in a strange and unexploited land to be welded together into a new social order.

Many came from urban communities with no agricultural experience to assist them in adapting themselves to pioneer life in the wilderness. At first

[1] Turner, F. J., *Frontier in American History*, p. 4.

all their physical and mental energies had to be directed toward winning a livelihood from the soil. Their common desire for survival forced them into coöperative groups, and undoubtedly was a leveling influence on marked individual variations.

Circumstances forced them into compact groups, one of whose striking characteristics is conservatism. The planting and harvesting of crops required stability of habits and habitat. The ownership of land itself is conducive to the continuation of the economic order under which it takes place. It is little wonder, under the circumstances, that the dissatisfied newcomers who followed the first colonists found that these early pioneers had become bulwarks of conservatism. Professor Turner writes of the first half of the eighteenth century, "The religious contentions were so closely interwoven with the struggle of New England's democracy to throw off the control of the established classes that the contest was in reality rather more political and social than religious."[1]

There was at least one fundamental difference between colonial development in America and conditions in Europe. In Europe the agricultural workers migrated to the city and carried with them rural standards of living. These standards made up in part their social inheritance and were the background upon which played the urban influences

[1] Turner, F. J., *Rise of the New West*, p. 18.

that their new environment contained. But many of the American colonists were city people with city standards. They were in part skilled workmen and small tradesmen, with a considerable number of agriculturists among them. The industrial workers had broken away from custom rule earlier in their history, and had come in contact with different occupational groups with points of view at variance with theirs, and hence with an appreciation of aims and standards different from their own.

The social inheritance of the colonists had to be molded anew to fit an agricultural environment. Thus there was a reversal of the European order where urban life rested on a rural basis. As a consequence there resulted in America a rural type which is found only in lands colonized by immigrants from older civilizations. The reversion to agricultural occupations developed an aggressive type of character into one of virile social consciousness. The tempering of an aggressive restlessness with the self-reliance and industry that independent agricultural occupations demanded molded early American rural character.

The colonists were compelled for the most part to wrest their food supply from the soil and to depend upon home industry to supply most of their other needs. This fact precluded any but the simplest plane of living, and in many instances was in marked contrast to their European standards. The European

standards had been suggested by their social superiors, and their inability to realize them led many of them to try their fortunes in a new and supposedly rich, unexploited land. Here they clung tenaciously to their old standards of living, hoping to realize them in the near future. But existing physical conditions dictated a sameness in plane of consumption on the part of most of the people. As a result, social differentiations in rank were not common, for there tended to exist that social equality which theoretically, at least, was upheld as most desirable. "Professional men lived much like the well-to-do farmers, in comfortable houses, surrounded with those families of ten and twelve children which put far into the future the shadow of race suicide. Life was simple and easy because there was little to do. Servants were few, because the older children brought up the younger."[1]

Says Henry Adams, "Many a country clergyman, eminent for piety and even for hospitality, brought up a family and laid aside some savings on a salary of five hundred dollars a year. President Dwight, of Yale, . . . eulogizing the life of Abijah Weld, pastor of Attleborough, declared that on a salary of $250 Mr. Weld brought up eleven children, besides keeping a hospitable house and maintaining charity for the poor."[2]

[1] Hart, A. B., *National Ideals Historically Traced*, p. 184.
[2] Adams, Henry, *History of the United States*, vol. i, p. 21.

"The homes of such professional men would now be considered plain in the extreme, lacking all luxuries and many things regarded as essentials today in the homes of mechanics. The farmers and mechanics of that time found clean sand a substitute for carpets, and pewter or wooden dishes sufficient for tableware. There was no linen on the table; nor prints on the walls; nor many books, nor any periodicals in the house (unless perhaps a small weekly paper). Except for hats and shoes (which were made, as well as sold, at the village shop), all the clothing of the family was homemade, and from homespun cloth and yarn. The three meals of the day were formed from varying combinations of salt pork, salt fish, potatoes and turnips, rye bread, and dried apples, with fresh meat for the town mechanic perhaps once a week. Among vegetables not yet known were cauliflower, sweet corn, lettuce, cantaloupes, rhubarb, and tomatoes; while tropical fruits, like oranges and bananas, were the rare luxuries of the rich. Even the rich could not have ice in summer."[1]

It was only a question of time when free lands were limited to the frontier, and this frontier was constantly pushed farther to the west. Inequalities of wealth arose, commerce increased in importance, and materially the Old World came in closer contact with the New. Articles of luxury now came within the reach of the wealthy, and there arose a material

[1] West, W. M., *American History and Government*, p. 390.

expression of social inequalities. Thus was transplanted from European soil the social competition which feeds discontent and goads the ambitious to greater industrial efforts.

In a dynamic society where economic and social institutions have not become crystallized, social strivings have undoubtedly proved one of the most stimulating forces in economic development. It is only in a socially static society that these are conducive to social retrogression. The cry for social equality in a new, undeveloped land is often prompted by a desire to eliminate the social barriers just ahead. At the same time, when the socially ambitious had once successfully invaded the social ranks ahead, they in turn proved to be equally aggressive in their opposition to the widening of the social ranks of which they were now a part. They now opposed the admission of those of an accepted lower stratum just as their own admission had been opposed by their former social superiors.

"In the cities a small class of merchants imitated in a quiet way the luxury of the corresponding class in England, — with spacious homes, silver-laden tables, and, on occasion, crimson velvet attire. The great planters of the South, too, lived in open-handed wastefulness, but with little real comfort. Otherwise, American society was simple and frugal, with a standard of living far below that of today."[1]

[1] West, W. M., *American History and Government*, p. 389.

The agricultural North developed small landholdings similar in their distribution and development to the rural communities of Europe; while the South with its rich plantations had still much in common with the feudal system. The black slaves in their relationship to their owners demonstrated to an accentuated degree the good and the evils of the feudal relationship between the lord of the manor and his serfs. Equally divergent were the social relationships. The slaves possessed no social privileges not a gift of their owners, nor did they render any military services such as feudalism implied. On the other hand, the black population of the South afforded the industrial basis for a leisurely aristocracy, and emphasized the social gulf between the two races. This social gulf was clearly an exemplification of the economic one.

With the growing stability of economic life in the older parts of America, there developed a marked tendency to revert to the customs and traditions of the *Old World*, with its rigid class distinctions and persistent opposition to social democratization. The incentive for the resurrection of the social institutions — the institutions which many of the early settlers sought to escape by migrating to America — was the growing inequalities of wealth. The later comers found the most fertile lands already privately owned in the older settled areas, and the prospects of attaining equal financial importance in the com-

munity were most discouraging. Either they pushed to the free lands to the westward or they accepted positions of economic dependence in the settled sections of the New World.

In comparison with the social and economic institutions of the continent of Europe, the English antecedent institutions were liberal, and in conjunction with the economic and social freedom in the New World, would seem to afford a nucleus for the development of a social democracy, unique in its insulation. But such proved not to be the case. The American colonists showed a tendency to borrow from the conservative social institutions of England. The old was grafted on the new with a complacency suggestive of innate qualities of character which are opposed to the establishment of social equality.

"Against the narrowness of social life, the South always protested, and in the eighteenth century all the colonies got away from it. The few rich men lived handsomely in houses like the Vassall mansion in Cambridge, later the Longfellow house, and always the most beautiful place of residence in America. They had velvet suits, which they carefully bequeathed by will to their sons; they had coaches and four; they had silver services like that of John Hancock, and proper glasses and no lack of Madeira to fill them; they wore the crimson small-clothes which still adorn the portraits of colonial worthies."[1]

[1] Hart, A. B., *National Ideals Historically Traced*, p. 184.

The incoming immigrants accentuated growing social inequalities. These grew menacingly dissimilar from the earlier groups who came primarily upon their own initiative, with perhaps some financial backing, but the newcomers proved to be a conglomerate mass. They were the laborers for the time being at least. But the free lands to the westward prevented for some time to come the molding of a permanently semidependent class out of this migratory horde. Some pushed to the receding frontier. "The ideal of the West was its emphasis upon the worth and possibilities of the common man, its belief in the right of every man to rise to the full measure of his own nature, under conditions of social mobility. Western democracy was no theorist's dream. It came, stark and strong and full of life, from the American forest."[1]

Those who remained behind either as indentured servants or as craftsmen found themselves surrounded by economic limitations that offered little hope for the future. The indentured servants had legal obligations to fulfill, at the termination of which they were free to compete with the workmen, whose bargaining powers diminished with the widening of the market. It was in the early thirties, with the development of transportation facilities, that the workingmen felt the competition of goods

[1] Turner, F. J., *Rise of the New West*, pp. 68–69.

brought in from distant industria' centers and made by cheaper labor than prevailed among them. Says Commons, "Thus it is that the ever-widening market from the custom-order stage, through the retail-shop and the wholesale-order to the wholesale-speculative stage, removes the journeyman more and more from his market, diverts attention to price rather than quality, and shifts the advantage in the series of bargains from the journeymen to the consumers and their intermediaries."[1]

At first labor's protest took the form of a political program which included free public education for all, elimination of imprisonment for debt, a militia system that would not allow the rich to escape service by the payment of a substitute while the poor were unable to resort to this subterfuge, and a mechanic's lien law protecting the worker from bankrupt or absconding contractors. The workingman, says Commons, "asked to be given a preference over property. Instead of an education vouchsafed only to the children of those who could afford it, he asked that the owners of property be required to pay for the education of children whose parents could not afford it. Instead of being compelled, like owners of property, to pay his debts, he asked to be exempted from the sacred obligation of contracts. Instead of equality with other creditors,

[1] Commons and Sumner, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, vol. iii, p. 46.

he asked that wages take precedence of all other forms of credit."[1]

If we contrast these demands with the demands of the "half-emancipated serf" of England, we find that the spirit of the two have little in common. The English workman of the same period was struggling for the recognition of his right to organize to prevent his plane of living from falling below minimum subsistence. The American workman, on the other hand, demanded the recognition of his rights of citizenship, as he saw them, and aimed at the equalization of social if not of economic opportunities. The Englishman struggled against victimization by the new factory régime; the American demanded the right to enjoy the ever enlarging benefits of the country's increased wealth. Nevertheless the development of competitive markets increasingly depressed the wages of the workingmen in America as in Europe, and the situation was met in three different ways. The one requiring the greatest degree of courage was the westward migration to the frontier; the second in importance was political pressure by the use of the ballot; and the third was through the organization of labor. The Homestead Act of 1862, ardently supported by labor, was aimed at the land speculator, who shut off an important avenue of escape from an overcrowded

[1] Commons and Sumner, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, vol. v, p. 29.

labor market. The ten-hour law as applied to government work was a concession made to the strength of the labor vote.

The transition from custom-made goods to competitive goods with their lower prices and wider markets made possible a wider diffusion of commodities which up to this time were limited by area and by comparatively high cost of production. The American consumer responded more quickly to the new market condition than his European brother, for he was not controlled to the same degree by customs and traditions which were effective retarding influences in the expansion of wants. The advertising merchant took advantage of this responsiveness to new wants, and placed on the market cheaper goods produced often at a lower labor cost. This policy followed by the merchant increased the discontent among the workingmen. They saw their standard of living depressed by the competition of those workingmen who were willing to accept a lesser wage than the customary one in order to gain access to the industry. Women and children proved to be a competing menace, as were the convict laborers and the new immigrants. "The capitalist who can reach out for these low-level producers can use them at will to break down the spirit of resistance of the high-level producers."[1]

[1] Commons and Sumner, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, vol. iii, p. 48.

The interests of the American people were primarily those of a rural population. While there were industrial cities of considerable size, such as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, which attracted many workers, their isolation, due to their geographical location and absence of cheap transportation facilities, made possible the erection of indefinite provincial barriers established by the early colonial settlements. The bond between workers was purely local, save in exceptional cases where the trade unions attempted to establish national organizations. These organizations did not prove very effective until after the Civil War, for the representatives in national trade union conferences were not able to promise unified class conscious action including other than workers in the locality. It took the Civil War to break down the geographical social barriers among laborers and to pave the way for the future welding of the working classes into a class conscious organization. The war brought men together from different sections of the country, from different occupations and nationalities to fight for the same aims and to accomplish the same ends. As a result, brought about by forced companionship, there ensued an amalgamation of ideas, traditions, and habits of life that would take years under ordinary conditions to bring about. In their exchange of experiences they constructed for themselves a wider mental

horizon. There were essential adaptations to be made to their war environments which demanded social readjustments as well as economic and physical. "The social changes of the earlier nineteenth century were accented after the Civil War, and caused a larger feeling of national life. The war threw several million men into new combinations, widened their horizons, taught them to know one another, broke up barriers."[1]

The first expression of this new national feeling of solidarity had its inception among the tailors of Philadelphia and spread rapidly over the entire country, embracing not only the labor element, but the farmers and small merchants, whose consciousness of economic grievances was interpreted as a class consciousness. The Knights of Labor, organized in 1869, demonstrated beyond question the fact that labor had not passed very far beyond its embryonic stage in organization, and that the fulfillment of labor's goal — a national organization of all labor in a class conscious group — was still an ideal of the distant future, to be attained only with the gradual growth of that unity of spirit and action which develops with the subordination of individual interests to group interests. The larger the group the greater is the intelligence demanded to appreciate the need of individual self-sacrifice for the promotion of a greater good.

[1] Hart, A. B., *National Ideals Historically Traced*, p. 190.

Meanwhile the industrial workers' world was being invaded by three philosophies: by that of trade unionism which had its origin in England, by that of socialism which flourished best on the continent of Europe, and third, by a philosophy which invaded the labor movement of America in the early sixties and offered a panacea for the existing labor problems aggravated by immigrant contract labor. This philosophy saw the salvation of the worker in his increasing standard of living. It could have had its inception only in a land of an aggressive, self-confident spirit. "It was a philosophy," says Professor Commons, "born of freedom and not of despair." Ira Steward, a mechanist, in 1863 believed that the emancipation of the workers depended upon raising the standard of living of the immigrant to the point where an unskilled worker would demand as high wages as the skilled. The first step toward raising standards of living must be the shortening of the workday. "The masses must be made discontented with their situation, by furnishing them with the leisure necessary to go about and observe the dress, manners, surroundings, and influence of those whose wealth furnishes them with leisure."[1]

The segregation of the unskilled from the skilled, with the application of machinery and division of labor, was to be overcome by a social force which,

[1] Commons and Sumner, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, vol. ix, p. 291.

when once implanted, would be sufficiently powerful to overcome the industrial methods applied to decrease cost of production by lowering wages and thereby increase profits.

"When an intelligent workingman applies for employment," says Steward, "he don't want to meet a fellow laborer offering to do about the same thing for fifty or seventy-five cents less per day; yet he will be there 'every time' until allowed the leisure necessary to be reached through his low pride or envy, if nothing higher — by wife, children, neighbors, and society generally. Give the masses time to come together and they cannot be kept apart; for man is a social being; and when they come together expenses multiply, because the inferior will struggle to imitate the superior in many things which cost. To see is to desire, from babyhood to old age; to desire is to struggle, and to struggle is to succeed, sooner or later.

"Imagine operatives or laborers of average capacity leaving work at half past four; they are liable to meet those whose good opinion is worth everything to them, and they think that a neat personal appearance is positively necessary; and it must be confessed that, while fine clothes do not make a man, we all look at them as a certain sort of index to his character.

"Men who are governed only by their pride are low indeed; but those who have no pride at all are

very much lower. We must take human nature as we find it; hoping and believing that the era of personal display will be succeeded by one of mental and moral accomplishment. A valuable point has been gained in pushing the man into a position where he is made to feel the imperative necessity of dress, and for this he will struggle. An operative running from the shop in the evening tired, hungry, and unwashed, has not time to be ashamed of his personal appearance; and our modern laborer passing through the streets at six has not time and strength enough; but the improvement which has been made in the personal appearance of ten-hour laborers, over those of the twelve and fourteen-hour system, is suggestive of what two hours more of leisure may soon accomplish."[1]

The increased importance of large corporations and capitalistic organizations after the Civil War suggested future segregation of economic classes into employers and employees, capitalists and laborers. The growing wage consciousness was apparent in the alignment of laborers and farmers in an aggressive campaign against large scale production and monopoly interests arising out of industrial combinations on a national scale. The laborers and the farmers were still in a large measure members of the same social class. Like the capitalists them-

[1] Commons and Sumner, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, vol. ix, pp. 292–293.

selves they belonged socially to the European middle class, the discriminations ensuing in America being due solely to an economic determinism having its roots for the most part in the economic opportunities which the New World afforded to those possessing the characteristics, physical, mental, and moral, which were most conducive to success in the struggle for economic survival. The northern European immigrants as distinguished from the southern European immigrants were Germans and Irish with a liberal sprinkling of English and French. The military system of Germany and the system of tenancy in Ireland drove many refugees to America. The higher wages offered in comparison with those obtainable in Europe brought many others. It is true that to get a foothold in America they were forced to underbid their predecessors, but since most of the American workingmen had emigrated from northern Europe within a few previous decades, and both groups had somewhat the same social inheritance, it did not seem beside the mark to Steward to win over the newcomers to the standards of living of their fellow workingmen whose arrival in America had been less recent. Many of the newcomers were not craftsmen. In fact, on their arrival they took the places made for the unskilled by the introduction of machinery. The competition between the unskilled and the skilled could be reduced in two ways: first, by creating a demand

for the same wages on the part of both so that there would be no advantage to the employer in employing inferior workmen; second, by segregating the skilled jobs from the unskilled, and through successful trade union action by preventing a further invasion by the unskilled into the territory of the skilled. The latter method claimed the attention of trade union activities in the eighties; the sixties and seventies demonstrated attempts made to amalgamate the two forces into an aggressive unit. The discouragements met in the field of industrial action emphasized the need of, and afforded the stimulation for a campaign for shorter hours. That the eight-hour movement should have been associated closely with the philosophy of higher standards of living in America is not surprising. A belief that "all men are born free and equal" was based on the conviction that existing social inequalities had arisen from unfair economic advantages, granted or usurped, or possessed without effort, and as a result of the development of the country.

Indeed, the impetus given to increased standards of living by the shortening of hours of work would be far-reaching, and would not stop short of a complete elimination of the profit system. Such was Ira Steward's doctrine. "Some children drop their playthings sooner than others, and the amusements of later years last certain minds longer than others; but so thoroughly aroused am I to the necessity of

something for every human being to enjoy, that I cry out reverently 'God bless every baby pleased with a rattle.' Tempt every producer of wealth then, by theaters, concerts, fine clothes, stories; and the leisure to enjoy, and the higher wages necessary to support them will, by wiser fellows, be used to study political economy, social science, the sanitary condition of the people, the prevention of crime, women's wages, war, and the ten thousand schemes with which our age teems for the amelioration of the condition of man . . ." With increasing wants, and increasing intelligence, "the producer and the consumer will come together more frequently and stay longer, and the knowledge they will exchange will commence melting and dividing between them the profits of capital. The capitalist, as we now understand him, is to pass away with the kings and royalties of the past."[1]

The philosophy of Ira Steward — that wages depended upon the standard of living — fell on fertile soil. From its origin to the present time it has been accepted by the labor ranks as one of the important factors in the determination of wages.

It is true that labor is primarily interested in the immigration policy of the country in so far as it threatens to increase the supply of workers and to lower wages, but its members point to the fact

[1] Commons and Sumner, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, vol. ix, pp. 294, 300.

repeatedly that the present-day immigrants differ from those of an earlier industrial period in that they embrace lower standards of living. The standards of life of the southern and eastern European are below those accepted in America as minimum standards of health and decency. For this reason their numbers should be restricted as a protection of an enlightened citizenship.

CHAPTER VII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN SOCIAL STANDARDS

Two forces which entered early into the development of American standards of living gave them a bent somewhat different from European standards. These were the rich unexploited economic resources of the country, and the early democratization of education. The one offered untold possibilities in that all had an equal, or nearly equal, chance of profiting by the development of the country, for the land and its raw products were the chief source of wealth, and they seemed apparently without limit to those not unwilling to invade the wilderness.

The democratization of education — one of the demands of organized labor during the first half of the nineteenth century — gave promise of a new social order in which social gradations could not rest wholly or in part on cultural advantages. The children of the workingman were to enjoy equal educational advantages with the children of the rich if labor's legislative program did not miscarry.

There was a tendency in Europe for class lines to be so sharply drawn as to suggest caste barriers, which were transmitted from one generation to

another as a social inheritance. The upper classes were the landed folk. They were the educated folk as well; while the working people were the poor and the ignorant. Thus education itself erected a social barrier between the rich and the poor; between the successful and the unsuccessful. And with this state of affairs established, a justification for the existing distribution of wealth was readily found in the world of human achievement, for the people of wealth and leisure were the only ones who possessed the requisite training for the higher professions.

In America there were vast areas of unexploited wealth. With the acceptance of the theory of the equal right of all to an education, there loomed on the labor horizon the future possibility of a social democracy in America. That the higher social classes could be effectively entrenched as in Europe seemed improbable. It was not long before concern was felt, however, over the growing inequalities of wealth brought about, in part, by the extension of the markets. Labor, then, planned an active campaign against all middlemen and financial promoters.

New business opportunities initiated a period of financial speculation in the thirties and again in the fifties. The appearance of the middlemen and the rapid increase in land values gave an added momentum to the struggle for a share in the wealth of the country. Class barriers were but temporary, for

the laborer of today often became the capitalist of tomorrow. The social importance of the wide diffusion of the existing wealth cannot be overemphasized, for it created unique social conditions which elicited comments from European travelers unaccustomed to finding the lowly transferred to high places in society and carrying with them habits of life inherited from the lower social classes.

Describing social conditions later, Rhodes says, "When we come to consider society in the narrower sense given to the word, we find we must study it as something distinct from the great throbbing life of the American people of 1850–60. New York, whose 'upper ten thousand' have been described by N. P. Willis and Charles Astor Bristed, furnished the example. Bristed introduces us into what is a curious world, when we reflect that he writes of the United States of 1850–52. While his sketches show a touch of caricature, they represent well enough the life of a fashionable set of New York City. We see men working hard to get money for their personal enjoyment; idlers who have come into a fortune; pretty and stylish girls; women who preside gracefully at table and converse with wit and intelligence. Bristed takes us among men whose sole aim in life seemed to be to make a lucky hit in stock speculation; to compound a sherry cobbler; to be apt in bar-room repartee; to drink the best brands of claret and champagne, and to expatiate on them in a

knowing manner; to drive a fast horse; to dance well, and to dress in the latest fashion."[1]

The desirability of exclusiveness in order to emphasize the social contrasts that wealth ownership implied was not overlooked. "N. P. Willis's chapter on 'Manners at Watering Places' would read oddly enough if set forth by a similar adviser of the fashionable world of our time. People of reserve, who wished for no other than their city acquaintances, were termed 'absolute exclusives' and counseled to have a summer resort of their own. For the very purpose of most in going to Saratoga and Newport in the gay season was to make new acquaintances. Yet care should be taken to avoid too great promiscuity in social intercourse. . . . Respectability and fairly good manners were of course requisite, but, these being presupposed, the important qualification was wealth. 'Wealth,' wrote George William Curtis, 'will socially befriend a man at Newport or Saratoga better than at any similar spot in the world.' "[2]

During the period following the Civil War large scale industry became conspicuous. The small business man felt keenly the competition of the larger business organizations which were able to take advantage of growing markets, and labor became increasingly conscious of its growing weakness in

[1] Rhodes, J. F., *History of the United States*, vol. iii, pp. 75–76.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78.

bargaining because of the substitution of machinery for the skilled worker, and the introduction of the southern European as an entering wedge in the undermining of collective bargaining power. Wealth increased rapidly, but with its increase went a growing concentration of its ownership. That discontent was not more apparent was due to the fact that wealth increased faster than its concentration, and the West still offered opportunities to those possessed of the pioneer spirit. The increase of corporate business was not alone responsible for large individual fortunes, for land values increased rapidly, especially in communities which developed into industrial centers. The cities of Boston, New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia grew rapidly in size in the era just preceding the Civil War and continued to be increasingly important as centers of trade, and many a family of humble origin and of decidedly limited business ability and experience found itself elevated as if by magic to the class of the well-to-do, if not to that of the extremely wealthy, through the increase of land values.

Even the farming population came in for its share. Increasing wealth, attributed generally to the fertility of soil and crop possibilities, had its source in the sale of agricultural lands whose increased value was due to immigrants from northern Europe. They either created a market for farm lands, or for the products of the land.

Describing the period of the Civil War in the South, Rhodes says, "Trade and manufactures afforded apparently rich returns. It was said that the war had stimulated business. Tradesmen increased their sales and profits; mechanics had never been better paid. The hotels in Richmond were crowded; it was said that the proprietor of one of them could make a fortune in six months. Freemantle found 'both the great hotels' in Charleston full to excess. Men were 'making money very rapidly'; those who had been poor were getting rich. It is a time of accumulation of fortunes, declared a preacher on a 'national fast day.' 'Huge estates have been acquired within the space of one and two years in many instances by those whom the war found in the shades and shackles of insolvency.' . . . Town lots sold in Richmond at 'fabulous prices' and the 'land fever' induced men to purchase old worn-out Virginia farms. Dividends of banks, insurance companies, and railroads ran according to published notices in the newspapers from six to twenty per cent per annum, but popular belief attributed to them greater profits."[1]

Possession of wealth in America lacked stability. Where so much speculation existed financial reverses were bound to follow; and the panics made bankrupts and shattered the expectations of many. The ever-present possibilities of wealth with the opening

[1] Rhodes, J. F., *History of the United States*, vol. v, pp. 421–422.

up of new mines in the West, the development of new transportation facilities, and the introduction of more profitable industrial methods spurred men on to greater industrial efforts.

Thus in a new country social values became as unstable as economic ones. Inherited wealth was the exception rather than the rule. The *rich* were the product of the existing generation, and their names lacked that compelling social recognition that most wealth in Europe enjoyed. The latter being largely inherited wealth, the inherited name carried with it the universal knowledge of social prestige. Not so in America. Wealth being in most instances newly acquired there was need on the part of its owners not only for changing their habits of life in conformity with the standards of living of their social superiors, but there still persisted the necessity of commanding the social recognition due their new economic status. No opportunity was lost to flaunt before the public eye the newly acquired wealth. Hence America's socially ambitious accentuated their financial standing by a conspicuous display of material wealth. Appearances alone were the only safe criterion of human social values; especially was this true in the western sections of the country where land was still cheap and hence a poor criterion of wealth ownership. Consequently, the personal display of wealth became generally recognized by European observers as an essentially American

institution. This was not wholly correct, for material standards were a European inheritance. European aristocracy has always shown a tendency to emphasize its social superiority by a display of conspicuous paraphernalia. It was in this respect that the successful merchant class first imitated its social superiors. What must be claimed as American is the transposition of the two standards of social value by giving to material wealth the importance Europe attached to the land. Land in Europe was not only scarce, and hence valuable, but the landed estates were kept intact where possible because upon their ownership rested the importance attached to inherited social titles.

In America land was free if one would but push toward the frontier. It was a free gift of nature, and its ownership did not carry with it social prestige. Even if land had been sufficiently scarce at the beginning to preclude its wide diffusion, its ownership would still have fallen to men without enviable social background. They would have been tillers of the soil, compelled to wrest a livelihood from it by strenuous physical effort. Nothing short of a system of slavery could have altered this fact.

In Europe, with the advent of the Industrial Revolution, it was industrial wealth which threatened the democratization of the existing social prestige, while in America industrial wealth was at a premium. Land was plentiful, but capital to be applied to the

country's natural resources was scarce. Hence its importance as a criterion of wealth ownership; and it carried with it a social importance that land could not claim. Little wonder then that material display usurped a place of importance in America's social life. "From a people of plain living, with or without high thinking, the Americans have come to have the most luxurious ideals of modern times in the sense of making the largest outlay for things not necessary for existence. The absence of a society divided by rank, title, and hereditary family leads to a struggle to 'arrive' through a display of money. Ladies at a ball may wear a parure of jewels like that of an Indian maharajah; at a girl's coming-out party, twenty-five thousand dollars may be spent for flowers, decorations, and perishable refreshments; and the wealthy man seeks to express himself through an enormous and costly house; while the great hotels have become the Roman baths of modern American life and vie with their prototypes in the display of marble and bronze."[1] That "all men are born free and equal" seemed daily verified by the special alignment which the economic development of the country brought about. The newly arrived immigrant had at least a fighting chance completely to change a social status which had been fixed for him by European standards. This convinced him of his inherent equality with his

[1] Hart, A. B., *National Ideals Historically Traced,* pp. 194–195.

social superiors when equality was measured in terms of ability. All he needed to demonstrate this fact to society was an economic opportunity. The financially unsuccessful alone were his inferiors in native ability. His theory of equality tended to give way as soon as he himself attained his desired goal. It had served its end as a means of combating transplanted European social standards. This independent, aggressive spirit which protested against social and economic inequalities became more apparent with the disappearance of free lands, and was given oral expression by the Boston mechanic — Ira Steward. He appreciated the dynamic power of social ambition, and knew that in America, at least, when once aroused, it would prove to be a great force in raising wages.

The employers probably recognized this force earlier than the employees. It was far easier to bring into the country laborers of lower standards of living to take the place of the American workmen than to reduce the wages of the latter. Experience had taught them that a reduction of wages even in times of depression meant open conflict with the men, and the defeat of the men did not necessarily imply a final acceptance of the work conditions established. The most to be expected was temporary respite in the conflict. Meanwhile men gathered strength for a renewal of their demands. The immigrants, if wisely selected so as to preclude the possibility of their

getting together as a wage conscious group, promised for the time being industrial peace. Wise selection took into account racial and religious differences. These had to be overcome before the immigrants would accept trade unionism as the issue of paramount importance.

The particular offense the American social standard gave was not caused primarily by its nonconformity to the European standard of social valuation, but rather by the democratization of the American standard to the point of vulgarization. Wealth, in spite of the complaints of the reformers, showed, comparatively speaking, a remarkable degree of diffusion, and the appearance of well-being, even though maintained at the cost of great personal sacrifices, was quite general.

"The Philadelphia World's Fair of 1876 waked Americans up to a knowledge of the possibilities in table service, silver, glass, and furniture, so that luxuries long enjoyed by the favored few and nurtured by foreign travel were suddenly multiplied and sometimes vulgarized. Poor indeed is the American family which does not every day gaze upon its own antique rug (possibly made in Philadelphia), its stained-glass window, and its hand-painted oil picture! Remote the hamlet from which at least one person has not gone forth during the last ten years to stay overnight at the Waldorf-Astoria."[1]

[1] Hart, A. B., *National Ideals Historically Traced*, pp. 191–192.

All arguments in favor of thrift fell on barren soil; in fact, the American people developed a marked tendency to live beyond their means, and by an opportune move to risk the certainties of the present in a fighting chance of winning a share of the increasing wealth values of the future. Additional impetus was given to the democratization of standards by the men whose economic interest lay in the manufacture of consumption goods. Their primary concern was the extension of their markets. Here they found effective allies in the merchant class. Through advertising, the merchant class has extended widely the radius of its sales.

"The incipient wants demand gratification, but the power of adapting means to ends is weak. The tendency is always to react along old lines. Hence the necessity to apply new stimuli to convert the individual to the use of new goods."[1] These stimuli are afforded through advertising.

The primary object of the manufacturer was to reproduce the clothing of the rich in materials of less cost. Durability was no particular object to the socially ambitious, for a season's wear was all that was demanded. Styles changed frequently, and the clothes of the preceding seasons must be remodeled or relegated to the attic, if the owner wished to look as well as his or her neighbor.

[1] Mead, E. F., "Place of Advertising in Modern Business," *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. ix, p. 229.

Goods of expensive quality of material and workmanship had to meet the competition of cheaper goods. The latter often served as effectively the purpose in view as the former, especially if the cheaper product when worn was difficult to distinguish from the expensive goods. High class woolens gave way to shoddy, or goods mixed with cotton; silk within the reach of a moderate purse ceased to be real silk, and yet as far as appearances were concerned — and often serviceability — lost nothing by the substitution.

Competition for markets applied to other articles of consumption as well as to clothing. Silver plating in table service became common. Fine grades of porcelain defied the daintiness of china, and veneering brought high grade furniture — at least in appearance — within the reach of a large number of people.

So skillful were the manufacturers in the practice of the arts of substitution that often the practiced eye was deceived and chemical analysis alone could detect the social fraud. Precious stones, jewelry, rugs, tapestries, furniture, table service, and clothing were alike subject to the imitation of cheaper wares and led to social claims which would at an earlier time have required a considerable outlay of money. The moral influence on the American character was as marked as was the social. Skill in deception had not only great social value, but great economic

value, and became in many instances the goal of a life endeavor.

The financial success of the manufacturer and the merchant often increased the social problems of their wives. With increasing frequency the mistress was humiliated by the appearance of her household servants in costumes rivaling her own in appearance. "It is an outrage," said the president of a western women's club, when the servant problem was the subject under discussion, "that people cannot distinguish the mistress from her maid when on the street," and to this fact may be attributed a part of the growing incorrigibility of the servant class. The social victory of the maid emphasized the problem of her mistress, and is given as one of the causes for the rapid changes of fashion in a country socially the most democratic. The invention of an imitation for the genuine takes time. This fact provides at least a short period of social peace for the scions of industrial wealth. But the American business man possesses the greatest versatility in the world when it comes to the promotion of his business interests, and unconsciously he has become an effective promoter of the doctrine of social equality. Ever on the alert to increase his profits, he has democratized the most cherished insignia of social distinction, namely, the conspicuous display of wealth. When the mistress and maid recognize the fact that the general public cannot readily dis-

tinguish one from the other by their respective personal appearance, the maid at least feels that the distinction is after all somewhat superficial.

It is the American business men engaged in the production and distribution of consumption goods who have helped by the capitalization of their versatility to make a veritable farce of America's leisure class standards of living. The business men are not alone in the promotion of the democratization of standards. Teachers of home economics promote this end when they stress correct usages in household arts. *Correct usages* embody the accepted standards of living of the social *élite*. The teaching of such a code is assisted by careful instruction in household management, demonstrating to the students the highest possible social standards attainable on a definite income by careful scientific management. The cultivation of æsthetic tastes in the purchasing of clothing and house furnishings is, it is true, one of the aims of the instructors, but their success can be measured here also by the degree of imitation attained in the reproduction of the æsthetic tastes of America's social aristocracy.

The knowledge the manufacturer and the merchant attempt to disseminate broadcast is transmitted to the students by the knowing teacher, and the effectiveness of the lessons learned in the household arts is proved when the standards of the wealthy are successfully imitated at a comparatively small

cost. A successful presentation of an appearance indicating an extensive financial outlay when in reality the feat has been accomplished on a surprisingly low income requires no small degree of intelligent application of existing knowledge. Herein lies one of the most appreciable features of scientific management of the home.

The contrast between European and American standards of living is very apparent when the clothes and habits of life and of thought of many of the American tourists are compared with those of Europeans of the same social station. For the most part the European men tend to dress better than their wives. There is an evident fastidiousness about the clothes of men of the upper classes which conveys the impression that time and thought has been lavished upon them, and that their wearers not only do not engage in physical work of any kind, but never have. Even though some of their ancestors were counted among the workers, the present generation takes good care to eradicate the slightest suggestion of a plebeian origin. Indeed, most American men look dowdy by the side of their upper class European cousins, so intent have they been in accumulating wealth for their families to spend.

Standards of dress are not the only difference. Habits of thought are equally out of tune. Many an American family is made unhappy in its inability

to challenge the admiration of Europeans of the upper classes. The American often possesses greater wealth, but its ownership has been of comparatively short duration, so that leisure class habits of mind have not become habitual. The men are often proud of being "self-made." They often boast of the fact that at one time they were a part of the labor ranks, but by force of character, and a little assistance on the part of opportunity, they have forged ahead to positions of wealth and esteem. They are accepted as big men in their home towns, and their wealth is accepted as the real index of their social station.

On the other hand, the upper class European looks upon the newly-rich Americans as social upstarts who justly merit the rebuke of men whose class culture is traditional and not recently acquired. Clearly, they are not of his social world.

The differences between European and American standards of social valuation are more apparent than real, for in the immediate past and at the present time the social aristocracy of Europe as well as the social aristocracy of America were and are recruited from the ranks of the newly rich. But the European social aspirant has an advantage over his American financial peer in that he finds well-established class traditions of standards of conduct and of ideas, which he immediately seeks to adopt.

In addition, the European can repeatedly claim

another advantage over his American brother when entering the higher social class. He generally comes from the so-called middle class, whose members have been effectively schooled for generations in upper class standards of conduct, if not of ideals, so that an adaptation to the higher social standards merely means the fulfillment of a long cherished dream. On the other hand, the comparative freedom of access to the economic opportunities as well as higher social class ranks, in America, has brought into enviable places in the industrial world men whose cultural advantages in their recent past have been most meager.

But the diminishing power of the inherited European aristocracy — political as well as industrial — is reflected in its waning social power. No longer does an unbroken enviable lineage carry with it unquestioned social prestige. The fact that this prestige is repeatedly bartered for newly acquired wealth suggests the possibility that the former loses nothing by the exchange. If this is true, the standards of social valuation of modern industrial Europe and America are not very dissimilar. The discrepancies which exist between them are due to environmental conditions of the past — both social and economic — rather than to inherent present day tendencies.

CHAPTER VIII

THE IMMIGRANT AND HIS STANDARD OF LIVING

Not until there was a marked development of machine industry did the United States reach out for the immigrants of southern Europe to provide her with unskilled workers. Many northern European immigrants had become independent merchants or tradesmen or prosperous business men. Others remained in the trades as skilled artisans and depressed wages temporarily. But the newcomers showed considerable aptness in the adoption of the wage demands made by the well-established artisans.

The northern European immigrants possessed the skill essential to the manning of American industries. With the extension of the markets, however, and the introduction of machinery and the division of labor, they were supplanted in part by the southern Europeans. The latter were unskilled and accustomed to low wages and a meager plane of living. Hence they were comparatively free from the restless discontent characteristic of workers whose standards of living were constantly exceeding their wages. The new class of immigrants superseded the old in the mines and in the mills. Many of the latter

were pushed into the more remunerative fields of work and surrendered to the southern Europeans the invaded industries. In colonial times the scarcity of labor was met in the South by the introduction of the slaves; in the North, by the indentured servants. Neither could be classed as skilled workers, but they met the economic demands of the community, which were primarily agricultural. The Negro, docile by nature, was a slave, and hence had no rights of free citizenship. The indentured servant was within the bounds of the law, for a time at least. With the expiration of their term of service some profited by the economic development of the country and became economically independent. Others undoubtedly became the progenitors of the tramp class.

The process of weeding out the incapables from among the capables went on from the beginning; the capables often being those classified as financially successful, and the incapables those who remained behind in poverty. This much can be said for the classification. The ambitious folk tended to march forward with the procession, seeking greater economic well-being. The indolent were among those who remained behind. Many of them continued to work in industries deserted by artisans of comparatively high standards of living. Their neighborhoods were the slums of rapidly growing cities, and their social outlook hopelessly atrophied. They

lacked the industrial habits of their new fellow workingmen and possessed a standard of living of comparative stability which did not drive them to make increased wage demands.

It is not correct to assume that all those who pushed westward as pioneers possessed qualities of character which make for economic success. President Dwight, of Yale, describes some of them as men who "cannot live in regular society. They are too idle; too talkative; too passionate; too prodigal; and too shiftless to acquire either property or character. They are impatient of the restraints of law, religion, and morality; grumble about the taxes, by which rulers, ministers, and schoolmasters are supported, and complain incessantly, as well as bitterly, of the extortions of mechanics, farmers, merchants, and physicians to whom they are always indebted. At the same time, they are usually possessed, in their own view, of uncommon wisdom, understand medical science, politics, and religion better than those who have studied them through life; and, although they manage their own concerns worse than any other men, feel perfectly satisfied that they could manage those of the nation far better than the agents to whom they are committed by the public. After displaying their own talents and worth; after censuring the weakness and wickedness of their superiors; after exposing the injustice of the community in neglecting to invest persons of such merit

with public offices, in many an eloquent harangue uttered by many a kitchen fire, in every blacksmith's shop, and in every corner of the streets, and finding all their efforts in vain, they become at length discouraged; and under the pressure of poverty, the fear of a gaol, and the consciousness of public contempt, leave their native places, and betake themselves to the wilderness."

The northern European workingmen had little to look forward to except the opportunities offered them through emigration to a distant land. To emigrate often necessitated the breaking of all national ties; but when once on American soil the newcomers were made conscious of the call of the western frontier. It offered an outlet for the restless and discontented. But conditions in America changed within a few generations. The frontier disappeared, and efforts of America's industries were directed to attracting to their workshops peoples representing almost static civilizations, for these remained deaf to the spirit of American restlessness which took the form of a great zeal for justice in the distribution of the economic wealth of the country.

The northern Europeans on reaching America found industrial opportunities which were closed before the tardy southern Europeans arrived. The latter were forced by environing circumstances to take their place on the lowest rung of the economic ladder. They were the marginal workers, obtaining

their foothold by underbidding their more intelligent competitors, and they inherited the least America had to give. The northern Europeans were early enough to inherit the best. This fact must not be lost sight of in comparing these two immigrant groups.

Industrial poverty in American cities is often as fatal to social progress as the poverty of the soil of the homeland; for an economic surplus has at all times been essential to promote that wider range of social contacts which creates new visions and ambitions.

Besides their poverty the southern Europeans brought with them a meager social inheritance. As agriculturists they came often from a land of worn-out soils or from mountainous lands deficient in the economic opportunities essential to the stimulation of industry and trade. Says Miss Semple, "Mountain regions discourage the budding of genius because they are areas of isolation, confinement, remote from the great currents of men and ideas that move along the river valleys. They are regions of much labor and little leisure, of poverty today and anxiety for the morrow, of toil-cramped hands and toil-dulled brains. In the fertile alluvial plains are wealth, leisure, contact with many minds, large urban centers where commodities and ideas are exchanged. The two contrasted environments produce directly certain economic and social results,

which, in turn, become the causes of secondary intellectual and artistic effects."[1]

The low standards of living of the southern and eastern European were often the direct result of limited economic resources. Poor soil and an almost static condition of the industrial arts left little surplus over and above a comparatively low plane of living. Where a surplus existed, it was most often taken by the landowners. Under the circumstances there would be a tendency for the working people to develop the characteristics of nonresistance to oppression, so hopeless was the future. And as long as they could be shielded from those stimulating influences which create wants and discontent with the *status quo*, they would prove a real asset in the lowering of the cost of production when they came into competition with workers cherishing comparatively high standards of living.

This contrast between types of workers is brought out clearly by Professor Phillips in his description of labor conditions in the South during the country's early development. The Negroes, he tells us, really proved financially more profitable than the northern Europeans, especially the Irish with whom they competed, although the output per day of the latter far exceeded that of their enslaved competitors.

The economic advantage in the employment of the Negroes lay in their acceptance of their position, while

[1] Semple, Ellen C., *Influence of Geographical Environment*, p. 20.

the Irish laborers lost no opportunity to better theirs. To promote this end the Irish laborers struck for better wages and work conditions at the most inopportune time for their employers. When the crops were ready to be harvested, and delay meant financial loss to the owners, the Irishmen threatened to stop work if their demands were not conceded. The Negroes, on the other hand, could be counted on at all times to be amenable to the discipline of their owners.[1]

The wages of the southern European were often lower than their low efficiency warranted. It is generally supposed that they were, on experiment, found to fit more adequately the industrial conditions than did the workers they superseded. When this was not true, industry adapted itself to the new labor force so as to utilize it to the greatest economic advantage. To train the southern European workingmen in skill would have taken time. It was far simpler to adapt machinery to their mental and physical limitations. The place of the southern European in the coal industry is aptly described by Roberts. "These peoples furnished the cheap labor needed in the development of the thinner veins of coal, and supplied the operators with men willing to work under conditions which labor of a higher grade resented."[2]

Applying this premise to industry as a whole,

[1] Commons, J. R., *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, vol. ii, p. 181.

[2] Roberts, Peter, *The Anthracite Coal Communities*, p. 13.

it would be equally true to say that Latin and Slavic immigration furnished the cheap labor needed in the development of the cheaper markets of the community, the benefits of which profited the consumer perhaps more than the producer and made possible the realization of a higher standard of living. The best example of such an instance is afforded by the women's clothing industry. So low became the consumer's prices that it no longer paid the housewife to stitch her own garments. Sweatshop methods of production were far too cheap to entice her to apply her labor so unremuneratively. She accepted the condition as one more instance where the factory invaded the home and took out of it one of its inherited industries.

The standard of living of these low-cost workers was originally a rural one, thwarted in its development by the poverty of the surrounding resources. Thus a stratification of wants ensued and endangered the natural virility of the population, if it did not actually destroy it. In fact, the stimulation of new wants among these people at times presented as great a problem as a low wage. Social workers often find that their greatest task is to teach the southern European to live better. While their wages may be too low for the maintenance of an American standard of living, on the other hand, a wider and higher range of wants prompts them to demand increased incomes.

American labor, appreciating the influence of standards of living on wages, accepted Ira Steward's solution as the only alternative when the southern European refused to demand labor-union standards of work conditions. The eight-hour work day movement received its greatest impetus from the competition of the southern European standards of living, and it was thought that through the medium of increased wants the wage demands of the unskilled would be made equal to those of the skilled workers they had displaced by the successful application of machinery and the division of labor.

Segregated groups of southern Europeans in New York City, in Chicago, and in the vicinity of Pittsburgh have offered fertile fields of investigation for students interested in the social side of America's industries. The wages without exception have been found to be miserably low, — too low to allow for the realization of accepted American standards of living, — yet affording a surplus beyond the actual needs they recognized or appreciated.

"Poverty," says J. A. Hobson, "is the difference between the number of felt wants and the power to satisfy them." Wants in the sense of a higher plane of living were not common, but the desire for land seems to have outstripped all other wants beyond those which deal directly with the physical needs of man. Wherever possible savings have been invested in a piece of land. The exorbitant

land values in the heart of a large metropolis are prohibitive of ownership to the poor. Many southern Europeans have been induced to buy land in the less congested districts of the city or in rural communities. Others have invested their savings in their old home communities in Europe. But in addition to those who have made investments in land in one place or another, there are many immigrants in the heart of our industrial centers who seem to have lost their old social moorings. They grope in the darkness for some tangible expression of their economic surplus. In so doing they fall back on their primitive proclivity for personal adornment and emotional stimulation. The advocates of higher wages are often met by the employers' assertion that higher wages will mean a greater outlay in movies and pool rooms, and these assertions are backed by convincing examples.

The standard of living of these people as expressed in their expenditures tends to be the same as their traditional plane of living, and surplus over and above this becomes easy spoils for the unscrupulous and the designing. When their social ideal expressed in landownership offers possibilities of realization, American standards of living, especially with the first generation of southern European immigrants, make little headway. So well fortified are their standards of social valuation by generations of inheritance that to change them within a decade or

two seems often a hopeless task to men and women interested in "social uplift" work, and leads often to the conclusion that the adult southern European is outside the pale of American social institutions as expressed in standards of living; that the children alone offer possibilities of assimilation.

If the gratification of a large variety of wants is essential to the furthering of mental and social development, the Americanization movement must necessarily meet with most serious obstacles in these foreign standards, but, on the other hand, the latter may contain desirable elements which the American standards of living do not possess. The social importance of individual landownership is continually emphasized by students of social institutions. "A propertyless person," says Hunter, "is one without any economic reserve power. He is in no position to ward off the sufferings which must frequently come to most persons depending wholly upon their ability to labor and upon the demand, in the community, for their services. . . . Security of livelihood in the present state of society comes only with the possession of property."[1]

Professor Ross also advocates individual ownership of property because "property makes for thoughtfulness and steadiness."[1]

Speaking of the Slav in the mining regions of

[1] Hunter, Robert, *Poverty*, p. 46.
[2] Ross, E. A., *Social Psychology*, p. 89.

Pennsylvania and his desire to accumulate property, Roberts says, "Private property is one of the best adjuncts to the preservation of law and order, and a pledge to the state of good citizenship." And also, "a person who can acquire no property can have no other interest but to work as little and consume as much as possible."[1]

The purchase of a home often involves sacrifices which to the Slav are of little relative significance. For instance, "some may object to the Slav's way of eating — a plain table, agate utensils, and a pocket knife. A tablecloth of fine linen, imported crockery, silver knives and forks, etc., certainly aid the appetite, but if, according to Richet, we impair our health by eating too much, why intensify the evil? But fashion? Yes, that is the nemesis — the tyranny of fashion; inexorable rivalry among the working classes, who imitate in a shallow manner the rich in house, clothing, and diet."[2]

Miss Byington, in her excellent study of the households of the steel workers at Homestead, presents similar conditions from a different point of view. The nationality of the workers observed was the same in both cases, and the industrial groups were in close proximity. "Undue economy," she concludes, "may result in the lowering of more than purely physical standards. It may also interfere

[1] Roberts, Peter, *Anthracite Coal Communities*, pp. 43, 124.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 109–110.

with the development of social standards. We are all imitators, and the inability to have what others have, even when the absence of the thing is not in itself a privation, reacts on the individual life by lessening the sense of self-respect and social standing."[1]

There is a large element of truth in both points of view. An exclusive adherence to one standard or the other means undoubtedly some social loss. Material expenditures whose object is solely a desire for reputability arising out of an effective imitation of the recognized higher social classes have little value in themselves, but they undoubtedly bring in their wake experiences of a broadening and liberalizing character, especially when they tend to establish a social equality. This social equality — nominal rather than real — offers an effective stepping stone to an equality in intellectual training brought about only after years of effort.

In their native land expenditures for conspicuous consumption did not promote social equality, but rather invited ridicule, unless the expenditures made were in conformity with their class status; their class status depended upon wealth ownership as expressed in land holdings.

The Slavic social standard has often proved a bulwark in the retention of an American social

[1] Byington, M. F., *Homestead, the Households of a Mill Town*, pp. 84–85.

status when the latter is finally adopted. "The person without property is always in danger of drifting downward in the social scale. . . . In case of continued illness, of serious accident, of death or other disaster, the propertyless must appeal to charity for support. The humiliation resulting from such an appeal almost inevitably tends toward a loss of self-respect, a weakening of the moral fiber and, in many cases, to pauperization. Property, then, under present conditions, is not only the price of progress, but the price of security."[1]

The ownership of property has meant at times more than this. The men who have invested their surplus in property have been in a position to educate their children. The children of foreign-born rural populations are found in large numbers in the classrooms of our colleges. The enrollment of children of foreign parents as students in the universities of Wisconsin and of Minnesota, for instance, gives rise to the question as to the whereabouts of many of the children of native Americans. On investigation it will be found that many of them, in order to maintain their social self-respect, have felt compelled to enter industry when they should be in college.

The ambition to realize the cherished standard of social valuation often leads to economies that are

[1] Ely, Richard T., *Property and Contract in their Relations to the Distribution of Wealth*, vol. i, p. 309.

detrimental to the health and morals of the family. For instance, Miss Byington found at Homestead a helper at one of the open-hearth furnaces who had been there for seven years. He was earning $2.50 to $3 a day. The family took in two boarders. With their two children there were six people in a scantily furnished two-room house, thus violating housing standards based on the demands of healthful living. There was a bank account at the same time of at least $400. Another Slav, the head of a family of three, who had been in this country ten years, earned in good times $6 a day. The family lived in a two-room house. It was neat and from their standpoint probably seemed large enough as they had no lodger. They had purchased a farm in the old country and besides had a $500 bank account.[1]

Unwise economies are often practiced among native-born workingmen's families with cherished industrial standards of living, as well as among the foreign population with their rural standards. The necessities of life are at times sacrificed to allow a higher standard of dress than is advisable. In fact, among the poor of American birth real poverty is often more apparent than real poverty among foreigners who receive a like income. This is due, without doubt, to a greater emphasis placed on personal appearance rather than upon physical

[1] Byington, M. F., *Homestead, the Households of a Mill Town*, p. 153.

comfort and well-being. That more instances are not called to our attention by social workers may be due to the fact that American workingmen, considering such matters of personal import, respond less readily than do foreign born to requests for information as to incomes and expenditures. Then, too, American workingmen are not found in large numbers in the lowest paid industries. When family budgets of the higher income groups have been obtained, they show a greater tendency to emphasize the importance of clothing than do the family budgets of the southern Europeans of the same income groups. The self-respect, which increases with financial well-being, is expressed by the American-born workingman in a higher expenditure for clothing.

While rural standards persist with apparent tenacity in isolated national groups, these are at times successfully invaded by the energetic business man ever on the outlook for the extension of his market. Where his agents are not found, the mail order catalogue is, and it plays no small part in breaking down well-established customs and traditions of expenditure.

"In their own homes," says Miss Byington, "the women quickly adopt the machine-made cotton wrappers, and on Sunday the streets blossom with cheap ready-made adornments. I was fairly startled by one apparition in a gay pink hat, crude blue skirt,

and green silk waist that no grass in Homestead could hope to vie with, all products of a department store, which evidently gave the wearer a proud sense of being dressed like other Americans. As I stood Easter Sunday watching the kneeling women, the mass of vivid colors showed how easily they copy the less desirable habits of their native-born sisters."[1]

No traditional social standard can long persist when in constant contact with strange social standards, especially when the latter alone command the much-desired social prestige. The new will be readily substituted for the old unless there exist forces within the community — either social or economic — which prevent social and industrial contacts between people upholding different standards of social valuation.

The accusation has been repeatedly made against employers that they deliberately encourage, at times, the retention of foreign standards of living on the part of the low-paid workers. They house the latter some distance from the homes of the American-born workers, and surround them as far as possible with environmental conditions which discourage social contacts between them and the workingmen of higher social standards of living. A like segregation is maintained in the workshops. The employers' object is to keep out of the foreign groups

[1] Byington, M. F., *Homestead, the Households of a Mill Town*, pp. 150–151.

those American industrial and social elements which breed discontent and result in collective demands for higher wages and better working conditions.

Were this accusation which is made against employers wholly without foundation, there would still persist a social segregation resulting at times in complete isolation. The consciousness on the part of the workingmen and their families of the wide differences existing between their respective social standards of living would tend to establish different social groups and lead to the exclusion of those whose habits of life were foreign to each group. *Like* not only attracts *like*, but shows an aversion to the strange and the unfamiliar. This is especially true when the standard of living upheld by another group is looked upon as an inferior social one.

Divergences in income alone might be responsible for an alignment into different social classes, for social class lines are drawn as stringently among the lower social strata as among the higher. In fact, greater care in social discrimination is exercised in proportion to the existing social insecurity; for only those individuals fairly secure in their social position feel that they can take chances in a more or less indiscriminate social intercourse. The exacting social code of the workers, which ranges them in definitely graded social groups with their, at times, impeding barriers, thwarts that democratization of standards of living which alone creates that consciousness of

kind which is essential to working-class industrial solidarity. The "hunkies" in the steel mills of Homestead are socially despised by the American-born workingmen. It is not a racial antagonism as much as a social one based on differences of economic status. The "hunky" is the unskilled low-paid worker; the American-born is the skilled worker with a higher wage-bargaining ability.

The social distinctions in the steel mills are similar to those existing in the mines and in the factories, and they illustrate a human desire to excel, or at least to equal others in reputability. One of the democratizing forces among them is the leveling down tendency of the well-organized capitalistic forces; that is, the tendency so to subdivide the work in industries as to create a comparatively smaller demand for skilled workers, and at the same time to increase the number of workers employed who are either semiskilled or unskilled. This capitalistic policy leads the workers to attempt the breaking down of all barriers which prove obstacles to the economic organization of those on a lower competitive plane, who by force of numbers threaten the standards of living of all.

There are other influences which are more powerful in their Americanizing tendencies than the labor organizations. These are the public schools, social settlements, free libraries, and recreational activities, such as public parks, playgrounds, and swimming

pools. In addition there are the moving picture shows, advertisements, and the daily press.

The social influence of the school and the settlement loses some of its value for want of social contrast. The tendency of the people belonging to the same economic class, or, as in the congested districts of our large cities, belonging to the same national group of immigrants, to live in the same neighborhood, shuts out, to a degree, social conflicts between customs and traditions — social conflicts which result generally in a mutual assimilation. The inspirational force of the greatest import in bringing about changes in the social point of view is probably the teaching staff or the corps of settlement workers. Yet, often between the latter and their pupils and neighbors exists a social gulf too great to bridge. The associations made are largely those of recognized superiors and inferiors, and are without that mutual understanding of differences of points of view which would probably exist if the social differences between them were less marked. The benefits derived from such associations by the so-called "inferiors" come about through imitation of their social superiors along lines within their understanding. For instance, the young teacher with her pretty clothes is the model of her pupils. If she is "stylish," she meets with the admiring glances of approval from her young disciples, while the "plain" teacher with a practical

sense of social values and wholesome sympathies is loved and reverenced for her knowledge, an appreciation of which is beyond their mental grasp. The children's social ratings do not differ fundamentally from those of their parents or of their respective neighborhoods. These ratings rest on a tangible basis and do not as a whole include intellectual elements when not given expression in some spectacular form. The "stylish" teacher gives expression to their primitive instinct for personal adornment. To the older group of admirers she gives tangible expression in their minds to desirable social distinctions. She undoubtedly helps to destroy the tyranny of an inherited social standard of living which is un-American and develops habits of thought in conformity with an American one.

The immediate result undoubtedly is an indiscriminate imitation of the habits of expenditure of those social superiors who express their status in conspicuous and expensive clothing. The relative success in imitation is of a varying degree. In fact, in but few instances is the prototype suggested in the new apparition, so crudely is the copy made. But the social import of the material display of spending power is grasped with avidity, and with a confidence which betrays no lack of appreciation of the importance of American standards of living.

On the other hand, the intellectual attainments of the teacher or the settlement worker fall on

barren soil. We get a hint of this fact in the autobiographical sketch of a working girl in *The Long Day*. "Please, Mr. or Mrs. Philanthropist," she says, "don't let it be Shakespeare, or Ruskin, or Walter Pater! Philanthropists have tried before to reform degraded literary tastes with heroic treatment, and they have failed every time. That is sometimes the trouble with college settlement folk. They forget that Shakespeare and Ruskin, and all the rest of the really true and great literary crew, are infinite bores to everyday people. I know personally, and love deeply and sincerely, a certain young woman — a settlement worker — who for several years conducted an evening class in literature for some girls, pants-makers. She gave them all the classics in allopathic doses; she gave them copies of *The Crown of Wild Olive* and *The Ethics of the Dust*, which they read dutifully, not because they liked the books, which were meaningless to the tired heads, but because they loved Miss —— and enjoyed the evening spent with her at the settlement."[1]

The social worker who attempts to develop in the minds of the dwellers in the tenement districts a sense of discrimination in the values of material things so as to promote their physical well-being, often meets with discouraging results. White stockings and white shoes, none too clean, trip after the

[1] Richardson, *The Long Day*, pp. 300–301.

baby carriage — a paragon of useless extravagance in ribbons and lace. The vehicle itself is by no means a poor imitation of a Riverside Drive perambulator. At the same time the larder is sadly in need of replenishing. The situation is met by the social worker sympathetically, for to condemn the apparently wasteful expenditures without offering an effective substitute for the expression of their sense of social valuation would immediately erect a barrier of misunderstanding not easily removed.

The problem of raising the standards of living of the poor by making additions to their customary expenditures is not a very difficult one provided the family income is sufficient to warrant the additional outlay. But when the standards of living must be raised by the elimination of commodities which seem to the outsider to be the least essential when measured in terms of physical well-being, the problem assumes a complex form. The social standards of living are here seen in direct conflict with those economic standards of living which best promote the well-being of the family.

It is a common practice among people whose social standing is in question because their incomes force them to skirt closely the outer fringe of the standards of consumption of their class, to dispense with those elements in consumption which are most essential to their healthful living, and to cling tenaciously to those items of expense which are closely associated

with social prestige. On the other hand, if the decreased earning power of a people were met by an intelligent elimination of those expenditures least essential to physical well-being, the social loss sustained might be of less importance than the physical losses previously described, unless the change in habits of consumption were purely temporary and general to meet an unusual emergency, such as a period of industrial crises or war conditions. No social loss might be experienced under these circumstances.

To dispense with the social factors in the consumption of products may bring about in time a lethargic social condition among the lower social classes, such as is characteristic of many European communities. Social progress would be effectively checked unless a new incentive for struggle was injected into the ideals of the people. The new incentive must come from the social classes above, who must be the first to lower decidedly their expenditures for display and to adopt a criterion of social value representative of a higher intellectual plane.

The peasantry of Europe before the World War were apparently so indifferent to the spur of social ambition as to have elicited the opinion often expressed that nothing short of a great war could stir them out of their state of social indifference. The ordinary avenues of social contact and social con-

trast through which modern nations received their social and economic stimulations seemed lacking. Hence the conclusion that war alone could break down the seemingly impregnable social barriers received considerable support.

Whatever social standards of living the community accepts, the members must entertain some hope of attaining them or the struggle to excel ceases. It is then that the community becomes a retrogressive one. Herein lies the importance of keeping the different economic classes sufficiently astir so as to prevent the loss of social ambition which makes possible a progressive evolution of the group.

CHAPTER IX

WAGES AND STANDARDS OF LIVING

The United States Department of Labor conducted an investigation covering the period of 1900 to 1902 to determine the incomes and expenditures of a typical group of American wage earners. No attempt was made to establish a scientific minimum subsistence level to ascertain the physical and moral effects of the plane of living common among the workers. Later budgetary studies were made with the purpose of presenting to the public pictures of the living conditions of workingmen's families and demonstrating the inadequacy of the family income to meet the generally recognized necessities of life.

Mrs. L. B. More was one of the early pioneers in this field of work in America. Her investigation included the families in the immediate neighborhood of the Greenwich Village Settlement House in New York City and extended over the period of 1903 to 1905. She estimated that a minimum income of $728 per annum for a family of five — man, wife, and three dependent children — was necessary for a subsistence. But not until 1907 was a scientific investigation made which was accepted by social

statisticians as a basis for estimates of the increased cost of living. Dr. R. C. Chapin's study of the budgets of 600 families in New York City led him to set as a minimum subsistence an annual income of $825 for the normal family of five individuals.

Numerous budgetary investigations followed in fairly rapid succession, covering different localities in the country. One of these, made in 1909–1910 in the Stock Yards District in Chicago, by J. C. Kennedy and others of the University of Chicago Settlement, established conclusions similar to those reached by Dr. Chapin. The apparent difference in the sums held to be essential for decent and healthful living can be explained on the basis of the differences in the cost of living in the two localities covered. Then, too, Mr. Kennedy and his associates made no allowance for those necessary expenditures which do not come under the classification of food, clothing, and housing. "If we allow $66.38 per year to cover all these items, the necessary minimum expenditure for each family of five would be $800,"[1] says Mr. Kennedy.

These earlier budgetary investigations were confined to the families of workingmen of the low income group, and were made up for the most part of men — usually foreigners — who are classed as semiskilled or unskilled. They were the workers, for the most part, who had been adapted to the

[1] Kennedy, J. C., and others, *Wages and Family Budgets.*

processes of division of labor and machinery. Their numbers, due to immigration, were sufficiently in excess of the demand for their services to keep their wages on a low level. On the other hand, their standards of living were low when measured in terms of American dietary habits, mode of dressing, and an accepted decency standard of housing. This fact militated against any class conscious movement at the time to better their living conditions — conditions which were not inconsistent with the standard cherished when living in their native lands. The budgetary studies were made for the purpose of calling the attention of the public to an existing social condition of living inimical to the community's welfare.

Undoubtedly those social agencies which sought to stir the apathy of the immigrant workers toward their living conditions, as well as to arouse public indignation and concern over the fact that such living conditions were allowed to exist in the country, helped to bring about an attitude of mind conducive to a reform. At any rate, when the World War shut off immigration and created a great and sudden demand for the increase of American products, the workingmen were not slow to take advantage of their new and increased bargaining power. Strikes became common.

When the United States entered into the World War, the struggle between the employers and their

employees became of national importance. The country could ill afford to have production checked while the men and their employers were disputing the rate of wages to be paid. As a consequence, strikes and lockouts were frowned upon as unpatriotic conduct in the face of the country's need, and in their stead were substituted conciliation boards. National, state, and municipal governments all took a hand in trying to adjust the new wage scales with increased expediency.

The workingmen claimed that the employers were making large profits in war industries while the increased cost of living brought the workingmen's plane of living below health and decency levels. Where this was not true, there was a decided lowering of the plane of living of workingmen who, through collective agreements, had been able to realize standards in their immediate past considerably above the minimum subsistence level.

In some cases there was actually a distressing loss in income on the part of the wage earners. Their increase in wages did not keep pace with the increase of general prices, and the deficits in the family budgets had to be met by drawing on savings accounts, by working overtime, or by sending into industry members of the family formerly unemployed.

To meet this charge the government carried on numerous investigations to determine the increased cost of living in different communities as a means

of fixing new wage levels in the war industries. The minimum subsistence level set by Dr. Chapin in 1907 was translated into the price terms of 1918. The War Labor Board concluded that in 1918 "Professor Chapin's budget would have cost $1390, and the budget of the New York Investigating Commission would have cost $1360. Independently, at this time also, a minimum subsistence budget was drawn up from data from 600 family budgets collected by the U. S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics, which set the minimum-of-subsistence budget at $1380. Still another method of estimating a minimum living was also used. It was found in New York in June, 1918, that the dietaries which yielded enough calories and grams of protein and which were actually in use, cost approximately $615 for a family of five counted as 3.4 equivalent adult males. As we know that, at the plane of bare subsistence, food costs about 44 per cent of the total budget, it is possible to estimate the total budget. According to this approximation, the minimum living wage would be $1390."[1]

The family income during the war often exceeded this sum, but the gains made over pre-war conditions were the gains of constant and overtime employment. Then, too, the excessive demand for labor in the face of a labor shortage offered opportunities

[1] Ogburn, William F., "Standards of Living as a Basis for Wage Adjustments," *Proceedings* of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, vol. viii, 1919, p. 108.

for constant and overtime employment for all members of the family of working age. Thus the enjoyment of an apparently higher standard of living was real, in spite of the fact that the purchasing power of the principal wage earner had not increased when measured in terms of hourly rates of wages.

Although the wages of the unskilled and semi-skilled before the war were often below the established minimum of subsistence, the wages of the skilled workmen often afforded a surplus. For years they had devoted their attention to the development of their collective bargaining power and looked to this source of strength as a means of bettering their wages and work conditions. Naturally, any interference with the exercise of their bargaining power was looked upon as a perversion of justice. But the exigencies of the war forced organized labor to accept — not without protest — the wartime decree that wage disputes should be submitted to the National War Labor Board or the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board in the war industries.

The only two possible bases for the fixing of the new wage rates seemed to be, first, the relative bargaining strength of the contestants, and second, the customary standard of living of the workingmen concerned when these were above a recognized minimum subsistence level.

The first method, the employers insisted, was out

of the question because of the labor shortage brought about by the conscription of men for war service. The government's concern over price levels prompted it to take a similar attitude. Hence the second method was employed. "Industrial man power was so essential during the war that *laissez-faire* conditions, which involved the freer operation of supply and demand, and the strike and the lockout could not be permitted, and in their place was substituted a strong measure of social control, vested in part in wage settling bodies, such as the National War Labor Board, the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, and the Railroad Wage Commission. With these bodies it can perhaps be truly said, the standard of living was a guiding principle."[1]

With the acceptance of the standard of living of workingmen as the basis for the establishment of minimum wage rates, two problems had to be met. The first was the establishment of standards. Where a minimum subsistence standard was to be fixed, the problem was comparatively simple. But when the wages of skilled and organized men were under consideration, a minimum subsistence standard would have been far below their customary plane of living. This of course would have been wholly unfair to the men. Hence, it was generally accepted that the rates of wages, based on standards of living,

[1] Ogburn, William F., "Standards of Living as a Basis for Wage Adjustments," *Proceedings* of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, vol. viii, 1919.

must rest on the customary standards enjoyed before the war.

What were these customary standards? In the absence of statistical data dealing with the budgets of the better paid workers, attempts were made to glean the facts from the hearings held in all the large industrial centers. The budgets presented by the workers were repeatedly challenged. The estimates made by the employers were likewise considered unfair by the men. The publicity given to the controversies around the wage boards prepared the public for the new classification of standards of living. These were presented by Professor Ogburn as (1) the pauper or charity level, (2) the minimum or bare subsistence level, (3) the minimum comfort level, (4) the reasonably adequate level. This last is called the citizenship and security level. The citizenship and security level is the standard of living organized labor sought to establish in the late eighties. Its interpretation in terms of money incomes depends upon the social standards prevalent at the time in question. It accordingly lends itself to indefinite expansion.[1]

The workers gained in some few instances with the establishment of minimum wage rates. In others there was a decided loss when the new hourly rates were translated into the existing price levels.

[1] Ogburn, William F., "Cost of Living," *The American Labor Year Book*, 1920, pp. 159–160.

Professor Ogburn made a study of wages covering the period from May 15, 1914 to May 15, 1918 in about twelve cities. With very few exceptions real wage rates fell from 9 to 27 per cent.[1]

A somewhat similar study of wages was made by Professor Paul H. Douglas and Frances Lamberson, covering a more extensive period — 1890 to 1918. Their conclusions were that wages did not rise, as generally supposed, but on the contrary fell 20.7 per cent when measured in terms of the purchasing power of an hour's wages.[2]

[1] Ogburn, William F., "Standards of Living as a Basis for Wage Adjustments," *Proceedings* of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, vol. viii, 1919.

Bricklayers'	real wage rates have fallen				.....	21%
Carpenters'	"	"	"	"	"	18%
Cement finishers'	"	"	"	"	"	20%
Granite cutters'	"	"	"	"	"	18%
Hodcarriers'	"	"	"	"	"	9%
Painters'	"	"	"	"	"	14%
Plasterers'	"	"	"	"	"	25%
Plasterer laborers'	"	"	"	"	"	20%
Blacksmiths'	"	"	"	"	risen	5%
Machinists'	"	"	"	"	"	10%
Iron Moulders'	"	"	"	"	"	5%
Plumbers and gas fitters'	"	"	"	"	fallen	20%
Stone cutters'	"	"	"	"	"	18%
Structural iron workers'	"	"	"	"	"	14%
Compositors'	"	"	"	"	"	25%
Electrotypers and stereotypers'	"	"	"	"	"	27%

[2] Douglas, Paul H., and Frances Lamberson, "The Movement of Real Wages, 1890–1918," *American Economic Review*, Sept. 1921.

Dr. I. M. Rubinow concluded for the period 1890–1912 that there was a decline in the purchasing power of hourly wages. "In years of falling or even slowly rising prices, the American wageworker was able to hold his own or to improve his condition to a slight extent. But when confronted with a rapidly rising price movement (accompanied as it was by a violent growth of profits), the American wageworker, notwithstanding his strenuous efforts to adjust wages to these new price conditions, notwithstanding all his strikes, boycotts, and riots, notwithstanding all the picturesque I. W. W.-ism, new unionism, and the modish sabotage, has been losing surely and not even slowly, so that the sum total of economic progress of this country for the last quarter of a century appears to be a loss of from 10 to 15 per cent in his earning power."[1]

Dr. Rubinow admits that in the period covered by his statistical computations the standards of living of the workingmen rose. The increased expenditures these new standards called for were made at the expense of families. There were fewer children to be fed and clothed, thus releasing part of the family income to be spent for some of the comforts and luxuries of life.

Mr. Royal Meeker, formerly United States Commissioner of Labor Statistics, expressed the opinion

[1] Rubinow, I. M., "The Recent Trend of Real Wages," *American Economic Review*, Dec., 1914, p. 813.

that workingmen's families were not living as well in 1918 as they did before the war.[1] The cases in point are those of the railroad workers and the coal miners.

But on the other hand, it was apparent to even the casual observer that many workingmen's families were enjoying the comforts and luxuries of life formerly out of their reach and now clearly pointing to a realization of higher standards of living. That the gains made were the result of overtime employment, constant employment, or employment of members of the family who were not wage earners before the war, the statistical studies of hourly wage rates make clear. On the other hand, when the hourly rate of wages is compared with labor's work output during the periods in question, the results suggest losses not borne by labor alone. "Actual studies in the labor cost of performing standard jobs on certain public utilities show the following labor costs for the period 1915–1919:

1915	$31.67
1916	37.07
1917	45.68
1918	70.72
1919	110.26

The increase in wage rates for these standard jobs between 1915 and 1919 had been 75 per cent, while the increase in total cost had been 248 per cent;

[1] Meeker, Royal, *Monthly Labor Review*, July, 1920, pp. 1–10.

the efficiency in 1919 had decreased almost exactly 50 per cent."[1]

Professor Ogburn's minimum comfort budget for 1918, for man, wife, and three dependent children, called for an annual expenditure of $1760. But in its later application the minimum comfort budget had to be interpreted in terms of the customary standards of living of the workers. These standards differed in the various industrial groups. What was a comfort level for one class of workers was not a comfort level for another. For instance, there was little similarity between the idea of a comfort level cherished by the members of the longshoremen's union and that of the members of the typographical union. The standard of living in each respective group reflected the social standards of the families concerned, and caused considerable discussion between the employers and the employees when new wage adjustments were to be made.

The National Industrial Conference Board, made up of representatives of the leading business organizations of the country, commented on the United States Labor Bureau Report, which fixed the health and decency budget of men in the printing trades at $2,632.68, as follows:

"These minimum comfort budgets have as their common purpose the determination of the cost of an ideal minimum standard of living. They do not

[1] Friday, David, *Profits, Wages and Prices*, pp. 109–110.

represent what workingmen's families are actually spending, but rather set up a standard of what should be spent in order to maintain life at a satisfactory level, regardless of whether the goods and services are locally available or not. There is, therefore, no assurance that families will spend for the items listed the income designated as necessary, or that their standard of living will adjust itself to the new requirements. Designated as 'minimum comfort' or 'minimum health and decency,' they do not set forth the lowest possible standard from which all others are to be graded up, but an average or normal level to which workers may look forward."[1]

The fact that a smaller percentage of income was spent for food and shelter in 1918, and more for clothing and sundries, convinced the National Industrial Board that the workingmen's standards of living rose rather than fell in the period in question.[2]

[1] National Industrial Conference Board, *Family Budgets of American Wage Earners*, p. 48.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

	Increases in expenditures in the United States 1901–1918	*Increases in cost of living in Massachusetts, 1901–1918*
Food	105.8%	151.0%
Shelter	70.9%	43.2%
Clothing	195.8%	151.5%
Fuel and light	116.7%	64.8%
Sundries	205.2%	70.5%
All items	132.2%	108.2%

This shows a difference of 24% between increases in expenditures in the United States and increases in the cost of living in Massachusetts, between 1901 and 1918. Even though the cost of living

The American workingmen insisted they were merely seeking to maintain their customary standard of living and that wage increases were necessary to meet price inflations.

The English workingmen, on the contrary, insisted that their standards of living had changed, and that these changes should be taken into account by the Ministry of Labor in its determination of what constituted the English workingmen's standard of living. The report of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress criticized the Ministry of Labor's retail price index number:

"In the first place it is not based on a recent collection of family budgets. It is admitted by the Department that the 'weights' applied to the different groups of articles included in its 'index number' are calculated upon the results of the inquiry made by the Board of Trade in 1904. The Ministry of Labor, in justifying its use of the 'weights' derived from this inquiry, states that 'between 1904 and 1914 there were almost equal increases on the average in prices and wages,' and it is, therefore, unlikely that these proportions 'would have altered appreciably during that period.'

"We think, however, it is beyond dispute that

in the country as a whole had increased considerably more than in Massachusetts, it is not probable that it approached 132%, which represents increases in expenditures. Since expenditures for living had increased more than the cost of living, it is evident that a higher standard was being maintained in 1918 than in 1901.

since 1904 there have been changes in working-class habits, which have been reflected in the character of working-class expenditure. Even if prices and wages move together there may be a transference of expenditure from one class of things to another. It is undeniable that since 1904 there has been an improvement in the dress of the wage earners and their families. We are also of the opinion that the homes of the workers are, in general, better furnished and equipped than they were in the early years of the twentieth century."[1]

Theoretically the wage rates of the workers in America were based on the standard of living maintained by them in the year 1914. Assuming that this standard could be accurately gauged, the incomes of many workers were far in excess of the incomes of 1914 when measured in terms of purchasing power. The demand for labor was far in excess of the supply. When men worked overtime, and were also constantly employed, their incomes reflected to a considerable degree their actual bargaining power. Never in the history of the American labor movement was there such a large percentage of the workers within the labor union ranks. The ensuing results suggested the application of Professor Hoxie's statement of the law of wages. "Wages of union workmen," he says, "are not determined

[1] Parliamentary Committee Trades Union Congress, *Final Report on the Cost of Living*, p. 16.

automatically by demand and supply, but by a process of bargaining. In determining the outcome of this process of bargaining, the two most important factors are the normal or standard day's work and the standard of living of the workers."[1]

The real test of the standard of living philosophy as a sole wage determinant came in the fixing of the wages of the coal miners and railway workers. It is a well-known fact that wages in neither instance rose with the increase of prices even to the extent common in those industries associated more or less indirectly with the promotion of the war.

In the railway workers' case, the Railway Labor Board refused to grant an increase in wage on the basis of the established health and decency standard of living. The supporting opinion held that "the abstract, elusive thing called a living wage, confessedly based upon a makeshift and a guess, cannot receive the sanction of the board, because it would be utterly impracticable and would not be 'just and reasonable,' as the law commands. The living wage is defined by its proponents before this board as follows: 'A wage which will support a family of five in health and reasonable comfort, such a family being assumed to consist of a husband and wife and three dependent children under sixteen years of age.'

"This constitutes a bit of mellifluous phraseology, well calculated to deceive the unthinking. It has

[1] Hoxie, R. F., *Trade Unionism in the United States*, pp. 11–12.

frequently been demonstrated that a melodious slogan contains more possibilities of danger than a dynamite bomb.

"Furthermore, if the demands of labor were granted the public would have to pay this wage bill, and when we say the public, everybody, rich and poor, is included. A vast percentage of the burden would be passed on to the laboring men and women in other lines of industry in the form of increased living expenses. From the effort to meet such increased expenses there would necessarily result a wide extension of the struggle to raise wages in all other lines of industry, and the disturbance and disorganization of business in general."[1]

The termination of the war brought the expected industrial reaction. Many plants shut down. Others curtailed their output. To the number of unemployed men was added the returned soldiers who insisted that their war services entitled them to first consideration in the apportionment of the available jobs. A slump in wages in many industries followed, and the standard of living philosophy as a basis for the fixing of wage rates was strained to the breaking point. In fact, it was not uncommon for the employers to fall back upon their old labor theory, applicable before the war, that labor like any other factor in production should be bought in the cheapest market to meet competitive prices. There was

[1] *Monthly Labor Review*, Dec., 1922, p. 120.

apparently a reanimation of the supply and demand doctrine in the fixing of the wage rates. In order to make it effective, the employers realized it was necessary to break down the strong bulwarks of labor. And so locally and nationally they banded themselves together into organizations with the object in view of breaking down the collective bargaining power of the men. Both sides fought bitterly. Victory was repeatedly claimed by the organized employers, but the men asserted that these victories were more often nominal than real. It is true that union shop conditions prevailed in many instances where no collective agreements were signed, but the rate of wages of the men showed no unfavorable reaction as a result of the attack made on their unions.

Professor David Friday concluded as a result of a careful statistical investigation in 1920 that real wages of labor had risen and were higher in 1920 than they were in 1914. "This is true," he says, "even if we take as our test of the source of wages the growth in yearly earnings per employee. If we take instead family earnings, the growth in wages exceeds the rise in prices by a considerable margin."[1]

Organized labor has always approached the problem of standards of living from an opportunist angle. That is, the emphasis placed on standards of living has always been in direct relation to the

[1] Friday, David, *Profits, Wages and Prices*, pp. 107–108.

possibilities of establishing higher wage levels. In this respect their position has not proved fundamentally different from that of the organized employers; the one group aiming to prevent a cut in wages, or to raise them; the other to cut wages, or or prevent them from rising.

At all times on the defensive when their plane of living is threatened, organized labor has maintained that one of the privileges vouchsafed them by a democratic form of society is to live as well as any other social class if their income warrant them in doing so. They insist that the toleration of any other point of view invites the growth of an objectionable caste system which would be a reflection of an industrial caste system.

The standard of living philosophy upheld by the employers during the war made no allowance for a rise in the standards of living of their workingmen. Then, too, it was invoked, the men held, to check a rise in wages resulting directly from increased bargaining power. The point of view of the workers was reflected in the *bill of rights* framed by the representatives of 119 national and international unions, including the four railroad brotherhoods. The basing of wages on standards of living "is pernicious and intolerable. . . . It means putting progress in chains and liberty in fetters. It means fixing a standard of living and a standard of liberty which must remain fixed. America's workers can-

not accept that proposition. They demand a progressively advancing standard of life. They have an abiding faith in a better future for all mankind. They discard and denounce a system of fixing wages solely on the basis of the family budget and bread bills. Workers are entitled not only to a living, but modern society must provide more than what is understood by the term 'a living wage.' It must concede to all workers a fairer reward for their contribution to society, a contribution without which a progressive civilization is impossible."[1]

Organized laborers were not opposed to the fixing of wages according to their standards of living, provided these standards were increasingly progressive and not the standards fixed by the employers or the social economists. Their attitude was not unlike that of the employers when it came to a question of fixing the profits of their business. The setting of lower limits in either case suggests the possibility of regulating the upper limits as well.

In the light of labor's standard of living philosophy there would be a tendency to discourage thrift. There are exceptions to the rule. For instance, during an industrial crisis when the laborer's bargaining power is comparatively weak, the value of savings is appreciated, especially when a strike is called. Under normal circumstances thrift campaigns are considered the machinations of the employing class

[1] *The American Federationist*, Jan., 1920, p. 36.

who advocate thrift on the ground that the man with the low standard of living and a bank account will accept a lower wage on a falling market far more graciously than will a man who has no savings to fall on and who must lower his plane of living if his wages are lowered.

The ten commandments for the guidance of a man's financial life which were given considerable publicity during the thrift week in January, 1920, show the same reasoning. They were endorsed by the American Bankers' Association, the United States League of Building and Loan Associations, the National Federation of Construction Industries, the Retail Credit Men's Association, the National Association of Life Insurance Underwriters, the National Credit Men's Association, the American Life Convention, and other national bodies. The men in church pulpits were called upon to preach sermons on thrift, and the movement was given considerable impetus by women's clubs, educational associations, and business organizations.

Supporting this movement in an address to the bankers in their convention, Arthur East of New York, national director of the thrift week movement said:

"Financial and industrial leaders are interested in the increased cost of living because they know that in most cases the bill for the increased cost is handed by the worker to the employer for liquidation.

The bill for the cost resulting from the inefficiency of the average man and housewife in the spending of money and their failure to get full value for money received is also handed to the employer for payment either in increased demands for wages or in increased dissatisfaction and industrial unrest. So, many employers are learning that along with plans for stimulating the interest of the worker in his job, there must go hand in hand with it an education of employees in fundamental economics and in the use and value of money."[1]

It will be remembered that the early mercantilists of the seventeenth century accepted the standard of living of their employees as the real determinant of wages. Hence every effort was made to keep these standards on a low minimum subsistence level.

Later the classical economists pointed out two important facts in relation to wages. They were determined by the standards of living of the workers, but these standards were necessarily at a minimum subsistence level. If they rose above that level, an increase in the birth-rate would absorb the surplus in wages over and above the subsistence level, and the workingmen's families would still find themselves in extreme poverty. Then, too, the niggardliness of nature would force men to cultivate increasingly poorer grades of land in an attempt to sustain an increasing population, but the returns would not

[1] New York *Times*, November 19, 1919.

be sufficient to meet the needs of life. Thus two inevitable checks — the increase of the birth rate, and the decreasing returns from the land — destroyed labor's hope of establishing better living conditions.

There was an evident pressure of population upon the means of subsistence in Europe, but this was not true of America. The apparently unlimited wealth in America converted the European workmen's hopelessness for a brighter and better future to visions of economic opulence. Little wonder, then, that organized labor accepted Ira Steward's optimistic philosophy of standards of living. He held, as will be remembered, that through the shortening of the working day men would establish wider social contacts. These in turn would inspire new wants which would be translated into persistent and effective demands for increased wages. Indeed, Steward saw a future in which the constantly rising standards of living of the working people would eliminate the profits of the employers and result ultimately in the establishment of an industrial democracy in America.[1]

Organized labor set aside Steward's philosophy as impractical in the face of increasing influx of immigrant workmen. It substituted in its stead a goal which held as its ultimate aim the establishment of collective bargaining in all lines of industry.

[1] Commons and Sumner, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, vol. ix, p. 293.

But the employers still see at times Steward's vision. With the increasing rise of the social standards of living of the workingmen they see one of two inevitable results. Either wages will increase to meet the demands of the new standards of living, which will prove inimical to profits, or else the discontent of labor will grow apace. They realize that a safe measurement of the discontent of their employees is the disparity between unsatisfied wants and incomes.

CHAPTER X

SOME CONTRASTS IN BUDGETS

Professor Ross says, "Habits of consumption constitute the *standard of living*, which may become so imperious as to overrule the sex and family instincts and exercise a salutary check upon the growth of population."[1] Professor Bullock observes, "Each class of people in any society is accustomed to enjoy a greater or less amount of the comforts or luxuries of life. The amount of comforts or luxuries customarily enjoyed by any class of men forms the 'standard of living' of that class."[2]

The ideas involved in the above definitions are enlarged in Professor Fetter's more recent one. "The phrase 'standard of life,' expresses the complex thought of that measure of necessities, comforts, and luxuries considered by any individual to be indispensable for himself and his children; that measure which he will make great sacrifices to secure. This standard differs from land to land, from class to class, and from time to time. In the Asiatic coun-

[1] Ross, E. A., *Social Psychology*, p. 262.

[2] Bullock, C. J., *Introduction to the Study of Economics*, p. 126.

tries it is so low that it touches in large classes the minimum of subsistence."[1]

Professor Fetter might have added that the *minimum of subsistence* differs "from land to land, from class to class, and from time to time."

The customary diet of the natives of India and of China is considerably lower than the minimum subsistence budgets of the working poor of southern Europe. The former consume largely rice, fish, and coarse vegetables; the latter meat, vegetables, and wheat substitutes where wheat is not generously consumed. Rye is more apt to find a place in a minimum subsistence diet than the native grown wheat whose marketable value is greater. Dairy products likewise play a far more important part in the dietary habits of the southern European than in that of the Oriental, who seems to have touched the rock-bottom of minimum subsistence levels. On the other hand, the minimum subsistence level of the southern European would prove inadequate to maintain the same degree of physical efficiency in the industrial countries of northern Europe. The northern peoples are accustomed to a richer and more concentrated diet, not fundamentally different from that of the southern European, but representing a higher level of consumption. The American subsistence minimum is higher than that of any other country. Of course there are exceptions in all

[1] Fetter, F. A., *Economic Principles*, vol. i, p. 417.

instances, but upon the whole no scientists would seriously consider the advisability of recommending the Oriental, southern European, or even the northern European diet for the American working people.

Habits of consumption are physical habits as well as social ones. That is, the digestive organs adapt themselves to the habitual diet of a people. When the food is coarse, or when large quantities of it must be consumed in order to extract the necessary nutriment for the individuals' physical well-being, the digestive organs tend to adapt themselves to the dietary habits of a people. Physical adaptation may require more than the period of a lifetime. Indeed, it may involve a process of selection, and those alone survive who are able to adapt themselves to the environing food conditions.

Some medical authorities venture to suggest that the apparent conservatism of people in the adoption of a different diet has at times a physiological basis. A sudden revolution in the kind of food consumed often results in digestive disturbances which undermine the general health level. The effect is not wholly dissimilar to that produced through underfeeding and results in diseases characteristic of malnutrition. For instance, the substitution of cheaper grains for wheat as a war emergency, in the diet of many of the Anglo-Saxon people, was believed by medical experts to be a possible explanation of the epidemic of diseases which swept the western world. The effects of the

curtailment of the use of fats in the diet of the people who were shut off from outside sources is well known.

If this is true, there is great risk involved in a sudden radical change in diet, and the American workingmen having a comparatively high minimum subsistence level would show signs of malnutrition and would become victims of disease because of their weakened physical condition before they could adapt themselves to a diet considerably below their accustomed minimum subsistence level.

It is true that geographical and climatic conditions play an important part in the diet of a people. "Where any population has for many generations been settled in a locality, it must adapt itself in two ways to the physical conditions of that locality. Its chief constituents of food, clothing, shelter, etc., must be accommodated to all the more permanent and important conditions of soil, climate, situation, and of the flora and fauna of the country. A tropical people cannot be great meat-eaters or addicted to strong drinks, though the materials for both habits may be abundant. An Arctic people, on the other hand, must find in animal fats a principal food, and in the skins of animals a principal article of clothing. In a country where earthquakes frequently occur, the materials and structure of the houses must be light. In the same country the people of the mountains, the valleys, the plains, and the seashores will

be found with necessary differences in their fundamental standard of consumption. It is, indeed, self-evident that physical environment must exercise an important selective and rejective power represented in the material standard of consumption. So far as man can modify and alter the physical environment, as by drainage, forestry, or the destruction of noxious animals or bacteria, he may to that extent release his standard of consumption from this regional control."[1]

There is little doubt that the increase in variety of diet resulting from the release of standards of consumption from regional control is a safe measurement of the intelligence of a people. While they themselves may not be directly responsible for the scientific discoveries made, their willingness to apply them reflects their adaptability to new ways of doing things. In the same way their acceptance of articles of exchange from the markets of the world demonstrates a freedom from complete dependence upon instincts as guides in the selection of food. In other words, the diet of a people is in part an hereditary one and in part it is not only influenced by custom and tradition, but it is the immediate result of the progress made in the industrial arts. The current psychological attitude toward change in habits of consumption is likewise inherited through the existing social institutions.

[1] Hobson, J. A., *Work and Wealth*, pp. 121–122.

It is not difficult to find the counterpart of the American's versatility in changing his habits of life. For instance, we are told that the Hindu "will starve to death during the famine rather than eat wheat, and the Italian who imports macaroni and olives, and who puts up with expensive adulterated articles rather than change his diet, are characteristic of the class."[1]

The Irish have been known to show a similar conservatism in their diet. "While the great Irish famine was at its worst, abundance of salmon and other fish could have been had for the trouble of catching; scarcely any of the starving peasantry would consent to touch it."[2]

In many respects the American born show a tendency similar to that of less advanced people who reject food outside the pale of their customary menu, especially when their social value is low. For instance, sea foods play a conspicuously small rôle in the dietary habits of the American people who live on the shores of the Atlantic or the Pacific when compared with their importance in the menu of the Japanese people, or even those of any of the northern European peoples who live close to the sea. Fish is one of the main articles of food of the Scandinavian people, and even with the English fish has almost as important a place in the daily food con-

[1] Meade, Emily Fogg, Jr., "Place of Advertising in Modern Business," *Junior Political Economics*, vol. 9, March, 1901.

[2] Jevons, W. S., *Principles of Economics*, p. 6.

sumed as meat. The Americans stand alone in their small consumption of fish when measured in terms of its potential supply. One might safely say that the relative importance of fish in the diet of a people who have immediate access to it is a safe measurement of their social dietary standards. A fish diet is indicative of a cheap diet.

Not even a rising standard of diet is always possible when it involves a change. Mrs. Mead says of the Chinese coolies and the European peasantry, "From generation to generation they eat the same food, dwell in the same houses, wear the same clothing, work at the same trades, and indulge in the same pleasures."[1]

In Japan "the mode of living in general — housing, food, clothing, and other factors of living — has not made noteworthy improvement. The mass of people live in just the same way as they did during the feudal régime. In the cities some change in the mode of living may be seen among a certain class of people. It is doubtful, however, whether the change could be called a real improvement or simply a mere adaptation to foreign customs."[2]

A comparison made in 1914 of the items appearing in the budgets of the working poor in America with

[1] Mead, Emily Fogg, "Place of Advertising in Modern Business," *Junior Political Economy*, vol. 9, March, 1901.

[2] Morimoto, K., "The Standard of Living in Japan," Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, vol. xxxvi, 1918, p. 49.

those of Japan brings out clearly the divergence existing between the two prevailing standards. Meat, milk, and eggs in the American diet call for the largest share of expenditure. In Japan they are insignificant. In Japan "the largest amount consumed of any kind of meat is only 1.535 pounds of beef per capita per annum. All other kinds of meat average much less than one pound a year. The cost of meat, including eggs and milk, amounts only to 1.21 *yen* per capita." (Gold yen equals 100 cents; the silver, 73 cents.) "The consumption of milk per capita per annum does not reach quite one quart."[1]

The Orientals as well as many southern Europeans find it necessary to change the content of their diet on their arrival in America. Some of the changes made are the result of a changed physical environment. Many of the Oriental and European foods are not native to the soil of their new home, and yet were it possible to purchase the food they are accustomed to, they would not be able, in many instances, to keep up the American standards of work output on a vegetable diet. Meat then begins to play an important part in their newly acquired menu.

One need not go to a foreign land to find marked contrasts in diets. America affords many different

[1] Morimoto, K., "The Standard of Living in Japan," Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. vol. xxxvi, 1918, p. 49.

food standards as well as different social standards of living. The immigrants bring with them habits of consumption that have been acquired in foreign lands. These change, it is true, to fit the new environment, but habits of thrift are so ingrained in their character as to be reflected in their expenditures for food.

A comparison between the diet of the immigrant Slavs and the Anglo-Saxons was made by Mr. Roberts in 1904 in his study of the anthracite coal regions of Pennsylvania. "A study of the daybook of stores, where Anglo-Saxons and Slavs deal, reveals very clearly the difference in their standards of living. A greater variety of articles are consumed by the former than by the latter. A storekeeper said, if the bill of a Slav goes up to $10 a month for groceries, it is high; the bill of the average English-speaking family goes up to $20 and $25. By a compilation made, in one of the company stores in Schuylkill County, of the purchases of twelve English-speaking and twelve Slav families for one year, we found the per capita expenditure of the former to be $5.48 and of the latter $2.86 per month.

"In the account of the Slavs we found the following items: flour, barley, salt pork, potatoes, cabbage, pickles (barrel), garlic, coffee, and coffee essence, sardines (five cans for 25 cents), eggs, and very sparingly butter, cheese, and sugar. In the

list of the Anglo-Saxons there were flour, ham, onions, potatoes, cabbages, pickles (bottled), coffee, tea, eggs, lard, dried beef, spices, cakes, crackers, mackerel, canned tomatoes, canned peaches, canned apricots, canned cherries, soap, rubbers, brooms, lemons, salmon, and large quantities of butter, cheese, and sugar. A perusal of the contents of these books clearly showed that the felt want of the 'white men' was far larger than that of the 'foreigners.' The dawn of luxury, however, was visible in some of the Slav accounts. It appears in the purchase of cheap prunes, mixed jams (5 pounds for 25 cents) and a brand of apple-butter (3 pounds for 10 cents). These luxuries would go a long way. Observing merchants say that a Slav will live on half what is thought to be necessary for the maintenance of an equal number in an English-speaking family."[1]

An interesting contrast is afforded in the development of later-day budgets. The proposed standard budget prepared by the Bureau of Applied Economics includes the kinds and, in a large degree, the quantities of food actually consumed by workingmen's families. The proposed standard budget has not been worked out by theoretical "experts" in the secrecy of the laboratory. It is made up of things which real people eat day by day throughout the year.

[1] Roberts, Peter, *Anthracite Coal Communities*, pp. 106–107.

Annual quantity of food for a family of five, including husband, wife and three children, boy aged 12, girl 6, and boy 2.[1]

Items		*Pounds*
Meat:		
Beef, fresh,	steak	75
	roast	63
	stew	47
Beef, salt,	corned	10
	dried	1
Veal, fresh,	cutlet, roast, stew	13
Pork, fresh,	chops, roast	30
salt,	bacon	19
	ham and shoulder	18
side,	dry	7
	pickled	2
Mutton,	chops, roast, stew	26
Poultry,	hens	23
Sausage		16
Liver		10
Cooked meat,	ham	8
	bologna, corned beef	10
Fish:		
Fish, fresh		41
salt		5
canned	salmon	10
canned	tuna	2
Oysters		5
Crabs, Clams		6

Items	*Pounds*
Dairy products:	
Milk, whole	1602
condensed, evaporated	65
Cream	3
Ice cream	8
Butter	80
Cheese, American	14
Cottage	6
Vegetables, fresh:	
Potatoes, white	738
sweet	48
Cabbage	82
Spinach, kale and other greens	78
Peas	11
Beans, string	37
Tomatoes	130
Onions	74
Corn	36
Lettuce	10
Celery	7
Beets	24
Carrots	52
Turnips	40
Cauliflower, Parsnips, Peppers, Asparagus, Cucumbers, Radishes	27
Vegetables, dried:	
Beans, navy	24

[1] Bureau of Applied Economics, *Standards of Living*, pp. 4–5.

Items	*Pounds*
Peas	5
Beans, lima	15
Graham	46
Cornmeal	25
Hominy or grits	12
Cream of wheat	7
Fats, mixed fats, vegetable oil, etc:	
Lard	37
Crisco	7
Lard, compound	13
Oleo	13
Nut margarine	4
Cottonseed oil, Mazola, etc	7
Eggs	102
Cereals and their products:	
Flour, wheat	332
rye	12
Sugars:	
Sugar	163
Corn syrup, Molasses, Honey	36
Candy	10
Fresh fruits:	
Apples	219
Peaches	28
Bananas	54
Lemons	10
Oranges	100
Grapes	14
Berries	51
Cantaloupe	10
Watermelon	15
Pears and others	36
Grapefruit	32

Items	*Pounds*
Fruits, dried:	
Prunes	24
Raisins, currants	11
Fruits, canned:	
Peaches	23
Pineapple	2
Berries	22
Jelly, Fruit butters	10
Corn flakes	4
Rolled oats	58
Bread, wheat	457
rye	22
graham	2
Rolls	22
Crackers	18
Cake	15
Pies	4
Macaroni, Spaghetti, Noodles	33
Rice	44
Vegetables, canned:	
Beans, baked	5
Peas	10
Corn	19
Tomatoes	25
Soup	5
Miscellaneous:	
Chocolate	1
Peanut butter	5
Cocoa	5
Cornstarch	4
Tapioca	2
Tea	10
Coffee	40
Gelatin	1
Ice	2800

In the measurement of the increase in prices, the Bureau of the United States Labor and Statistics aims to include in its study those articles which are most widely used. This necessitates the elimination of articles no longer generally used, and the substitution of other articles which claim places of importance in later day budgets. The substitutions used by the Bureau suggest a change in the national diet.

(*a*) Articles quoted up to 1907, and also for 1907–1913:[1]

1 Sugar, granulated	6 Lard, pure	11 Sirloin steak
2 Wheat flour	7 Corn meal	12 Ham, smoked
3 Butter, creamery	8 Eggs, strictly fresh	13 Pork chops
4 Milk, fresh	9 Hens	14 Bacon, smoked
5 Rib, roast	10 Round steak	15 Potatoes, Irish

(*b*) Articles quoted up to 1907, but omitted for 1907–1913:

1 Coffee	6 Molasses	11 Prunes
2 Tea	7 Beef, salt	12 Fish, salt
3 Veal	8 Beans, dry	13 Mutton
4 Vinegar	9 Pork, salt	14 Rice
5 Bread, wheat	10 Fish, fresh	15 Apples, evaporated

Some of the articles eliminated are those representing a cheaper diet. For instance, molasses, salt beef, dried beans, salt pork, salt fish, and rice, articles omitted from 1907–1913, were food items of great importance in the pioneering days of the country. It must be remembered that the items selected to

[1] Rubinow, I. M., "The Recent Trend of Real Wages," *The American Economic Review*, December, 1914, pp. 800–801.

measure price fluctuations are characteristic ones, for the most part consumed in urban or suburban communities. Did the statistics apply to rural communities only, the process of elimination of articles from the price list would be retarded.

Some of the changes in the diet of a people are due wholly to evolutionary industrial processes. On the other hand, some of the changes, when taken from price statistics, are more apparent than real. For instance, the almost complete absence of fresh and canned fruits and vegetables from the price statistics of the last century can be explained by the fact that most families owned their own garden plots and purchased practically no green vegetables. Women, too, canned the fruits and vegetables which the family consumed during the winter months. With the disappearance of the home garden, and the continued transference of many of the home industries to the factories, naturally a long list of new items would appear in the budget of expenditures which were formerly omitted and yet claimed an important part in the family menu.

Among the items added to the list of products making up the price statistics for 1920 are the following:[1]

Canned tomatoes	Plate beef	Crisco
Bananas	Hens	Rolled oats
Oranges	Evaporated milk	Corn flakes
Chuck roast	Nut margarine	Macaroni

[1] Senate Report No. 1394, 52d Congress, 2d Session.

The careful perusal of the budgets of families who are now and then recipients of charity and who are well known to charity visitors will show varying standards of consumption for the different sections of the country; the higher standards prevailing in those sections of the West where many resources are still unexploited and the wealth is more equally distributed.

The industrial depression in America, following the World War, called for financial relief for many of the families of the unemployed whose savings were exhausted, if they ever had any. In one of the largest of the northwestern cities the distributors of supplies were made cognizant of the fact that the food standards of many of their families had risen in the course of a few years, for the budget planned with the idea in mind of providing one that was well balanced at a minimum cost met repeatedly with challenges of a more or less indignant nature.

Some of the families had become accustomed to purchasing only "A grade" ham and bacon. Chops and steaks of the best quality had varied their diet. They resented keenly the onslaught about to be made on their customary plane of living and were not in the least reticent in voicing their protests.

In the same city a survey was made of the kinds of food purchased in the different sections of the community. The data were procured from the grocery stores and butcher shops in the respective

neighborhoods. People in certain sections of the city demanded only the best cuts of meat and bought many of their groceries in sealed packages. Canned fruits and vegetables played a large part in their menu.

In other sections of the city the demand for the cheaper cuts of meat was conspicuous. Canned goods were used in such small quantities as to be a negligible factor in the family budget, while package goods were not kept in stock where the bulk goods were available so little demand was there for the former. Fresh vegetables and fruits were purchased in the market where they were to be had the year around.

The marked differences in the budgetary accounts were not found necessarily between the expenditures of the well-to-do and the poorer classes. The line seemed to show a distinct cleavage between the native born and the foreign born. The Orientals and the southern Europeans purchased the cheaper foods. The negroes were more fastidious in their tastes and ranked in their budgetary expenditures with the majority of the American born. There were a few exceptions. Wherever the American working people owned their own homes, greater care seemed to be shown in their expenditures.[1]

Scientific analyses of food values have demonstrated that beyond doubt the inefficiency of many workers is due to under-nourishment and that the

[1] Unpublished report of Bogardus; Helen and Ranthum; Lucile.

wages paid are insufficient, even when scientifically expended, to meet minimum physical needs. On the other hand, these investigations have also shown that a problem of considerable importance appears because of the housewife's ignorance of what food products constitute a balanced diet. Her expenditures, where they are wisely made, are often sufficient to meet the physical needs of her family. The desirability of educational propaganda along the line of expenditure of income is made evident by the following menu of a Polish widow with four dependent children:

Meals — 3–17–'19 to 3–23–'19

Monday morning Bread with butter
dinner The same
Sopper Potatoes
Tuesday morning Ballony
dinner Cake
Sopper Potatoes
Wensday morning Downuts
Dinner Harings
Sopper Macroni
thursday morning Bread with lard
for dinner the same
sopper Tamotoe soup
Frieday morning Cake
Diner Bread with butter
Sopper rice
Saturday morning Bread Just
Dinner Sausage
Supper potatoes
Sunday Sausage
Dinner tomatoe soup
Sopper the same.

"The home visitor communicated with the dietitian of the Maryland State College of Agriculture Extension Service, who undertook to instruct the Polish mother in the buying and preparation of food. A new menu was substituted for the old one, and the revised edition had a totally different appearance, mentioning oatmeal, rice, biscuits, cocoa, bean soup, prunes, lima beans, and cabbage which, queer as it may seem, the widow had not previously known how to prepare. 'Bread just' disappeared from the index altogether."[1]

Few families adopt a budget which is the result of a scientific analysis of food values. Custom is preferred to science, but the sins of consumption cannot be attributed to the past alone. The innumerable suggestions of the present create wants where none existed before, and the influence of these suggestions increases with a better understanding of the psychology of advertising. There are many items of consumption more or less detrimental to the physical well-being of people which have been inserted into family budgets by outside forces. This is especially true of all foods and drinks containing opiates or alcoholic ingredients. In addition, there is a long list of preservatives and adulterations whose food values, if not wholly negative, are considerably less than those contained in the foods and the beverages that the substitutes displace.

[1] *The Survey*, July, 1919, p. 599.

The old-fashioned porridge is rapidly giving way to prepared cereals whose food values, scientists claim, are often considerably less. And yet the blame centered on the housewife rests primarily on the merchant-manufacturer, who, in his attempt to break the dietary habits of the people sufficiently to introduce his commodity into the family menu, not only gives away his product free of cost, but delivers it to the kitchen door. When once he establishes his goods in the family budget, his profits compensate him for his earlier generosity.

In spite of the errors in the modern American family budgets, the scientists agree that upon the whole they are vastly superior to those characteristic of our forefathers. The ill health of the Americans of the nineteenth century is proverbial. Nearly every family claimed one victim of the malady known as "dyspepsia." The *Atlantic Monthly* declared in 1858, "We are a nation of health-hunters, betraying the want by the search."[1]

Rhodes tells us, "Our physical degeneracy was attributed to the climate. . . . But without begging the question of American ill-health by ascribing it to climate, it may unquestionably be found to be due to a bad diet, bad cooking, fast eating, and insufficient exercise in the open air."[2]

While we are in danger of minimizing the need of

[1] *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1858, p. 529.

[2] Rhodes, J. R., *History of the United States*, vol. iii, pp. 69–70.

adoption of scientific budgets based on health requirements, the real concern felt at present for workingmen's budgets has a purely economic basis. The complaint is not that men eat too much or too little, but rather they eat too expensively. The same degree of physical efficiency can be obtained, it is claimed, at a far less cost. In this day of scientific management the physical efficiency of the workers is the justification made for their dietary expenditures. But *efficiency* is not the workingman's slogan. He works as a means to an end, and that end is the pleasure of enjoying a fuller life. What constitutes a *fuller life* is determined by prevailing social ideals.

CLOTHING STANDARDS

"We hear much of 'living standards,' " says Miss Gibbs, "but the vital spark of such a standard cannot be expressed in figures. One must be in contact with the daily lives of the families in order to appreciate the advance from discouragement to ambition."[1]

One cannot depart widely from habits of consumption of a community by embracing lower standards of living without encouraging social ostracism — a punishment far severer than the one inflicted by nature when the physical demands of the human system are not met. The kind of clothing people wear, especially in the United States, is generally accepted as a standard of social valuation. The

[1] Gibbs, W., *The Minimum Cost of Living*, p. 14.

common saying that, "Clothes make the man," has a similar origin. A common expression is, "Show me the clothes a man wears and I will tell you the kind of man he is." Little wonder, then, that the psychological need for clothing — *good* clothing — is far greater than the physical demand; and the measurement of the psychological need thwarts all efforts at a scientific basis.

The Association for the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor of New York City, under the supervision of Winifred Stuart Gibbs, attempted to practice the scientific expenditure of incomes among seventy-five families with the object in view to "improve family groups that they might become stronger units in the future. . . . From the beginning the teachers realized that the clothing budget must be very carefully planned. . . . It was felt, however, that a carefully administered clothing allowance would do much to increase the general *morale* of the family. As in the case of food, a slipping to a low standard in matters of dress came almost invariably from fatigue, ill health, and the resulting loss of desire and power to think and plan. The direct influence of neat and suitable clothing can hardly be overestimated. It is perhaps in this item that the lack of margin in the budget was most keenly felt. Practically all the families, however, were recipients of gifts of clothing from friends and relatives at various times throughout the year,

which served somewhat to supplement the amount allowed for this item. As in the case with most mothers, nearly all of these women sacrificed their own tastes and comfort in clothing so that their children might be neatly and attractively dressed."[1]

The American criterion of social valuations in terms of clothing is appreciated by all. Spahr says, "At Tuscaloosa on Sunday the dresses of the negro girls presented an extremely bright picture and showed that the ability to dress well with little means was a gift of the race. Of course the cast-off finery of the mistresses contributed much to the splendor of some of the costumes, but as Jane Addams of Hull House has pointed out, the desire to dress as well as social superiors is in part an instinct of democracy, and its achievement makes for self-respect."[2]

The dilemma of the investigator of standards of clothing was brought home to the employers of women in the state of Washington when the Industrial Welfare Commission asked them to coöperate to the extent of making out an estimated itemized budget for a working girl with the object in mind of including items of expenditure considered by them essential to the preservation of the health and morals of their employees. Some of the employers called into council the women folk of their respective

[1] Gibbs, W., *The Minimum Cost of Living*, pp. 8–9.
[2] Spahr, C. B., *America's Working People*, p. 97.

families and in addition asked for suggestions from their women employees. The added itemized column of necessary expenditures refused to come within the range of either their suggested minimum or any minimum wage likely to be established. Yet, in spite of these figures, they were sincerely convinced, prices remaining the same, that the women of a previous generation would not only be able to dress on their proposed minimum, but lay aside a competency to meet the vicissitudes of an uncertain future.

The employers insisted quite generally that an increase in wages would do little good. It would not result in the discontinuance of the practice on the part of the girls of running a diminutive laundry in their rooms after working hours, or preparing their meals over an alcohol burner. The financial gain procured through the commission's award would be immediately swallowed up in expenditure for clothes. Even if a wage adequate to maintain physical efficiency were awarded the girls, there seemed, to the employers, no assurance that the wage would be spent with this object in mind or that the evil of low standards of living would be remedied in the slightest degree.

And yet, the question arises whether the employer would not quite generally give preference in his selection of an employee to the girl modishly dressed rather than to the girl clothed in plain and inexpen-

sive garments. Indeed, the department-store girls insist that if they applied for clerical jobs dressed in the garments their employers insisted were adequate for their well-being, they would meet with decided disapproval. The so-called "well-dressed girl" is often able to see a direct connection between her earning power and the kind of clothes she wears. Her good clothes, she thinks, are to her what the workingman's tools are to him; they are assets rather than liabilities.

Men of wealth are often made to appreciate the clothes problem by the financial demands of the women folk of their own families. Said one, "My grandmother was the wife of an American statesmen. When she was presented at court in England her wardrobe consisted of three dresses, — an everyday dress, a Sunday dress, and a dress which she wore when presented to the Queen. My daughter, whose social position is far less important than that of my grandmother, thinks her wardrobe scant, indeed, when it contains less than a dozen dresses."

"The chief mission of clothing," says Miss Gibbs, "is that of helping to conserve the family self-respect and happiness."[1] Self-respect is engendered by the conviction of having merited and received a favorable rating by the general public. To be thought well of by one's fellow men is conducive to a high degree of happiness. To procure this goodwill demands in

[1] Gibbs, W., *The Minimum Cost of Living*, p. 7.

the minds of the majority good clothing — clothing in harmony with the standard of social valuation.

In countries where social barriers show the greatest stability, the percentage of income spent for clothing is relatively lower than the percentage of income spent for clothing in those countries where social class lines are flexible.

"The expenditure for clothing relative to total expenditure in the incomes," says Morimoto, in speaking of Japanese expenditures, "decreases with the increase of income. This result differs from the results of studies prosecuted in the United States, which show that the expenditure for clothing increases steadily."[1]

Ernst Engel's study of budgets in Saxony leads him to conclude "that the percentage of outlay for clothing is approximately the same, whatever the income." Streightoff insists that Engel's law relative to clothing needs considerable modification before it can be applied with a degree of accuracy to the American workingman's expenditures. He would restate it as follows: "There is a strong tendency for the percentage of expenditure for clothing to increase."[2]

HOUSING STANDARDS

Housing standards differ as fundamentally between nations and between classes within nations (climatic

[1] Morimoto, K., *The Standards of Living in Japan*, pp. 72–73.
[2] Streightoff, F. H., *The Standard of Living*, p. 20.

conditions remaining the same) as do standards of diet.

The minimum requirements for airspace and light in tenement houses have been embodied in the legislative acts of several states, and active agitation continues on the part of the socially minded to secure a greater degree of individual privacy as a means of promoting the general morality of the community. But housing standards do not lend themselves as readily to scientific classification as do food standards. "There is a minimum of food," says Streightoff, "without which the human animal will starve, but there seems to be no limit to the squalor that may characterize his habitation."[1]

The standards set contain a degree of flexibility dependent upon the judgment of the investigator. "As to whether a dwelling place is good or bad," says Veiller, "rests upon the amount of open space surrounding it, the provision for adequate light and ventilation, reasonable fire protection, and proper maintenance and care of the premises."[2]

Professor Commons in his article on "Standardizing the Home" says, "I had read that Glasgow was the most densely crowded of modern cities, because 14 per cent of the families lived in one room. After visiting one of the model tenements of the London County Council, I was asked by a

[1] Streightoff, F. H., *The Standard of Living*, p. 69.
[2] Veiller, L., *Housing Reform*, pp. 21–22.

Glasgow mechanic to look into his ancient rookery. The one room in which he and his family lived seemed to me to be larger than the three-room apartment of his fellow who enjoyed the municipal socialism of modern London. The difference was that he put up his own flimsy partitions, while paternal London got the credit of relieving congestion by merely erecting permanent partitions."[1]

The English Board of Trade in its study of comparative costs of living of various industrial centers of Europe and the United States found that the American workman spends, upon the whole, a larger share of his income for rent than his European brother, and that this increase represents a higher standard of housing. The conclusion reached by the English investigation was that a comparison of rents between European communities and those of the United States was of little value, for the rents in different countries or in different sections of a country may be due wholly to economic factors, such as increased land values, a greater demand for houses than the existing supply, the higher cost of building, or to the "higher general level of material prosperity that is able effectively to demand such increasing variety and completeness of accommodation."

A comparative study made of rents in the great centers of population shows that the rents paid in

[1] Commons, F. R., *Labor and Administration*, p. 14.

Liverpool are a little less than half the Boston figures, Manchester and Salford a little less than half that of Philadelphia.[1]

A comparative study made of the dwellings of workpeople in eastern and western states of the United States would show like discrepancies, which could not in justice be attributed solely to higher housing standards of the occupants. The houses in the western section of the country are, upon the whole, more recently built, and hence more modern in construction. Land values are lower because of sparseness of population. House rent, therefore, represents more nearly the competitive returns on capital invested, rather than a differential arising out of the pressure of population upon a limited supply of desirable land. The houses are built primarily as capitalistic investments, and cognizance is taken of decreasing returns with the further introduction of more modern improvements in the form of household conveniences. Hence, dwellings are built to last for a relatively short period of time. The western dwelling houses upon the whole are cheaper in construction than those of well-established eastern cities, but they contain conveniences which represent a higher standard of comfort — psychological as well as physical.

The western states in their dwelling houses offer some of the distinguishing features characteristic

[1] Board of Trade, *Cost of Living in American Towns*, London, 1911.

of the village or suburban communities located near the great industrial centers east of the Mississippi River. Here there still survives much of the rural in housing standards; the house in which one lives is to a certain extent a criterion of one's financial status, and one's dwelling place is not easily concealed in a sparsely settled community.

In large industrial centers the situation is strikingly dissimilar. Social life tends to center in an increasing degree in public or semipublic places. In fact, so common is the practice of meeting social obligations outside the home that a new line of business activity has sprung up in recent years to meet the social situation. Added to private dining rooms in restaurants, hotels, and department stores, are reception rooms or parlors which can be rented for the afternoon or evening. The club, too, in its latest development aims to meet these new social demands. To the long list of industrial activities which have been removed from the home to the factory must soon be added many social activities. Many of these are being transferred from the home to the settlement house or community center in workingmen's neighborhoods, and to the hotels, restaurants, and clubs in the more prosperous districts.

The business world is demonstrating that it can offer attractive conditions of entertainment at far less cost than the upkeep of a pretentious home

would involve. In fact, it is not unusual for friends in a large city to be in entire ignorance of the type of home inhabited by each other, nor is an invitation to break bread by the home fire expected. When such social customs as entertaining in the home are obsolete, the apartments occupied will have as their main attraction the comforts and conveniences they afford, with little if any emphasis placed on cost as criterion of social valuation. The American standard of comfort is by no means a negligible factor in estimating the cost of living, although comforts often take secondary place when social valuation is involved. A high degree of physical comfort is often implied rather than experienced.

"The 'American passion for physical well-being' brought about refinements in domestic life. Cheap transportation distributed fuel, and that made possible a variety of new forms of heating hotels, private houses, and public and office buildings. The hard-coal base-burner, the hot-air furnace, steam coils, hot-water pipes, and electric radiators, each in turn seemed the summit of human convenience and comfort. So it was with lights: for the old-fashioned tallow candle was substituted the whale-oil lamp and the gas-burner, then the kerosene lamp, then incandescent gas, and various forms of electric lighting."[1]

The inference drawn that one's dwelling place is

[1] Hart, A. B., *National Ideals Historically Traced*, pp. 190–191.

no longer a criterion of social status in large industrial centers is hardly correct. One's dwelling place — like one's clothes, when paraded in public places — determines, in most cases, the existing degree of self-respect. But one's dwelling place — unknown to a circle of socially desirable acquaintances — like the clothing worn in the privacy of the home, is apt to be selected according to a standard of physical comfort.

The social tyranny of dwelling places, when these are publicly known, is illustrated by the tendency of people in medium financial circumstances to put up at expensive hotels of known social repute, in communities where the daily papers list the hotel guests of the day, while meals are eaten at inexpensive restaurants whose prices conform to a meager purse.

The housing standards of the foreign laborer and the native born are seen in the standard of furnishings of the two industrial groups. "In the houses of the 'white people,' the front room is carpeted and comfortably furnished. Here they entertain their friends. In the next room, which is generally large and serves as a kitchen and a dining room, the floor is covered with a rag-carpet and a large strip of oil-cloth under the stove. The cooking stove and all cooking utensils are new — nothing else will do for 'young America.' A plentiful supply of crockery, a dining room table, and a half dozen chairs give the

room a comfortable appearance. The stairs leading to the second story are generally carpeted. The front bedroom is carpeted and furnished with a bedroom suite of 'eight pieces.' One other bedroom will generally contain a bed, so that the family may entertain a friend in case of need. The third bedroom — a small room generally — is used for storage. Add a heating stove, and a home, where the average native-born young people of mining communities begin life, is complete.

"The Slav discards the carpet and the oil-cloth. None of it is seen in the majority of the houses. If a few strips of rag-carpet are used, it is a sign of an advance above the ordinary racial standard of living. The cooking stove is generally bought at a junk shop. The cooking utensils are few, and tinware often serves as a substitute for crockery. A common kitchen table and chairs to match complete the furnishings on the first floor, if made up of one room. If there are two rooms, then the front room has one or two beds in it; no carpet and no bedroom suite of 'eight pieces.' When shown one of these rooms, we had to sit on a trunk of one of the boarders, for there were no chairs there. The room or rooms on the second floor have beds in them and a few trunks. If a heating stove is purchased, it is the old-fashioned bell-shaped kind, bought secondhand, which is a good heater, and the practical Slav wants heat and not nickelplate and polish. All here are articles of

necessity, not a trace of luxury seen anywhere. Of course there are exceptions. German Poles, who have been in the country for twenty or thirty years, live differently. We describe the home of the average Slav which may be found in every town in the anthracite coal fields. . . . 'Young America,' with his comfortable home, almost invariably starts life with a debt; the Slav, with bare necessities, starts free of debt."[1] As a rule, the Slavs rent the cheapest houses, furnish them in the scantiest manner, and pay very little for the fuel consumed. The English-speaking pay the higher rents, liberally patronize the furniture, hardware, and crockery stores, and pay for the coal used. There are exceptions.

When one contrasts the budgets of the foreign born, which reflect European standards of living, with the budgets of the American born in which the social factors play such a conspicuous part, one can readily appreciate Professor Streightoff's restatement of Engel's famous laws. The main points of difference between the conclusions of Engel and Streightoff are: first, in relation to expenditures made for clothing. According to Engel's laws, "As the income of a family increased, the percentage of expenditures for clothing remained approximately the same." Streightoff concludes that, "As the income increases there is a strong tendency for the percentage of expenditures for clothing to increase."

[1] Roberts, Peter, *The Anthracite Coal Communities*, pp. 92–93.

Second, Engel found that with the increase of incomes, "the percentage of expenditure for rent, fuel, and light remained invariably the same." Streightoff found that, "As the income increases, the relative expenditures for housing remain about constant for the country at large" and the "proportionate expenditures for fuel and light decrease."[1]

The main point of difference between Engel's laws and Streightoff's laws deal with the expenditures made for clothing. This is due to the social standards of living upheld by the workingmen's families in the two respective countries.

A comparative study of budgets brings out marked contrasts in minimum subsistence levels. These are influenced by climatic conditions, the flora and fauna of a country, and the marketing facilities

[1] Streightoff, F. H., *The Standard of Living Among the Industrial People of America,* p. 20. As the income increases:

1. The proportionate expenditure for food
   a. Decreases for the country at large from 50 per cent to 37 per cent, but
   b. In New York City, it amounts to almost 45 per cent of the total outlay until an income of $1000 is attained.
2. There is a strong tendency for the percentage of expenditure for clothing to increase.
3. Relative expenditures for housing
   a. Remain about constant for the country at large, falling very slightly after $400 incomes have been reached, but
   b. Decreasing rapidly from 30 per cent, or more, to 16 per cent in New York City.
4. Proportionate expenditures for fuel and light decrease.
5. Expenditures for cultural wants increase absolutely and relatively.

established with foreign countries. A low state of development of the industrial arts generally means that the masses of the people live on a very low subsistence level. There is little variety evident in their diet, and it consists for the most part of the simplest and cheapest food elements, considerably below the subsistence level of a more prosperous people.

A poor country can maintain only a low minimum subsistence level. A rich country possesses the possibility of a high one. Much depends upon the distribution of the wealth within the country. Where a comparatively even distribution of wealth exists, and the resources of the country have made possible an economic surplus over the accepted necessities of life, there the minimum subsistence level is the highest. A larger variety and better quality of food is consumed than in countries where abject poverty is characteristic of the masses. Clothing takes on the decorative element with increasing conspicuousness, and the requisite minimum housing facilities take into consideration the family's pride in its domicile.

Any change in the distribution of wealth to the advantage of the lower classes is immediately reflected in new minimum subsistence levels. And these become as imperious in their demands as the old, and must be taken into consideration in the determination of a standard "health and decency" budget.

CHAPTER XI

AMERICAN RURAL STANDARDS

Like its urban standards of living, America's rural standards are the result of the assimilation of various European social elements, with their physical and economic backgrounds. These in turn have been adapted to American conditions, producing standards distinctly different from those which rest directly upon a feudal régime and which were nurtured in a European environment.

Unlike Europe, America does not present a unified rural population embracing the same social standards of living. In Europe, much of the same antecedents came into play in the molding of distinct national rural types. One is struck by the prevailing like-mindedness which is reflected in well-established habits of thought and of behavior.

In America, rural as well as urban populations are made up of a number of distinct national groups of markedly varying social ideals which in their amalgamation present a social type distinctly American.

In urban communities the assimilation of the new foreign element took less than a generation when

industry was still primarily in the handicraft stage and economic and social associations were conspicuously cosmopolitan. It is true that the later immigrants manning our large industries are more effectively isolated than their predecessors; but even among them there are forces at work slowly bringing about social assimilation.

Rural immigrant communities, if not less responsive to American standards of living, retain social and racial differences at least a generation longer than do urban immigrant centers, and in so doing present an American rural population upholding side by side American and foreign standards of living, and at times a standard of living which possesses many of the striking features of two social ideals.

As descendants of a poverty régime in their native land, the immigrants from rural communities find on their arrival that the best lands are under cultivation and are open to them only as renters. Cheap lands are either worn-out deserted soils, or low-grade soils which do not afford under present conditions of cultivation the realization of an American standard of living. The fertile lands not under cultivation, and available at a low cost, are generally outside the radius of easy transportation facilities, and therefore offer as little inducement as the poorer lands more strategically located.

The recent immigrants' poverty in the country of their adoption, as in their native land, precludes

a social contact with groups whose superior social status has been assured by their financial prosperity. The members of the more prosperous group hold themselves aloof from an assimilation not thought to be mutually beneficial.

Assimilation and amalgamation of various types of rural groups is often prevented by the absence of economic contacts. As in industrial centers, the invasion of peoples of lower standards of living has been a signal for the emigration of those workers with higher standards who were in possession of the field before the arrival of their new competitors. In many instances, the newcomers, upon their arrival, find the field deserted for greater economic opportunities offered elsewhere. New England and parts of the old South afford the best examples of deserted farms and worn-out soils. Only people of lower standards of living or of greater industry than their predecessors would be able to make a living out of the soil. Hence it is not surprising that some rural settlements take on the nature of a national group settlement in these regions.

Inherent national clannishness may be primarily responsible in certain instances for the segregation of linguistic groups in various agricultural regions; but this fact is difficult to determine, so powerful are those other social factors culminating in like habits of life and creating a consciousness of social kind. Were all other factors eliminated, the

economic factor alone would be sufficient to bring about these national settlements.

Peoples of the same race, speaking the same language, often show a marked similarity in their customary industrial activities. For instance, the southern Europeans have inherited communal village life not conducive to the development of the individuality characteristic of the American pioneers who owned relatively large areas of land and practiced extensive agriculture. Diversified farming such as was carried on in southern Europe because of small land holdings naturally led the Italian and Greek immigrant to take up truck farming in America. They are helping to reclaim the worn-out soils of New England and the old South by intensive cultivation and seemingly tireless effort. It is little wonder that their social institutions are not always in conformity with those upheld by the majority of the American-born farmers.

Ohio, with its large German population, Minnesota, with the Scandinavians predominating in its rural communities, and many other middlewestern states afford excellent examples of immigrants embracing in their adopted country the same type of soil culture to which they were accustomed in their native land. Professor Galpin, formerly of the Agricultural College of the University of Wisconsin, says of his social survey of the rural communities of Wisconsin, that he was struck by the

fact that the types of farming followed in the various sections of the state corresponded in the main with national groupings. The Swiss were the cheese makers, the Danes followed general dairying, the Scandinavians raised grain, and the Irish showed a decided proclivity for the raising of pigs. Professor Coulter says, "Of late years such settlements as that of the Italians at Tontitown, Arkansas, in the Ozark Mountains, show also that Italians can bring their home industry with them and succeed here."[1]

But too much emphasis can be placed on the natural fondness of a people for the preservation of their customary industrial activity. Ingrained habits, refusing to give way in face of adverse conditions, would result in the utilization of soils in an uneconomic way; and in agriculture, only the application of the competitive principle in its severest form would serve to break these conservative industrial habits. The country would then, under existing circumstances, present a picture of misdirected husbandry to a far greater extent than exists at the present time. While scientific agriculturists can point out many soils used uneconomically, this phenomenon can be traced generally not to national perversity, but rather to an agricultural ignorance which is common to all nations.

The settlement of definite rural sections by national

[1] Coulter, J. L., *The Influence of Immigration on Agricultural Development,* Annals, vol. xxxiii, p. 378.

groups often receives its primary impetus from the owners of large tracts of land who are anxious to sell, or from state interests looking to the economic upbuilding of the state. Immigrants are not always encouraged irrespective of their agricultural habits, but sometimes a bid is made for those peoples accustomed to following that agricultural art for which the soil is most suited. The owners of the land who realize its low economic value to the American agriculturists with their comparatively high standards of living bid for foreign national agricultural groups which have been known to utilize effectively in their native land soils of equally low or lower fertility.

"On account of the high state of development of their industry they can teach us much which we have failed to take advantage of and which would result in the uplift of many of the subindustries in agriculture in this country. These should be urged to bring with them their home industries and introduce new phases of agriculture into this country. The United States has been spending millions of dollars in introducing new plants, animals, and methods of farming from other countries. At the same time little groups of foreigners such as the Swiss of Wisconsin, or later the Italians in some southern districts, formerly thought of as the least desirable immigrants, have settled in our midst and put into practice their home training which has resulted in the establishment of great industries such as the Swiss

cheese industry. The class of immigrants most desired is, therefore, those who will add most to the industry they enter."[1]

Often the promoter, likewise a foreigner, is prompted in his land settlement scheme by a desire to help his own people to better their economic condition by immigration. Often the new settlers, under leadership, establish at the outset a coöperative association so as to eliminate speculative gains in the distribution of the land and to marshal more effectively their individual economic resources.

The United States government, through the Bureau of Immigration, seeks to divert the immigrant from congested cities to rural communities where they will not only best promote their own economic interests, but at the same time prove a greater economic asset to the country at large. Indeed, the settlement of national groups on the land represents a directed adaptation rather than a persistence of national characteristics opposed to change.

The South, confining itself largely to a single staple crop, — cotton, — has in the past suffered financial reverses because of unusual atmospheric conditions, or because of the destruction of the cotton by parasites. The instability of the crop conditions precluded that security in economic

[1] Coulter, John Lee, *The Influence of Immigration on Agricultural Development*, Annals, vol. xxxiii, p. 374.

well-being which is assured in sections where diversified crops helped to cover, at least in part, the loss due to the failure of a specific crop. Occasional large crops, affording financial returns sufficient to more than cover the losses of the poor years, introduced not only a large element of speculation in the agriculture of the South similar to that prevailing in many industries, but this situation discouraged or prohibited landownership in small tracts when the owner did not possess the essential credit facilities. Even if credit were available, the risk would be too great to induce him to stake his all on uncertain crops. This economic situation has led to agitation for the introduction of diversified farming, and the encouragement of the immigration of peoples habituated to the type of soil culture which would be conducive to the upbuilding of a South made up of small independent landholders. The Italians are the people needed. The climatic conditions are not so unlike Italy as to prevent the transplanting of their agricultural art successfully and at the same time offer possibilities of adaptation not easily made by peoples emigrating from northern climes. Hence the Italians as a national group are directed to the South.

A counterpart of national agricultural groups can be found among the native born. The southern states, especially in the mountain regions, afford us splendid examples of isolated communities show-

ing little, if any, effect of recent Americanizing influences. The occupations and the language, responsible in part for national groups in the North and the West, do not hold here. The isolation of the communities is due to the poverty of their economic resources, and to their geographical locations, which are difficult of access.

Similarly situated communities exist in England. "Isolated from their fellows, rarely seeing a paper which writes of a large outlook on life, and only coming into contact with that larger outlook when some one returns from Canada to tell them about a country where a man is treated as a man and not as some one's servant, these village laborers of the Cotswolds lead lives entirely cut off from the streams of modern movements; there is no one to take the initiative in such villages — no one that in any sense represents the laborers."[1]

"Isolation is sufficient to explain the stratification of social institutions in some rural communities, and to create a community spirit averse to the adoption of any new habits of life. In fact, people who migrate to the city from these backward rural communities often cling tenaciously to their accustomed standard of living," says Gillette. "Life of the average farmer is devoid of the larger and more attractive elements. His life is a round of eating, working, sleeping, saving, economizing, living meagerly, recognizing only

[1] Green, F. E., *The Tyranny of the Countryside.*

the bare necessaries, skimping along with inconveniences, especially in the home, which is uncalled for, considering his wealth. The wealthy farmer is one of the most helpless of men in the matter of finding satisfaction. This appears whenever he moves into the city to live. He still practices the stern economies, lives in houses without modern conveniences, keeps the old rag carpets, attends no theaters, goes to no lectures, unless they are free, and acts as a man in a strange world or as one with a starved soul. The enjoyment side of life is lacking. His cultural and aesthetic soul is in a state of suspended animation."[1]

Numerous objections are raised — and justly so — against immigrant groups retaining their native national characteristics as reflected in their social institutions. They constitute a foreign state within the United States, continuing often to the second generation. Undoubtedly one of the principal problems of a country made up of cosmopolitan elements is the welding of them into a national group possessing sufficient uniformity of interests to bring about a marked degree of like-mindedness — a like-mindedness essential to the successful carrying out of a national democratic policy. Yet purely economic reasons demand a policy of maintaining intact national groups so as to capitalize their industrial

[1] Gillette, J. M., *Conditions and Needs of Country Life*, annals, vol. xl, p. 7.

traits, and the economic factor is, after all, the basic factor in national welfare. These traits, unaffected by American standards of living, vitalize unused land and hence call into existence new wealth in the form of much needed agricultural products. The frugality, thrift, and industry of those groups are somewhat impaired when brought into contact with the spendthrift habits of the American born, especially when these groups realize that American standards of living alone bring a much desired social prestige. The cityward emigration often indicates the adoption of American standards of living which cannot be attained while working on low-grade agricultural soils. These soils will maintain only a people of low standards. A good example is afforded in certain agricultural regions of the Pacific Coast. There the Orientals, through their intensive method of cultivation and their ability to live on small returns, are able to pay rent on land previously classed as no-rent land. The Orientals have not only converted poor sidehills into berry farms, but they have effectively demonstrated their ability to wrest fertile lands from people of higher standards of living by offering more rent than the previous renter. In fact, many farmers, who in the past cultivated their own lands, find it more profitable to rent their farms to these people of low standards of living whose industry is unparalleled by that of any other group.

For several years the Oriental shave had a practical

monopoly of the truck gardening industry. The Italians, their close competitors, are being gradually pushed into the background. But the Orientals refuse to remain content in this restricted field and are reaching out ambitiously for industrial occupations requiring greater skill and greater financial outlay. Least affected by American standards of living of all immigrant groups, they give promise of becoming effective competitors of all other national groups.

The Orientals have introduced a new factor into American life which, as yet, has received comparatively little attention. Heretofore immigrant groups of low standards of living have proved less intelligent, upon the whole, than the native Americans they have industrially displaced. The latter have held more or less successfully the higher remunerative occupations. When the immigrants became competitors of the skilled workingmen of higher standards of living, they too had changed their standards to meet the Americans' demands.

This is not the case with the Orientals. They bring with them not only low standards of living, but a comparatively high degree of intelligence which enables them to compete successfully not only with the lower wage-earning groups, but with the skilled workers and small manufacturers and merchants as well. The necessary capital for the establishment of small business concerns is brought

together often through a system of coöperation. Small savings are combined for the purpose of financing the prospective business men among them.

While the standards of living of the higher classes of Orientals in America bid fair to compare favorably with American standards of living, many people living in the Pacific Coast states think the higher class Orientals show a remarkable degree of versatility in rejecting the most wasteful elements in American standards of consumption and at the same time retaining the socially more desirable features. Much of the same intelligence is manifested in their business activities. They adopt the best in the prevailing industrial methods and reject the least scientific elements. Thus they become effective competitors of the American business men. Herein lies the cause of much of the existing racial antagonism seen in western states.[1]

Very little first-grade agricultural land is within reach of the recent immigrants on their arrival in America. As tenants or day laborers they exercise a marked degree of frugality, and often with their savings purchase the land they cultivate as tenants, but when this end is attained it is usually at the expense of a rise in standards of living. Low stand-

[1] In some of the western states the Oriental is not allowed to hold title to land, but this policy is circumvented often by corporate holding, ninety-nine-year lease, or by holding the title in the name of a native born. The state of Washington limits leases to Orientals to a period of two years.

ards have made savings possible, and landownership follows as a natural expression of their aspirations. To purchase in addition the stock and farm implements essential to the successful cultivation of the soil, implies excessive toil and thrift on the part of all the members of the family. When economic security is once attained, late middle age has generally been reached, and that impressionable period when individual characteristics mold themselves to the existing social conditions has passed. The social adaptation is generally made therefore in the second generation; the first clings to its European rural ideals and makes possible the adoption of new ideals on the part of the descendants.

Even when there exist social contacts through the school, church, or other social agencies and economic associations, such as marketing implies, the severity of economic life precludes a financial leeway conducive to an expansion of wants and at the same time making possible the economic security that landownership implies.

The landholders who owned desirable lands found their lands more valuable in the next decade, and because of these increased land values they found themselves in the well-to-do class. Where rural populations have benefited by land speculation, their traditional ideas and habits are discarded with greater ease, and American standards are adopted when they are a qualification for the desired social

prestige. Undoubtedly an economic surplus realized from increased land values is spent more graciously than savings wrested from the soil by a life of toil. In many instances it has taken considerably less time than a generation to discard all traces of an inherited social standard of living distinctly different from the American rival standards.

Great industrial changes experienced in the eastern and middle western states shortly after the Civil War did not spend their force in the western states until after the first decade of the twentieth century. Not that fortunes are no longer made from increased land values, but rather that the phenomenon is now far less common than it was in the recent past, when with the impetus of the westward movement it was the rule. This fact may account in part for the rapid assimilation of immigrants in a considerably shorter period of time than like national groups under economic and social conditions prevalent farther east. The West not only affords economic opportunities to the poor man far greater than the East, but social opportunities as well, for socially the West is still in the making. With growing stability of land values, social and economic transitions will be retarded, and the stimulus to the development of versatility in habits of life will be lacking.

There are instances where the social inheritances of people are not readily discarded even under

favorable economic conditions. The Jews are in point. They have been so long separated from an agricultural life that agricultural circumstances do not appeal to them. But when they do become agriculturists they still retain for the most part their customary habits of life. So great and effective have been religious prejudices against them that for centuries these people have been under a social taboo which isolates them, even when living under social conditions generally accepted as favorable to assimilation.

Sir Horace Plunkett calls attention to a similar persistence of national characteristics among the Irish peasants under conditions favorable to change. He says, "The Irish peasant scarcely seems to have a home in the sense in which an Englishman understands the word. If he loves the place of his habitation he does not endeavor to improve or to adorn it, or indeed to make it in any sense a reflection of his own mind and taste. He treats life as if he were a mere sojourner upon earth whose true home is somewhere else, a fact often attributed to his intense faith in the unseen, but which I regard as not only merely due to this cause, but also, and in a large measure, as a natural outcome of historical conditions . . ."

Further, "I am convinced that a prime cause of the failure of almost every effort to settle them upon the land in America was the fact that the tenement

house, with all its domestic abominations, provided the social order which they brought with them from Ireland, and the lack of which on the western prairie no immediate or prospective physical comfort could make good . . ." He then reviews the historical reasons for the Celtic view of home, and continues, "The Irish people have never had the opportunity of developing that strong and salutary individualism which, amongst other things, imperiously demands, as a condition of its growth, a home that shall be a man's castle as well as his abiding place."[1]

Types of social institutions often persist in certain sections of the country long after they have become obsolete elsewhere. For instance, many of the descendants of the southern aristocracy of pre-Civil War days cling tenaciously to the standards of social valuation transplanted to America by members of a European aristocracy seeking to retrieve their fortunes in a new unexploited land. These standards have not come down to the present time as a pure survival of the social past, nor are they copies of present-day European social standards. Molded in part by the economic conditions of the South, and affected markedly in the past by the institution of slavery and now by the presence of the colored population kept in a state of servility, they represent a different social standard from the one most common among Americans.

[1] Plunkett, Sir Horace, *Ireland in the New Century*, pp. 54, 56, 57.

New England has also maintained through a long period social traditions of the past. The natural poverty of the soil and the comparative stability of land values seem to have been no deterring force to a developed tenacity of purpose in clinging to the social standards of the past, for there persist intact within New England standards of living which under similar economic conditions elsewhere would have tended long since to become obsolete. As it is, there exists a tendency to embrace social isolation rather than to relinquish cherished standards of social valuation. The succeeding generations of foreigners have, to a considerable extent, taken possession of the factories and the land. It is true that social amalgamation and assimilation have taken place within limits, but there has persisted at the same time a clear-cut tendency to draw social lines on the basis of a distinguished ancestry — distinguished according to the extent of inherited landholding, a distinctly European criterion.

The saying that one's social importance in New England depends upon one's ancestry and in the West upon the size of one's bank account effectively contrasts the two standards. The southern social standards as well as the New England standards imply the ownership of a spacious domicile and surrounding grounds. The native southerner shows less persistency in clinging to these *accoutrements* of respectability than the New Englander, especially

when the upkeep calls for the personal services of members of the family. Leisure is distinctly a southern social criterion of social values.

On the other hand, the spacious house and grounds to the descendants of the early New Englanders represent primarily an inherited social status, and their retention is socially of the utmost importance, even if to the women of the household it means excessive burdens.

The control of a purse, too nearly flat to meet the financial needs of the situation, together with the responsibility of preserving intact the inherited social prestige of the family, has developed among the New Englanders characteristic thrift unknown among native Americans in other sections of the country.

The industrial development of New England has fallen to such an extent to the later immigrants and their descendants that the descendants of the early New England stock no longer remain unchallenged holders of large fortunes, nor alone are they the banner bearers of prevailing social standards.

Firmly entrenched behind the social barriers of European rural standards, the descendants of the early colonists find themselves surrounded by social standards of living which are wholly industrial. In so far as they fail to accept these, they remain examples of those upholding isolated social standards of living. A similar situation exists in the South.

Unlike the European standards embraced by the recent immigrant groups, the isolated standards of living of these New Englanders and Southerners are not destined to elimination through an adoption of the standards of living of the people around them, for to adopt these standards would necessitate the imitation of social groups they consider their social inferiors.

On the other hand, so great is the burden at times of maintaining the social inheritance of the past that there is little economic leeway for the rearing of families. Another generation or two may find few sons and daughters to keep alive the inherited social traditions. When these social standards perish, they will offer an historical example of a struggle between the standards of living of a social group and its biological survival.

At times European rural standards are found intact where national and industrial groups are located in definite geographical areas and shut off from social contact with people whose habits of life have been markedly affected by the prevailing industrial standards of living.

But when a rural section is in close touch through trade with an urban community, especially when the former has within it representatives of various European nationalities, as is quite characteristic of western rural sections, there is seen a marked tendency to uphold urban standards of living as a

social ideal. That these rural people fall short of the realization of this social ideal is unquestioned, but it is equally certain that out of their efforts there has arisen a standard of living which is distinctly American. It is seen in its fullest development in the country town. The country towns are centers of trade for the environing rural sections, but in most instances their inhabitants are rural folk who migrate townward and carry with them a sufficient number of their rural habits to color distinctly their future social standards.

The small town is made up of rural folk placed in an industrial setting. The industrial forces in the community would tend toward the adoption of urban standards of living were it not for the strong social forces transplanted from agricultural regions.

The situation is reversed with suburban communities. In all cities there are people dwelling near the outskirts of its geographical limits who are taking advantage of the cheaper rents in the vicinity. As the city grows they move farther away from the heart of its industrial activities. This is made possible by increasing transportation facilities. The members of the family whose work requires them to spend the greater part of their day in the business section of the city are thus able to reach their places of work within a reasonable length of time. As city dwellers they embrace city standards of living, but when their homes skirt the agricultural regions or

actually become a part of a nearby small town, their standards of living tend to conform to their changed environmental conditions. Their habits of life present a case of grafting the standards of living of a small town on the city standards. This is seen, for instance, in the growing importance of one's dwelling and surrounding grounds, and in social amenities which spring up and which are alone characteristic of rural communities.

While rural standards of living tend to leave their impress upon the suburban dweller, the social influence of the newly arrived suburban dweller upon the small town or rural community is greater. Urban standards of living, which are industrial standards, rank highest in social prestige and therefore serve as a model for rural communities. In other words, it is the city which tends to dominate the country socially rather than *vice versa.*

This fact is causing no little public concern, for the adoption of industrial standards of living by the rural folk is thought to be instrumental in speeding the cityward migration of rural population. Not only are the children raised on farms attracted to urban communities, but there is an evident tendency for the older people to move to small towns and cities.

When manufactured products are becoming cheaper, and prices of foodstuffs continue to rise, the explanation generally given is the ever increasing

tendency for the second generation of agriculturists to seek their fortune in rapidly growing cities. "Back to the land" was the slogan of the movement initiated in Roosevelt's administration by the report of the Country Life Commission. It was agreed that the lives of the members of the farmers' families must be made more attractive, and accordingly a concerted movement was initiated to transplant many of the urban social attractions to rural communities.

So closely linked in the American mind are physical well-being and comfort with sumptuous expenditures that the introduction of a higher standard of comfort means a rise in general standards of living. Following close on the heels of the propaganda of higher comfort standards for rural dwellers are the promoters of higher standards of living generally. The latter are prompted not only by commercial interests, but by a group of teachers of home economics subjects, and by the extension workers from our colleges and universities who are carrying industrial standards of living into rural communities with the sole purpose of promoting a greater degree of happiness and well-being.

Thus the social gap between the country and the city promises to be bridged through the adoption of uniform standards of living. Undoubtedly urban and rural communities will be mutually affected socially. If there is this elimination of marked differences in social standards of living between country

and city, it will not only remove one of the most objectionable features of country life, but will prove to be a deterring force to the cityward migration tendency of rural folk, and the rural communities will possess an added attraction to city people. When agriculture as an industry claims social importance with other occupations demanding a like degree of ability, it will offer an increasingly attractive field to the city bred.

On the other hand, the tendency to adopt uniform standards of living on the part of urban and rural populations in America will unquestionably promote a like-mindedness and make possible common social, political, and economic activities. These in turn promote a national consciousness based on the democratization of social life.

No nation can permanently survive when in the conflicts with other nations its people are hopelessly divided into antagonistic social classes. The gulfs existing between these social classes have at times been spanned more or less effectively by a national psychological crisis that appeals to the emotions. The emotional tie thus established in the spirit of patriotism has at times brought about a like-mindedness of untold value in national conflicts. But this like-mindedness is not so easily effected among immigrant folk whose emotional allegiance to their native land has been formed in their early youth. When, in addition to these emotional ties

to European countries, there exists an isolation through their industrial occupation, many students of the problem see the need of awakening a social consciousness of kind by the promulgation of a uniform standard of living. In its last analysis, Americanizing the immigrant is teaching him to think, live, and act like an American. Through compulsory public school education, social centers, extension work of colleges and universities, there is being created gradually a like-mindedness in relation to American social, political, and economic institutions which in its last analysis is fundamentally democratic and hopefully progressive.

The probable economic effect of the adoption of higher standards of living by the people cultivating low-grade soils is of no small importance. Unless the fertility of these lands can be increased so as to bring about greater economic returns, the prevailing social tendencies in social agricultural life are in direct violation of the nation's economic good. This apparent conflict between national social development and national industrial development may be merely temporary, for long before the immigrants now cultivating low-grade soils adopt American habits of expenditures, the social standards of living of the nation may undergo an evolutionary change. Indeed, there seems to be a growing tendency to minimize the social importance of conspicuous expenditure of wealth and to stress as preferable

that social prestige which rests on desirable social achievements. If American social standards of living become in time social standards of achievement, much waste in consumption of wealth will be eliminated, and there will be less pressing need for a continued increasing production of the nation's wealth. The problems involved here are problems not only of the economics of production but of the economics of consumption as well.

If the well-being of the people of a nation is closely connected with the nation's production of wealth, the basic factor in the promotion of progress is a surplus of wealth produced over and above what is needed to provide for the essential wants of the people. When a nation's industrial activities have provided this desirable surplus of wealth it is equally important that it should be so utilized as to bring about the greatest degree of national well-being. But it is possible that in the production of an economic surplus under competitive conditions the racial stock of a country may undergo drastic changes. We have seen the tendency of the thrifty southern European with his long hours of work and comparatively low standards of living to displace, if not the northern European, at least the American-born farmer; and in terms of the birth rate to substitute for a nation made up for the most part of Anglo-Saxons a nation of southern Europeans.

The American born is conscious of a pressure of

his standards of living on his income. The foreigner possesses a surplus of income above his personal needs. The latter marries early and rears a large family. The former tends to postpone marriage or to restrict the birth rate. The conflict between the standards of living of the two is a comparatively peaceful one. But the results can be determined with greater accuracy than were the conflict raged on the battlefield.

CHAPTER XII

FEMININE STANDARDS OF LIVING

While common standards of living tend to differentiate into rural and industrial standards, or a combination of these two, there exist at the same time, correlative to definite social groups, standards which are not distinct and powerful enough to dominate the prevalent social complex, but yet are among the forces which influence social ideals. They may be classified as *feminine* standards of living, *simple* standards of living, and standards of *achievement.*

The most important of these in their influence are feminine standards in so far as they differ from masculine standards. The differentiated sex standard is seen most clearly in America, where social democracy exists in its highest form of development. In European countries feminine standards of consumption resemble more nearly those of the men.

For instance, simplicity of attire is more characteristic of the dress of European women on ordinary occasions than that of American women. On state occasions Europeans far outclass American women in their use of conspicuous paraphernalia, but this

European tendency is characteristic of men as well and cannot be held to be a sex standard of dress.

In those parts of the world where rural standards of living prevail, men wear on state occasions paraphernalia such as is rarely seen in America, if we exclude the academic or court costume worn by certain members of the professional classes. But the costumes of these are indeed inconspicuous in comparison with those worn by men in countries where social prestige is generally an inheritance from the past. In countries where social equality is stressed as an ideal, men are relatively conspicuous for their simplicity of attire, while women upon the whole aspire to a plane of extravagant consumption.

There is little doubt that in communities adopting industrial ideals women are the spenders. One need but travel through the shopping districts of our large cities to see this fact demonstrated. The windows of the shops display goods aimed primarily to attract the women shoppers. Within the shops women are the principal purchasers. The commodities purchased to meet men's needs are either of little significance, when measured in terms of society's total consumption, or else the advertisers assume that men are less susceptible to the psychology of advertising than are women. At any rate, little space is devoted to advertising men's goods in display windows or in the columns of the newspapers or magazines in comparison with the space devoted

to women's apparel. Men's clothing is fairly well standardized; and the changes called for by fashion from season to season are slight.

Few question the marked deviation of sex standards of dress. The causes for this deviation have been discussed generally, but no common conclusion has been reached. So many factors enter in as motives for the expenditures of women, that any attempt to segregate these factors in their respective influences, calls forth a challenge on the part of the advocates of the different theories which have been presented.

All will agree that the women of America offer the best examples of national extravagance in expenditures for clothing. They symbolize, so to speak, the fullest development of industrial standards of living, and have leveled at times all class barriers by their aptness in imitating expensive apparel without making any great financial outlay. By their own ingenuity, and the assistance of ambitious merchants, they are able to give the impression of possessing enviable bank accounts. Women who are lacking in ability as seamstresses, and at the same time are devoid of artistic sense and power of imitation, have their deficiency met by others willing and anxious to capitalize their natural or acquired skill. There are firms in our large cities which make it their business to imitate imported garments at a cost within the reach of the average purse. Indeed,

it is not unusual in the city of New York for the clothes of women of wealth and social position, when worn in public places, to be under constant scrutiny by small manufacturers and merchants who later reproduce them from cheaper materials to be worn by social aspirants of comparatively small incomes. Women themselves often select the costume they wish to imitate, notify a commercial copyist, and shortly appear in a gown or a hat thought by the original wearer to be a wholly exclusive model.

Competition in clothing among women has reached that stage of development where it is no longer safe to accept material display as a criterion of economic status. With the fullest appreciation of this fact, clothes will probably lose much of their social significance. The clothes of men, for instance, with their standardization, are reaching a uniformity in appearance, especially among those not engaged in manual labor, that challenges the casual passers-by to distinguish the tailor-made garment from the factory product. There are exceptions, it is true. There are men so fastidious in matters of clothing as to attract the attention of all to their wearing apparel, but this fact does not carry the conviction that the best dressed men are necessarily the wealthy men. The incident is looked upon rather as a personal expression of taste in clothing, or as an eccentricity to be generously tolerated but not necessarily extolled.

It is otherwise with women. Their personal appearance is accepted by the women themselves as a criterion of their social status. Their clothes suggest spending power and leisure, even though the impression conveyed as to spending power and leisure may be entirely erroneous.

Social scientists have offered various explanations for feminine social standards. The one given the most credence, perhaps, is that of Professor Veblen. He holds that leisure is a social inheritance of women, for idle women and idle servants advertise the financial status of the head of the household. In this sense, women express the standards of living of men of the household rather than standards peculiar to women. In other words, being economically and socially dependent upon men, they have had imposed upon them the inconveniences attached to the expression of the family's status. Like the servant class, their social activities have been wished upon them by the will of their superiors. "At the stage of economic development at which the women were still in the full sense the property of the men, the performance of conspicuous leisure and consumption came to be part of the services required of them. The women being not their own masters, obvious expenditure and leisure on their part would redound to the credit of their master rather than to their own credit; and therefore the more expensive and the more obviously unproductive the women of the house-

hold are, the more creditable and more effective for the purpose of the reputability of the household or its head will their life be."[1]

There are certain elements in the dress of women which suggest the applicability of Professor Veblen's explanation of women's standard of consumption. For instance, the physical discomfort involved in the wearing of much of women's clothing might register their lack of freedom as agencies in expressing a standard of their own making and choosing. Where the position of women is most menial, there the physical discomfort of their clothing is most apparent. The example commonly given is that of the footwear of the women of China, which in the recent past necessitated the binding of female infants' feet. The modern survivals are the corsets and shoes customarily worn by women. In harmony with them are the tight skirts of the present and the hooped skirts of our mothers. One may add the custom of wearing the hair long. All are impediments to many activities followed by men, and undoubtedly they play an important part in the determination of women's industrial and professional inferiority in so far as it is admitted to exist.

In contrast with the physically uncomfortable customs of women's dress, men's expenditures for clothing suggest a higher degree of physical ease, and their expenditures for luxuries more often are

[1] Veblen, Thorstein, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, pp. 180–181.

made to gratify the senses. For instance, in pointing out fashion's tyranny over men, we are reduced practically to two illustrations in matters of clothing. The starched linens worn by men, and the conventional coat, which must be worn irrespective of the heat of the weather, make it impossible to believe that men have entirely emancipated themselves from the discomforts of long established habits of dress. On the other hand, the expenditures of men for tobacco, liquor, high-grade foods, and different forms of amusement prevent them from claiming the distinction of adopting wholly simple standards of living in contrast with the high standards upheld by the women. The club-rooms of men are often expensively furnished even though the dominating note in the furnishings suggests physical ease and comfort rather than conventional display of wealth. Men make some concessions, it is true, to fashion, but these are relatively few when compared with those made by women. Women show willingness to put up with considerable discomfort if in so doing they gain greater social recognition.

Mrs. Gilman's explanation of women's social position is not wholly dissimilar from that of Professor Veblen. They both stress the economic dependence of women as being a fundamental factor in the determination of the social relationships between men and women. Leisure and the possession of a disproportionate share of the economic surplus in

society does not fall to women as such, believes Mrs. Gilman, but rather to those women who can claim kinship to men of wealth. Their financial status bears no relation to their economic activities. "The women who do the most work get the least money, and the women who have the most money do the least work. Their labor is neither given nor taken as a factor in economic exchange. It is held to be their duty as women to do this work; and their economic status bears no relation to their domestic labors, unless an inverse one."[1]

Since marriage plays such an important part in determining the economic status of women, and since the social status of an individual is directly dependent upon his economic status, it is not surprising that one of the chief qualifications of men in the process of sexual selection should involve the possession of material wealth. The economic status of men, under such circumstances, would tend to determine their valuation as prospective husbands. The natural limitations to wealth and its uneven distribution have brought about a state of affairs in which men of wealth are distinctly in the minority, and therefore are sought in marriage rather than left to seek their mates in competition with other members of their sex. So well established has this condition become that its origin must be traced to prehistoric times. In its modern aspect it has become

[1] Stetson, Charlotte Perkins, *Women and Economics*, pp. 14–15.

traditional and customary, and hence incites only an occasional comment in the form of criticism from those interested only in the scientific aspect of the problem.

The economic dependence of married women on men is a stimulating force, inciting women to emphasize their sex characteristics by the aid of adornments so as to prove a greater attraction to men of enviable financial standing. To state it a little differently, the more attractive women can make themselves, the wider, in an economic sense, their range of selection becomes. "We are the only animal species in which the female depends on the male for food, the only animal species in which the sex relation is also an economic relation. With us an entire sex lives in a relation of economic dependence upon the other sex, and the economic relation is combined with the sex relation. The economic status of the human female is relative to the sex relation."[1]

Hence the great consumption of material goods on the part of women is due to an exaggerated sex distinction, purely social in its origin, and in contradistinction to nature's plan. Biologically it is the human male who is gifted with natural adornments. It is the human female who has assumed artificial adornments with the same motive in the background, and the male tends to discard in modern society some of the natural distinctions nature imposes

[1] Stetson, Charlotte Perkins, *Women and Economics*, p. 5.

upon him. Women "obtain their economic goods by securing a male through their individual exertions, all competing freely to this end."[1]

There is another explanation for the social standards of women which is discarded by modern psychologists. It is that women represent a more primitive stage in social evolution than men do, that this social evolution is merely a reflection of the biological one. "Women in their mental and physical development represent a stage of development characteristic of men in an earlier period of human development. This theory may afford a possible explanation for the manner of dress of women. If we will examine the matter closely, we shall discover that the dress of women resembles in its general design that of uncivilized races far more than does that of men. It is more as both sexes originally dressed, before the art had been improved upon and adapted to practical wants. Modifications and refinements in the dress of women took the direction of embellishment, while those of men tended toward utility."[2] Like the primitive savage, she has not outgrown her desire for adornments in brilliant colors, and, like the chieftain of old, she expresses her social superiority in the only language she knows — the language of the primitive mind.

The decreasing economic importance of women in

[1] Stetson, Charlotte Perkins, *Women and Economics*, p. 109.
[2] Ward, Lester, *Dynamic Sociology*, vol. i, p. 643.

the home gives a decided opportunity to those who most successfully exploit their natural attractiveness. The elaborate coiffures, eccentricities in footwear, and daring adventures in clothes all suggest attempts not only to attract attention by virtue of the novelty of the attire assumed, but, to many observers, these indicate a direct appeal to the sexual sense. Women dress as they do in order to exploit men. One is justified in calling this theory the sex-exploitation theory.

Professor Parmelee refers to "the evolution of an idea bred into the woman that her sex is something of peculiar value which must be bartered for a consideration. This idea still influences most women in their dealing with the other sex, all the way from the unions which are most temporary and most explicitly and frankly commercial in their nature, to the permanent marital unions in which the bartering is glossed over by a vast mass of social usages and the polite phrases of religious and conventional morality."[1]

The implication here is that women have become sex exploiters, adopting the easiest means at hand of promoting their economic and, therefore, their social well-being. Thus has taken place in modern civilization a subversion of early race experiences. In other words, the sex attractiveness of the female, although artificially emphasized, gives her a degree

[1] Parmelee, M., *Economic Basis of Feminism*, Annals, Nov., 1914.

of selective power which is characteristic of the sex in lower animal life, and thus the race is reverting perhaps to one of the earliest forms of sex selection, although differing markedly from the earlier form in one respect, that sexual selection on the part of women is guided by economic and social interests rather than by physical attraction. There are exceptions, it is true, among women economically independent, but the growing economic independence of women is destined to be retarded somewhat by the biological attitude of man toward woman. Man instinctively wishes to protect women and to provide for them. The exploitation on the part of women of this innate male characteristic naturally gives them an additional economic bargaining strength.

"Male gallantry will always be somewhat of an obstacle in woman's economic independence and productiveness. This gallantry has its fundamental psychological basis in the tender feelings aroused by the sexual passion. . . . These tender feelings of the male and the receptive attitude on the part of the female, which are indissoluble concomitants of the fundamental sexual passion, will always lead to a certain amount of care of the female by the male. It will always be somewhat of an obstacle in the way of female economic independence, and will always be somewhat of a force for keeping in existence a leisure class of parasitic, unproductive women."[1]

[1] Parmelee, M., *Economic Basis of Feminism,* Annals, Nov., 1914.

Professor Parmelee further states that "owing to her valuation of her sexual nature as having peculiar worth and the consequent desirability of bartering it for as high a price as possible, she must devote much attention to her physical appearance."[1]

The explanation is repeatedly made by women in answer to the sex exploitation theory, that they dress for each other rather than for the men. As convincing evidence, they state that most of their expensive embellishments are beyond the appreciation of men in that the latter have no way of determining the financial outlay made. Women alone are their uncharitable critics. The latter are not easily deceived as to cost values. Hence, great ingenuity is required to make effective a deception as to the real financial status existing.

It is generally known that women are less fastidious about their household furnishings where men alone are concerned than they are where other women are involved. Many of the household details will pass without calling forth even the casual notice of a man. In fact, much of the expensiveness of furnishings and appearance of leisure is thought to be lost upon men, so generally ignorant are they of cost and social proprieties, while prospective women guests often cause a veritable revolution in house-

[1] Parmelee, M., *Economic Basis of Feminism*, Annals, Nov., 1914.

hold habits in order to meet most effectively the critical gaze of an accepted social superior.

It is claimed that the same critical attitude is assumed by women toward women in habits of dress, and therefore it is the scrutiny of their own sex that they are most anxious to meet triumphantly.

Many women become slatterns after marriage within the confines of their own homes, and yet on the public thoroughfares are paragons of finery and attractive display. Often their activities outside their homes are confined to club duties. The club associations are most generally made up entirely of women. On such occasions their contact with men becomes almost casual, being confined largely to their return journey when men are homeward bound from their day's work. This contact seems hardly of sufficient importance to warrant a departure from a modest street attire. There is little doubt that assemblies made up wholly of women possess an atmosphere of sumptuous expenditure as great as that characteristic of assemblies where men and women alike are present.

Some people interpret women's sensitiveness to the criticism of their own sex as a result of sexual rivalry. So keen has the competition among them become for the economically desirable males, that the conflict itself has assumed paramount importance, and is carried into all the different relations in life and leads to the assertion so often made that

"women are the worst enemies of women." This idea is often suggested in the attitude of women toward each other when running for political office. Women find it difficult to obtain the support of their own sex at the polls, irrespective of their superiority and ability in fulfilling the obligations that the office implies. Women candidates for office count on the men for their support unless some vital issue in the election submerges for the time being sex jealousy.

Women's conspicuous consumption of goods may be a means of demonstrating to their sex not only their individual comparative success in making a desirable matrimonial alliance, but at the same time of offering proof of their individual superiority in sex attractiveness. For this reason they flaunt before their jealous rivals the emblems of their success. It is a generally accepted fact that women judge each other by a standard resting on a sex basis, and they rise or fall in the general estimate of their sex by their ability to stand the social sex test. Men, on the contrary, consider their sex life as a thing apart from their main activities. They judge each other either by their degree of wealth or achievement, but never by their attractiveness to women. The suggestion itself is so far afield as to receive no support even from the most credulous.

A more recent explanation of feminine social standards is that the standards of men and of women

are alike in countries where social democracy is most highly developed. That there is a marked deviation in the expression of social standards on the part of men and on the part of women is due to the fact that women and not men inherit the leisure and economic surplus of society. This leisure enables women to give a fuller expression to the common standard. We are told that men, too, show a decided liking for types of apparel indicative of a life free from the necessity of physical toil.

While men's clothing, upon the whole, possesses greater utility than the clothing worn by women, credit is due to necessity rather than to men's judgment, for to them has fallen the task of providing for the family group, and they must dress accordingly. Indeed, this theory continues, it was with considerable reluctance that men discarded flowing robes, silk stockings, jeweled buckles, and elaborately embroidered waistcoats. It is apparent that the paraphernalia worn by men as lodge vestments is adopted with an evident degree of pride. There is little evidence to establish the premise that their use is objectionable, but the use of the paraphernalia is not very practical under modern conditions of industrial life. In countries where the male aristocracy is a leisure class, or a class engaged only in political or religious functions, one finds the dress of men equally conspicuous for its elegance or even more conspicuous than the dress worn by women. This

is especially true at the present time of the aristocracy of the Oriental nations. Even in modern industrial nations there exists between the professional and wage-earning classes a clear social demarcation as expressed in types of clothing. Men prefer not to look like wage earners. Wage earners have the same preference, but the nature of their work precludes the adoption of genteel attire except on holiday occasions. "No apparel," says Professor Veblen, "can be considered elegant, or even decent, if it shows the effect of manual labor on the part of the wearer, in the way of soil or wear. The pleasing effect of neat and spotless garments is chiefly, if not altogether, due to their carrying the suggestion of leisure — exemption from personal contact with industrial processes of any kind. Much of the charm that invests the patent leather shoe, the stainless linen, the lustrous cylindrical hat, and the walking-stick, which so greatly enhance the native dignity of a gentleman, comes of their pointedly suggesting that the wearer cannot when so attired bear a hand in any employment that is directly and immediately of any human use. Elegant dress serves its purpose of elegance not only in that it is expensive, but also because it is the insignia of leisure. It not only shows that the wearer is able to consume a relatively large value, but it argues at the same time that he consumes without producing."[1]

[1] Veblen, Thorstein, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, pp. 170–171.

In modern society women often take into consideration in the selection of their mates the ability of the latter to support their families in reasonable comfort. This is true even where women have regained a considerable degree of their former sex-selection power. The social and economic motives tend to dominate the purely biological motive. This fact leads men to struggle, frequently in a primitive way, for wealth, while women, with the same end in view, vie with each other in their efforts to attain the greatest degree of sex attractiveness in order to enlarge their field of selection. Hence, sumptuous apparel which at an earlier period of social development denoted subjection to the male sex has in modern times become a badge of sexual triumph. On the other hand, the number of men who possess an undue share of the economic wealth of the community is so small that these few have a considerable range of selective power, so keen is the competition among women for wealth and position.

Women in America, upon the whole, enjoy a status nearer equal to that of men than women of any other country, yet no one can deny the fact that their attire and mode of living are indicative of a greater expenditure than that of the women of any other nation. This fact leads many people to believe that the standard of leisure class consumption, upheld generally by women, is proof of their greater bargaining power when it comes to sexual selection.

There are two possible explanations for the fact that women enjoy a disproportionate share of the wealth and leisure of America. First, men have always outnumbered women in this country. Second, but of no less importance, the work of women in the home is steadily decreasing in its economic value. The factory's invasion of the home has left many women with leisure heretofore unknown to them. It is true that many women have followed their work into the factory, but these are conspicuous by the absence of their leisure and spending power.

In so far as the women do not follow the work from the home to the factory, they tend to lose their importance as economic assets in the home. It is then that men no longer select their wives because of their industrial efficiency in the domestic work in the household, but are "guided largely in their choice by other motives. It is then a man will often choose a wife on the ground of her capacity to minister to his vanity or to his sensuality; to choose one, for example, who will help him in fashionable society, whose face will please his fancy, etc."[1]

Irrespective of the possible origin of the differentiation between men's and women's aptitude for conspicuous paraphernalia, the fact that women's standards of dress and of living generally are distinct from those of the men is accepted as indisputable. Nor does there seem to be any tendency on the part

[1] Carver, T. N., *Principles of Rural Economics*, p. 337.

of women to attribute this difference to the early tyranny of the male over the female. While men may look upon the dress of their wives as a vicarious expression of their economic and, therefore, of their social status, the women themselves in no way accept the performance of their part as onerous. Indeed, the pleasure their clothes are capable of affording them is sufficiently great to substantiate the claim often made that their own individual desires in matters of dress are sufficient to explain present feminine standards of consumption.

Equality between the sexes is not thought of by women generally in terms of standards of consumption, but applies only to legal, political, and industrial affairs. Equality before the law and in shaping the governmental policies of the nation are the two primary demands made by the women of the world. Equality in education and equal freedom to pursue professional or industrial careers for the most part closed to women, are among the demands made by a comparatively few. Intellectual equality with men, and an economic independence, based on their own professional or industrial activities, are goals sought by so few women as to classify them as pioneers in fields as yet outside the vision of the sex as a whole.

One of the advantages women have over men is in the expenditure of the family income. In this respect women seem to have won an unquestioned

prerogative. This fact is brought out in court decisions, in divorce cases, and in breach-of-promise suits. Men are expected to dress their wives not only according to the family income, but there is a sympathetic regard for the woman who marries expecting to enjoy an income which her husband does not actually possess. Deception as to his financial status is a serious offense on the man's part against the sex code of fair play. It receives a significance vastly deeper than a similar piece of deception in a business relationship between men, or between men and women where matrimony is not a question involved. Breach-of-promise suits often rest on a disappointment in financial expectations, and the court reflects in its decisions the opinions of the general public.

The man who insists that his wife maintain a simple standard of living against her will, when he is able to afford a more complex one, is held to subject her to an unjustifiable humiliation in the eyes of her own sex. Publicity given to her mental tortures calls forth a flood of sympathetic response. Reverse the situation, and the public immediately becomes indifferent. The shabbiness of the husband, even where it is known that the wife holds the family purse, excites no interest. The natural gallantry of men, and the growing sensitiveness of women to their economic dependence may be the reasons for the precedence generally awarded women in the

family expenditures. In addition to these two reasons there is another often put forward. Women, like children, are still in a primitive state of mental development. A general appreciation of this fact leads to a tolerance being shown for their propensity for physical decorations. Men, representing the intellectual sex, have no legitimate claims to luxurious expenditures.

The type of economy practiced by a people has played such an important part in molding its social institutions, that there has arisen a school of economists known as economic determinists. The adherents of this school believe that economic influences alone are responsible for types of social development. If we accept the economic influences as paramount in molding racial, national, or class types, the economic position of women in their relation to men might be sufficient to explain the variations apparent in the standards of living of the two sexes. They may have their basis in the fact that women have been subjected in part to different environmental conditions from those surrounding men. While it is possible that in an early stage of the development of the human race the activities of men and women did not differ fundamentally, and the equality of the sexes was recognized, historical evidence, as well as anthropological evidence, points to the conclusion that there has always been a recognized different sphere of activity for the two sexes. If environ-

mental conditions of men and women are not the same, it follows that their mental outlook on life will show somewhat similar variations.

Assuming that the social inheritance of the two sexes was the same at some time in the distant past, — there is little data to prove that it was the same, — there would in time, with growing differentiation of sex employments, ensue two types of social developments: the one feminine and the other masculine. It would not be strange for the conclusion to be reached in time that women in their mental outlook are fundamentally different from men, and that this difference is due to inherent differences of sex. The modern tendency of giving women the same kind of education as is given to men, and of opening up to women the industrial activities of men, promises to eliminate not only many mental differences generally attributed to sex differences, but will undoubtedly promote the acceptance of a common standard of living. The number of women engaged in professional and business activities is increasing. There is a growing appreciation among them that the social standards upheld generally do not fit their new environmental conditions, and there is a marked tendency for them to deviate from a commonly accepted type and to set up standards of their own. Greater simplicity is shown in their wearing apparel than is characteristic of the women who are still primarily engaged

in the so-called "womanly" spheres of work. The influence of conventionalities is less marked, and the relations of the men and women engaged in like professional and business activities are similar to those existing between men. The criterion of social valuation is not so much a materialistic one as it is one of human achievement. Pride in one's work is gradually usurping the place formerly held by pride resting on material display of one's wealth.

In addition to the standards upheld by professional and business women, there will probably always exist standards of living upheld by a large number of women whose economic dependence upon men will create environmental conditions distinctly feminine in their nature. They will cause a differentiation in the standards of men and women.

Here and there in rural or in urban districts, we find the standards of living of women not markedly dissimilar from those upheld by men. But these are European standards transplanted to American soil by recent immigrants. It takes hardly a generation to detect the increasing influence of a distinctly American feminine standard of consumption reflected in the dress and habits of life of the women-folk.

Immigrant and rural communities do not afford the only exception to the general rule, for women as well as men are known to depart widely at times from the accepted and traditional social customs, especially where the latter are looked upon as

obvious obstacles in a course which has been deliberately selected. The Quakers offer but one of many examples.

In addition to these we cannot overlook a vast army of women whose plane of living is so suggestive of self-sacrifice as seemingly to put them wholly outside the pale of the so-called feminine standards of living. Their expenditures for clothing are considerably less than those made by their husbands, and when an economic surplus is available for the satisfaction of a wider range of personal wants, it is expended often in the clothes of the children of the family. Mothers, among the working poor, consistently deny themselves better clothing in order that their families may make a more presentable appearance in workshops or in public places, and they establish a plane of living for themselves lower than that of their husbands.

There are two possible explanations for this well-established divergence between the expenditures of women of the different social classes. One is the predominance of the maternal instinct. Where the interests of the children are involved, no sacrifice is too great for the mother to make. Indeed, her sacrifices in clothing are often compensated in seeing her daughters give expression to the mother's standard of living which the latter was unable to realize at a time when the desire for its realization was most keen.

The other explanation is that men's clothing plays such an important part in their work that to be well dressed is essential to the retention of a position. Good clothing is as important to the economic success of some men as tools are to others. This fact is appreciated by the family when expenditures are not made as expressions of standards of living but rather as economic expedients.

Many women, and some men, see a future wherein women will be on a basis of industrial equality with men; that is, the prestige commonly held by men in the business and professional fields will be shared with an ever increasing number of women, and in time the economic dependence of one sex upon the other will be a state of affairs characteristic of the past. If this actually comes to pass, the standards of living of women will not differ fundamentally from those of men. That they will be the same is denied by many ardent supporters of the modern feminist movements. They assert that women possess to a far greater degree than men a sense of the artistic, which will find its expression in the standards of consumption of women, and will always be a means of differentiation between sex standards.

That the feminine standards of living will always imply a sumptuous display of economic goods does not necessarily follow. Increasing intelligence on the part of the general public may ultimately lead to a more conscious control of social institutions, and

to the survival of those institutions which justify their existence by their appeal to the intelligence of the community. Much of the consumption of economic goods on the part of women is of a primitive origin, and with the application of reason will be relegated to the least intelligent members of society, and in time will disappear. It is then, probably, that sexual selection will be put on a different economic and social basis. Meanwhile, there will persist two standards of living upheld respectively by many men and many women, and the most distinct of the two in its social significance will be the feminine standard.

CHAPTER XIII

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL CLASSES IN EUROPE

So difficult has it become to segregate modern society into distinct social classes with their characteristic standards of living, that the question arises as to whether social gradations are not undergoing revolutionary changes. Old class lines, even in continental Europe, are no longer held as fixed social barriers. Indeed, there are indications pointing to a new social alignment that is fundamentally different from that which has persisted from the early modern era.

Those who in an older order of society were habitually ranked as members of the middle class, have, as a result of unsettled and changed economic conditions which the recent war brought about, forged so far ahead in their financial successes as to be able to claim positions of importance in the political and industrial world; and in turn these reflect themselves in new social relationships on a higher plane of social prestige.

Reverse conditions, it is true, have also occurred. Men of wealth have occasionally found themselves divested of their earlier economic gains, with life

too far spent to enable them to retrieve lost fortunes. Under these adverse circumstances they are able to make only a pretense of maintaining the standards of living of their class. Most often social moorings are lost. Sometimes a change in habitat is effected, and life is begun anew within a class whose standards of living are commensurate with the financial means possessed, and oblivion is sought through a life of social retirement. The resultant discouragement destroys future ambition unless a new goal of endeavor is accepted, one divorced for the most part from the influence of material wealth.

The shifting of individuals from one class to another is of far less significance than the shifting of entire classes. Classes have been known to have lost their prestige — social as well as political — only to be superseded in power by a lower class. A complete interchange of positions took place, and social as well as economic institutions of the time reflected the new leadership in their future development.

The early history of European nations shows two distinct social classes: the upper and the lower, the rich and the poor, the aristocrats and the common people. There were, however, minor social gradations within each of the two distinct social groups. The lower stratum of the aristocracy and the upper stratum of the common people merged later into a distinct class known as the *bourgeois*. This class at first consisted primarily of the small

landowners, but later it included the merchants and the tradesmen as well.

While social class distinctions in the main rested on an economic foundation, wealth alone did not, in all cases, determine class status. For instance, there were certain professional occupations which carried with them enviable social rating, and these occupations were not necessarily associated with wealth, although wealth played a part — an important part through its patronage — in determining class lines within the occupational group. It is an undisputed fact that members of the clergy enjoyed political power and social prestige out of all proportion to their wealth. It is true, too, that clerics vied at times in importance with nobles in matters of political and social import. The former based their claims not necessarily upon their wealth, but rather upon spiritual and intellectual prerogatives. The poverty of the lower ranks of the clergy has become proverbial. Indeed, in many instances the incomes enjoyed by the artisan classes in the community were greater than those received by their spiritual guides. Yet the social position of the latter was unquestionably higher than that of the workingmen.

During the Middle Ages the higher clergy and the noble class competed with each other in their attempt to gain political control. The temporary success of either was reflected in the social position held. At times the two classes merged, at least socially, and

many individuals were guided by personal inclinations in their choice of a clerical or a secular career. Political rulers occasionally relinquished their temporal estates in order to enter the church, and members of the clergy often became renowned rulers of vast landed areas rather than guides in the spiritual realm.

The law of primogeniture preserved intact for generations a social class aristocracy. The social positions of the younger sons would have proved precarious were it not for the opportunities offered them in the church, army, or politics. These positions, secured through patronage, enabled them to enjoy their accustomed prestige, even though the accompanying salaries were insufficient in themselves to maintain their customary standard of living. The wealth of the church, and the economic rewards of successful military conquest, however, brought to a few individuals financial returns which placed them in an enviable economic class.

Literary men, likewise, found their incomes wholly out of accord with the standards of living of the class of which they were a part. Quite generally, men who sought to make their livelihood through their literary efforts contended with life-long poverty. Some few enjoyed a patronage from the higher social classes, and this often resulted in a close personal relationship which emphasized the discrepancy between their financial and their social status.

The profession of teaching was originally associated with the church. Professor Veblen tells us that learning "set out with being in some sense a by-product of the priestly vicarious leisure class; and, at least until a recent date, the higher learning has since remained in some sense a by-product or by-occupation of the priestly classes."[1] Likewise the profession claimed a social prerogative superior to that enjoyed by men of like incomes engaged in commercial pursuits.

The medieval university arose in response to the need for training the clergy. At first clergymen were the instructors, but shortly there emerged a distinct class of teachers known as "the masters," some of whom were distinguished for learning in fields in no way connected with religious life.

Not all teachers, any more than all members of the clergy, were able to command the social prestige vouchsafed to the upper stratum of the aristocracy. It was the higher clergy and the men distinguished in the profession of learning who assumed the prestige of the aristocracy. The clergy as a whole and the learned professions in general lent themselves to social gradation not dissimilar to those persisting within the confines of the nobility.

While the aristocracy of intellect received many of its early recruits from among the aristocracy of wealth, there were among the former many men of

[1] Veblen, Thorstein, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, p. 367.

humble birth. Where they distinguished themselves by their achievements, they were able to take their places on a plane of social equality with their wealthy patrons. There is little doubt that much of the social prestige enjoyed in the modern era by the intellectual classes rests on early patronage of the clergy and the nobles.

It is common knowledge that the hereditary aristocracy of Europe accepted as one of its traditional obligations the fostering of the arts and sciences. Money gifts were not regarded by the beneficiaries as charity, for the recipients of the gifts, as well as the givers, acknowledged a mutual sacrifice for the purpose of promoting progress along lines wholly outside the realm of money valuation. It was realized that the uneducated masses had no appreciation of many of the contributions made in achievement, and that unless the patronage of the rich made possible the devotion of a lifetime to work which had little, if any, commercial value, progress for want of appreciative support would be disastrously thwarted. Annuities were granted, either large or small, to men of literary ability. The small remuneration offered men of learning for their services in the universities was supplemented often by appointments to public positions which demanded comparatively little service. These positions were awarded largely in recognition of public services rendered in the academic field, which in themselves

were unable to command incomes sufficiently large to maintain the requisite standard of living.

Wherever the landed aristocracy is in political control, the intellectual aristocracy enjoys a political patronage which frees it for the most part from financial worries. An inherited aristocracy is more likely to appreciate intellectual achievements than a public made up of men who are unfamiliar with the academic field of work. As early as the Elizabethan era, "it had grown to be a custom for the sons of rich men to spend some time at the university, as part of the training for a secular career."[1]

Where higher education is confined for the most part to an inherited aristocracy, it is sought with two ends in mind. One end is purely cultural; that is, cultural in the sense that knowledge is acquired which is of little practical value in the ordinary activities of life. It implies the possession of leisure if not of wealth. Professor Dewey insists that "our conception of culture is still tainted with inheritance from the period of the aristocratic seclusion of a leisure class — leisure meaning relief from participation in the work of a workaday world."[2]

The second end is far more creditable. Education is sought as a means of training for the responsibilities of the inherited social position. The "British

[1] Sheavyn, Ph., *The Literary Profession in the Elizabethan Age*, pp. 103–104.

[2] Dewey, John, *The Educational Situation*, pp. 96–97.

aristocracy have been distinguished as a class for their high standard, both of personal honor and of public duty,"[1] and a university education was accepted as a prerequisite in the training for the fulfillment of the administrative duties of the class.

Little wonder, then, that the early universities reflected the needs of the social aristocracy, and a point of view common to the class. The social structure within the universities was borrowed from the social gradations within the ranks of the nobles and the clergy. Their common origin is apparent.

The nobles were influenced in their conduct by the social ideals of their king, and when the court life in France emphasized luxurious expenditures in the maintenance of expensive standards of living no sacrifice seemed too great to meet the demands which their social position implied. According to Taine, "For a hundred and fifty years a kind of all-powerful attraction diverts the grandees from the provinces and impels them toward the capital; and the movement is irresistible, for it is the effect of two forces, the greatest and most universal that influence mankind, one, a social position, and the other the national character."[2]

In order to be free to live in the city where the court was held, the nobles were compelled to leave the management of their estates to paid overseers,

[1] Lecky, W. E. H, *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i, p. 392.
[2] Taine, H. A., *The Ancient Régime*, p. 43.

and this policy grew into a system of absentee landlordism which resulted in the alienation of the small landed gentry from the owners of the large estates.

When the nobles left their country estates in charge of subordinates, new injustices and tyrannies arose. On the other hand, what might have been interpreted as tyranny in the absence of the lord of the estate, when he was present was softened by the social contacts which inspired at the same time acts of kindliness in cases of need. But historical evidence pictures to us a peasantry increasingly oppressed. The financial needs of the absentee lords increased and led to unreasonable demands upon the cultivators of the land.

The burgher was more fortunate. While he was regarded as a source of revenue, "he was spared a little more because he stood together with many others behind walls. He was less of a prize and succeeded better in defending himself. On their side the nobles had need of the products of his industry and trade. They commenced also to understand that there was a profit for the seignior in facilitating the development of towns. When the burgher was rich, and they could not exact money from him by imposts or brutal force, they borrowed from him; they used him as a banker, whom they repaid partially or not at all."[1]

[1] Luchaire's *Social France at the Time of Philip Augustus;* trans. by E. B. Kiehbiel, p. 384.

The partial independence of the burgher in the twelfth century grew with his increasing wealth and culminated in his complete emancipation before the Middle Ages merged into the modern era.

The migration of the rural aristocracy from the country to the city was significant of a change in the criterion of social valuations. So important became wealth which could be readily converted into purchasing power, in order that the nobles might be able to meet the financial obligations incurred by their luxurious standards of living, that ownership of wealth, irrespective of its origin, carried with it social preferment. Taine tells us that "almost all the powerful and accredited families belong to 'the aristocracy,' whatever may be their origin and their date. Through their habitual or frequent residence near the court, through their alliances or mutual visits, through their habits and their luxuries, through the influence which they exercise and the enmities which they provoke, they form a group apart, and are those who possess the most extensive estates, the leading suzerainties, and the completest comprehensive jurisdictions."[1]

Not until the rising importance of commerce and trade was recognized were the social prerogatives of the ruling aristocracy challenged. It was in the modern era that those who had amassed wealth usurped the social prerogative of the landed aris-

[1] Taine, H. A., *The Ancient Régime*, p. 41.

tocracy in communities where capitalistic industries had reached considerable development. When "James I began to sell baronetcies and peerages, the distinction between rank and mere wealth became still less evident. . . . A natural consequence of the change was that men began to attach to riches an importance vastly greater than before. The commercial desire for gain spread rapidly; all classes entered into a race for wealth. Further, the existence of a number of opulent men, the merchant capitalists, tended to raise the general standard of comfort, and to encourage a spirit of luxury and display."[1]

The French Revolution transferred in France the political power to the *bourgeoisie* — a class that originally embraced only small landowners, but at the same time included also the tradesmen and manufacturers. A similar revolution was effected in England through peaceful means. The Reform Act of 1832 transferred political control to the House of Commons, but left intact the social aristocracy which was gradually worn away by the rise and conflict of industrial ideals.

"The middle class, which now became the most powerful in the political system, was one which could be excellently trusted with a controlling power. Aristotle long since observed that it is to this

[1] Sheavyn, Ph., *The Literary Profession in the Elizabethan Age*, pp. 2–3.

section of the community that the chief power in government may be most wisely and most profitably given. It is not the class most susceptible to new ideas or most prone to great enterprises, but it is distinguished beyond all others for its political independence, its caution, its solid practical intelligence, its steady industry, its high moral average. It also, perhaps, feels more promptly and more acutely than any other class the effects of misgovernment, whether that misgovernment takes the form of reckless adventure and extravagant expenditure, or whether in the not less dangerous form of revolutionary legislation, it disturbs settled industry, drives capital to other lands, and impairs the national credit, in which the whole commercial system must ultimately rest.

"In England, however, this middle class, though it became after 1832 the most powerful, had not the same absolute empire as in France. The active administration of affairs was chiefly in the hands of the upper and most cultivated class."[1]

It is not uncommon for members of the House of Commons to be chosen from among the upper classes. "A considerable proportion of the members of the House of Commons were returned by members of the House of Lords, and nearly every great family had at least one representative in the Commons. The aristocracy formed a connecting link between

[1] Lecky, W. E. H., *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i, p. 20.

the smaller country gentry and the trading and the industrial interests. . . . They possessed in many cases great fortunes in money; they had wider interests and more cosmopolitan tastes than the ordinary country gentlemen; and they shared with the commercial classes the ascendency in the boroughs. A few of them had risen from those classes, or were connected with them by marriage; while, on the other hand, they were the chief landowners, the natural leaders of the landowning classes."[1]

While the influence of the landed aristocracy is still seen in English political life, Lecky calls our attention to the absence of any apparent recognition on the part of the electorate of the contributions which might be made by the intellectual classes. "It is curious how often in modern England extreme enthusiasm for education is combined with an utter disregard for the opinions of the more educated classes."[2]

The social ascendency of the members of the middle class in Europe was secured largely through economic weapons. That is, the wealth of the class surpassed that held by the landowning aristocracy; but of no mean significance was the ability of some of its members to imitate the manners and habits of life of their social superiors. This was especially important when luxurious expenditures became

[1] Lecky, W. E. H., *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i, p. 4.
[2] *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 30.

symbolical of the higher social life. The cultural ideals of a class were not so easily assimilated, especially when they included intellectual activities.

The intellectual life of the noble class was highly colored by a traditional background made up of accumulated experiences, — economic, political and social, — which reflected themselves in a sense of responsibility for the community or country of which they were a part. The successful merchant could not meet this test. His social inheritances were those of a lower social and economic class which carried with them a deference for social superiors and no sense of social obligation to inferiors.

This middle class attitude was well reflected in the economic and social life of the community. Social valuations were made in terms of economic success, and individuals, as well as classes, were judged largely by qualities of character which served the individual in his struggle for financial gains. With the ascendency of the new criterion of social valuation, the landed aristocracy, unable to meet the demands of a life of leisure and extravagant display, either withdrew from the competition to the seclusion of their estates or entered into the field of commerce and trade.

Those suffering most from the transition of the political control from the landed aristocracy to the middle class tradesmen and small landowners were

the professional classes depending upon patronage for the promotion of their aims.

"The only persons who regarded very seriously their obligations as patrons of the literary man were the higher nobility and the older country gentry. But these were neither very wealthy nor very numerous, and were heavily burdened by increased expenditure due to social conditions. On the other hand, the wealthy *nouveau-riches* either held such obligations lightly, or held views which rendered them indifferent altogether to the literary art."[1]

The attitude of the middle class toward intellectual life is well illustrated in the political life of Ireland. "Nothing in the Irish representation is so manifestly wanting as a more adequate representation of loyalty and intelligence in three provinces. Loyal and well-educated men are to be found there in abundance; in nearly every form of industry, enterprise, and philanthrophy, they take the foremost places; but they have no corresponding weight in the political representation, as they are usually swamped by an ignorant and influential peasantry. . . . Yet we are now told that, in computing the relative strength of parties in Ireland, the University representation must be subtracted, as, 'it does not represent the nation.' "[2] The same opposition toward

[1] Sheavyn, Ph., *The Literary Profession in the Elizabethan Age*, p. 21.

[2] Lecky, W. E. H., *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i, pp. 28–29.

the influence of the educated classes in politics is seen in England. "Many of those who are doing their best to reduce the influence of education and intelligence in English politics are highly cultivated men, who owe to university education all that they are, though they are now imitating — usually with awkward and overstrained effort — the rant of the vulgar demagogue."[1]

In view of the fact that the English people have been compelled in the past to accept the leadership of their inherited aristocracy, it is reasonable to assume that many of the social phenomena characteristic of English life and wholly absent in America are survivals of the influence of an inherited aristocracy. Certain social valuations in England imply the acknowledgment of a well-established social leadership. To appreciate this, one need but contrast the evolution of the social classes in America. In England the gulf between social control and economic or political control is deep. In America the separation is far less evident. The varying results within the two English-speaking nations reflect wholly dissimilar antecedents.

[1] Lecky, W. E. H., *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i, p. 30.

CHAPTER XIV

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL CLASSES IN AMERICA

In America the landowners were mostly middle class folk. Between 1830 and 1840 universal manhood suffrage had been practically established among the white population, and with the development of an industrial organization the conflict between the industrial interests of the towns and the interests of a farming population became evident. The political control, whether held by the merchant and the manufacturing classes or by the rural folk, was recognized as a middle class control from the European point of view. Middle class interests and ideals dominated the country and were reflected in the early social institutions of America.

Any comparison made between the middle class of modern Europe and the middle class of America must take account necessarily of their respective social inheritances, as well as of the fact that the middle class in Europe and the middle class in America were not made up of the same social strata. The middle class of America, in its political and social control, shows a decided freedom from the aristocratic influence of an inherited social class. This

freedom from aristocratic influence results in part from a conscious effort to prevent any possible tendency to make political power in any sense hereditary. On the other hand, the middle class in Europe was made up at first of small landowners, and later it included the merchant and tradesman. It is true that the wealth of the latter, in specific instances, gave them admittance to the ranks of the social aristocracy, but without in any way fundamentally changing its social ideals. In America the middle class likewise included the landowning class, the merchants, and the tradesmen, but in addition many of the artisan class. The compensation of the skilled workmen in a country of undeveloped resources compared favorably at times with the incomes of small merchants and tradesmen. It was a common occurrence, especially before the Civil War, for skilled artisans to join the manufacturing class. Indeed, the last generation of manufacturers could claim an inheritance of neither wealth nor educational opportunities.

Their financial success came from the development of the unexploited resources of the country, and the protection afforded them in their new ventures by a government concerned in the protection of expanding industrial activities. The skilled workingmen in Europe, on the other hand, have always been considered a part of the lower class, — the upper social strata of the lower classes.

While the middle class in America includes men who, in a European régime, would be a part of the lower social strata, it also includes in its ranks groups who in Europe have been for generations a part of the social aristocracy. For instance, the intellectual classes in America are considered a part of the middle class, for their social status is measured in terms of their incomes. Where they have sources of income other than their salaries, they often merit aristocratic affiliations, especially when they are able to maintain a standard of living characteristic of the higher social classes.

This does not mean that an academic career in itself is wholly devoid of social significance. European influence made itself felt, at least for a few decades, in the Atlantic Coast states, but growing perceptibly less to the westward. It was in the East that custom and tradition found their most persistent stronghold, but even there is seen the leveling influence of modern industrialism upon social gradations. Competition, as an element in the fixing of salaries, has become more apparent with the growing instability of social status as fixed by custom.

It is true that no workers in the past were less conscious of their work status than university teachers. They would have scorned any allegation that their social status was similar to that of the artisans whose incomes compared favorably with theirs. They insisted that their social rating

depended upon their intellectual achievements, and that their goal in life was wholly dissociated from financial aspirations. They believed that they were alone in the ability to view the economic class struggle in society as disinterested and intelligent spectators.

Many believed that this contention on the part of the academic men was unfounded, and that in reality their sympathies have always been with the propertied classes and the well-established social aristocracy; for it was to the latter, and to the political state — in Europe — that the university men looked for financial support.

What was true of the university men was equally true of those men who pursued literary careers. There was in earlier days "absolutely no resource for the would-be writer but patronage or the monastery; failing these a man had to give up the attempt to live the literary life."[1]

For the most part the middle class in America has no intellectual background. Success in life resulted largely from individual qualities of character and access to economic resources which were in the process of exploitation. The successful men were practical men, — practical in the materialistic sense which inclines them to place undue importance upon success in the accumulation of worldly goods,

[1] Sheavyn, Ph., *The Literary Profession in the Elizabethan Age*, p. 20.

and to minimize intellectual contributions to the cultural life of a nation. "In the modern community, under the strain of the price system and the necessities of competitive earning and spending, many men and women are driven by an habitual bias in favor of a higher 'practical' efficiency in all matters of education; that is to say, a more single minded devotion to the needs of earning and spending."[1]

A common outlook is aptly expressed by Professor Dewey, "To very many the idea of culture covers adequately and completely that for which the college stands. Even to suggest that the college should do what the people want is to lay unholy hands on the sanctity of the college ideal. The people, the mob, the majority, want anything but culture — indeed, they are capable of anything but culture. The college stands for the remnant. It is the fortress of the few who are capable of upholding high ideals against the utilitarian clamor of the many. To ask that the colleges do what society wants done is to surrender or compromise the idea of culture by requiring the introduction of the professional factor — a preparation for specific callings in life."[2]

The middle class point of view is well reflected in the halls of state legislatures. Adequate appropriations to maintain institutions of higher learning

[1] Veblen, Thorstein, *The Higher Learning in America*, p. 42.
[2] Dewey, John, *The Educational Situation*, p. 97.

are made reluctantly, unless the results obtained from university training can be shown to be of material advantage to the students, or to the community as a whole. The practical work in agricultural colleges is notoriously more adequately supported than is the work in liberal arts which administer primarily to cultural aims. "The place in men's esteem once filled by church and state is now held by pecuniary traffic, business enterprise. So that the graver issues of academic policy which now tax the discretion of the directive powers, reduce themselves in the main to a question between the claims of science and scholarship on the one hand, and those of business principles and pecuniary gain on the other. In one shape or another this problem of adjustment, reconciliation, or compromise between the needs of higher learning and the demands of business enterprise is forever present in the deliberations of the university directorate."[1]

It might be assumed that the practical point of view, as demonstrated in middle class control of our institutions of higher learning, would show a high degree of appreciation for all scientific research if the ultimate aim of that research resulted in a more effective and complete control of natural forces, and, if successfully prosecuted, would bring about a greater freedom from environmental conditions. But such is not the case. Commendation and

[1] Veblen, Thorstein, *The Higher Learning in America*, p. 48.

support falls, for the most part, to those academic studies whose practical significance is seen in the immediate results to the individual or community.

In the countries still primarily under the control of an inherited aristocracy, the tendency is to foster scientific research under conditions which promise no specific results in the immediate future. This was seen in the recent war. "The Great War was based largely on science and engineering. During the twenty-five years preceding the outbreak of the war, the enemy had developed science and the practical applications of science in a wonderful way. He had fostered the industries, developed shipping and foreign trade, and promoted scientific research and education until the German nation stood in the forefront of the nations of the earth. . . . When the blow fell, the allied nations were unprepared, not only for the lack of armies and munitions, but for lack of industrial equipment, transportation facilities, and scientific development. Holding the enemy at bay under fearful odds while they built up their armies and their industries, the allied and the associated powers utilized all the resources of science and engineering and a vast amount of accumulated treasure to make good their initial deficiencies and gain strength enough to wear out and overcome the enemy."[1]

[1] Rosa, E. B., *The Economic Importance of the Scientific Work of the Government*, Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, June 19, 1920, p. 341.

The relative importance of the different functions of the state, as measured by the national budget of the United States for the year 1920, shows that the obligations arising from recent and previous wars, etc., and the war and navy departments, "amount to 92.8 per cent of the total; public works amount to 3 per cent, primary governmental functions 3.2 per cent, and research, education, and developmental work 1 per cent."[1]

It is interesting to note that of this inadequate amount, — 1 per cent, — which is allowed for research, education, and developmental work nearly two thirds is expended for the work of the Agricultural Department. In Great Britain the Engineering Standards Association is largely financed by the government, while the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research is a body financed entirely by the government. The American Engineering Standards Committee and the National Research Council (of America) are financed entirely without government aid.[2]

Professor Cooley attributes the progress of great industries in Germany, to a marked extent, to the technical schools. "They illustrate Germany's patient toil and tenacity in seeking success in the industrial world by rational means and scientific

[1] Rosa, E. B., *The Economic Importance of the Scientific Work of the Government*, Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, June 19, 1920, pp. 348–349.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 374.

methods. They are institutions devoted to the adaptation of science and education to the necessities of economic life."[1]

The well-established private corporations in America are making the best showing in their development of scientific research, and have drawn from our institutions of higher learning many of the men interested in research. The latter are given greater freedom and encouragement in their work than they would obtain in the universities. "The Standard Oil Company has attained a wonderful reputation for its technical and commercial success in deriving valuable products from petroleum, a result which could never have been reached without extensive research.

"The General Electric Company has achieved notable success in the development of electrical instruments and machinery, electric lamps, steam turbines, the applications of electricity to ship propulsion, etc., and a very large part of this success may be credited to its scientific development work. Its research laboratories have turned out many valuable contributions to science, in addition to the results of direct application to their business. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company, and its subsidiary, the Western Electric Company, have achieved a world-wide reputation for their development of long-distanced telephony, multiplex telephony and telegraphy, and radio telephony, as well

[1] Cooley, E. G., *Vocational Education in Europe*, p. 173.

as for the development of many of the engineering features of telephone practice of the present day."[1]

The Rockefeller Foundation is likewise making possible research in the sanitary field with the purpose of improving general health conditions. Not only hospitals for the training of men and women as physicians and nurses are established in foreign countries which are backward in social welfare, but vast sums are expended in the attempt to eradicate diseases which have made persistent ravages upon mankind.

Were not the initiative taken by individuals possessed of private fortunes, there is little doubt that the movement for the promotion of public health would be considerably handicapped in America, and hopelessly crippled for some time to come in many of the countries of the Far East.

It is apparent to all concerned that the middle class control of our institutions of higher learning reflects distinctly middle class social ideals, and whether the economic background is a rural or a commercial one, it is immediately reflected in the curriculum of the college or university.

Since the Civil War the industrial development of the country has been responsible for the transference of the political control from the landowning to the industrial class. There are exceptions, it is true, but

[1] Rosa, E. B., *The Economic Importance of the Scientific Work of the Government*, Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, June 19, 1920, pp. 370–371.

for the most part, success in industry is accepted as a criterion of a successful life, and this is undoubtedly responsible for the popularity and growth of college courses dealing directly with a business career. The ideals of business tend more and more to dominate university life, and are responsible also for revolutionizing the social status of the college teacher.

The men who command salaries commensurate with their standards of life, are men of business ability whose work is largely administrative, or men whose practical relationship to the business world is sufficiently close to make their teaching of distinctly practical character. So great is the demand on the part of our universities and colleges for "practical men" that their salaries tend to be out of proportion to their academic training when compared with the salaries of highly trained men who have done creditable research in fields only remotely connected, if at all, with business life.

Business methods applied to our institutions of higher learning — in conformity with the public's conception as to their real function — has led to a peculiar admixture of the old ideals and the new. While salaries and rank are awarded largely on a competitive bargaining basis, the intellectual status of the men within the university halls, and determined by the consensus of opinion of their fellow workers, rests primarily on their intellectual con-

tributions to their respective fields of work. It is not uncommon to find men in the institutions of higher learning who receive enviable salaries because of their bargaining power, yet whose academic training, teaching experience, and contributions to the intellectual world of achievement are of a comparatively low order. They reflect the intellectual standards of the common people far more accurately than the men whose academic ideals reflect the old order rather than the new.

The fact that university professors have been unable to maintain their class standards of living during the recent period of price inflation has had the effect of cheapening them socially in the public mind. Their shiny, threadbare coats and patched shoes are looked upon as evidence of their social degradation. Even the skilled mechanic, whose economic importance has been reflected in many instances in his increased wages, looks upon academic men with a degree of sympathy akin to pity; sympathy for the professor's poor bargaining power, and pity for his shortsightedness in not being able to see that his economic interests are the same as those of the wage earner. The apparent indifference on the part of the public conveys the impression to academic men that their financial predicament is accepted by people generally as an evidence of their lack of practical ability.

Recently one of the professors in a western uni-

versity died. His death was looked upon as a distinct national loss to the intellectual world. And yet, during his brief illness the attending physician and nurses were deeply moved by the fact that the professor's income was not sufficient to allow for the ordinary conveniences and comforts of the sickroom which were habitually in the homes of the working men. Other men, teaching in the same institution, were at the same time supplementing their salaries by the performance of unskilled work during the vacation periods. One went longshoring; another worked in the harvest field, and a third was a floorwalker in one of the department stores in the city. One professor, more fortunate than the others, had learned a trade in his early youth and so was not forced to compete with the unskilled. At the same time he was able in plying his trade to command an enviable income during his vacation period. There is little reason to believe that the experiences of the teachers in this western school differed fundamentally from those of men in other educational institutions during the recent period of price inflation.

The reaction upon the profession is apparent. Not only are fewer men willing to devote their lives to educational work, but those who cannot easily turn from their academic careers to more remunerative lines of work, because of early training, are becoming increasingly class conscious; a class consciousness

not with men of property but a class consciousness with pick-and-shovel men.

Robbed of the social prestige the class at one time enjoyed, denied complete freedom of research in fields not directly connected with industrial life in the state-controlled institutions, the profession offers little attraction to the *student* other than that afforded by the pleasure of teaching.

Professor Veblen insists that "the intrusion of business principles in the universities goes to weaken and retard the pursuit of learning, and therefore to defeat the ends for which a university is maintained. The result follows, primarily, from the substitution of impersonal mechanical relations, standards or tests, in the place of personal conference, guidance, and association between teachers and students; as also from the imposition of a mechanically standardized routine upon the members of the staff, whereby any disinterested preoccupation with scholarly or scientific inquiry is thrown into the background and falls into abeyance."[1]

In view of recent changes taking place in the social status of the profession of teaching, it is not surprising that the point of view of the teacher is undergoing a greater change than is evident in any other social class. That the profession has lost its oldtime social moorings is evident in the affiliations made, in an increasing number, with labor organizations.

[1] Veblen, Thorstein, *The Higher Learning in America*, pp. 224–225.

Teachers' organizations have existed for many years, but within the last ten years such a great impetus has been given to the movement as to call into existence teachers' organizations in nearly all the institutions of higher learning, and some of them have become affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.

That the strike has not been generally resorted to on the part of the teachers is due probably to two reasons. First, teachers are employees of the state, and the public shows little tendency to condone on the part of its employees acts which it is willing to concede to the employees in privately owned industries. Second, many teachers are still cherishing the idea that they are not a wage-conscious class, but are pursuing their profession in a spirit of sacrifice for the general good, or for the love of their work, and that their incomes are in no way a criterion of their class status; for them deliberately to throw in their lot with the wage-earning classes, and to use the tactics of organized labor to improve their wage conditions would result in breaking the last tie which binds them, though ever so lightly, to a social class possessing an enviable economic rating. But the number of so-called conservative teachers is growing perceptibly smaller.

Organized labor is likewise sensing a close social and economic relationship in the teaching forces. Direct attempts are made on the part of the American

Federation of Labor to bring the organized teachers into the national labor movement. Organizers are employed to encourage and to promote the affiliations wherever the spirit of the teaching group shows a tendency to be in a receptive mood.

It has been repeatedly suggested that the only way to check this alignment of the teaching forces with labor is to raise the salaries of teachers to that point where they will be able to associate on a footing of social equality with the so-called aristocracy. It is unreasonable to assume, it is claimed, that the teachers will or can reflect or present the point of view of a class when they do not come in social contact with that class. Outside the schoolroom the teachers' associations, when not confined to their own professional group, tend to be limited to the income groups whose expenditures compare favorably with their own.

The literary man was compelled to adapt himself to an industrial environment at a much earlier date, for the patronage he enjoyed was of far less significance than that which fell to the lot of the university man. In Europe, the latter was generally the recipient of the state's patronage in the form of official positions which were income producing, yet demanded little of his time outside his usual scholastic pursuits. The teacher received the patronage of individuals only indirectly. The literary man was far less fortunate. When unable to enlist the

interest of men and women who were willing to stand sponsor for his literary efforts, he suffered the pangs of the most abject poverty. His living often proved so precarious, even under the best conditions, that he early showed a decided tendency to wield his pen for the public's favor. His publisher's interests in the financial side of his literary endeavors led to the almost constant consideration of "what will sell." It is true that there are men who refuse to "prostitute" their art in catering to the public's tastes. They write wholly for an intellectual audience which is small in numbers and often poor in purse, yet, occasionally they live to see the day when their literary efforts are recognized and compensated to such an extent as to make them financially independent in their future undertakings. The literature of a country reflects the spirit of the age, and one might add, reflects as well the source of its patronage.

What is true of the literary profession is equally true of dramatic art. The desire and the need of an appreciative audience was recognized by the men of the stage at a time when the literary men of Europe enjoyed a considerable patronage. The social position of the former, whether playwright or not, "was of the lowest. They were certainly regarded as of low social status; theirs is called 'the basest trade,' and perhaps the consciousness of this, undermining their self-respect, tended to

encourage some of them to give way to their coarser instincts."[1]

It is only within the last generation that the theatrical profession has been able to free itself wholly from the social stigma formerly attached to it. The patronage denied theatrical men in their earlier history convinced them that their support had to come from the general public, and so they made every possible effort to reflect the humors of their prospective audiences, and at the same time to carry on an educational campaign, not only to dislodge well-established prejudices against the profession, but to train the public into an appreciation of the higher dramatic art. Without doubt no other profession has so successfully adapted itself to the demands of the time. Misrepresentation of the desires of the public immediately reflected itself in an unappreciative audience, if not an empty house.

Originally possessed of a middle class population, — according to European standards of valuation, — America developed, with the rise of large scale industry, men of wealth and social position whose prestige compared favorably with that enjoyed by the inherited aristocracy of Europe. The power arising from the ownership of large fortunes was quickly transplanted into political power. Many students of politics conclude that the middle class

[1] Sheavyn, Ph., *The Literary Profession in the Elizabethan Age*, pp. 97–98.

control, exercised over the national government in the early history of the country, has been usurped by a small class made up of men who possess large vested interests. While the influence of great wealth may be seen in the national political life, it is less conspicuous in state legislatures, where the small landowing classes are well represented.

The tendency of wealthy classes in America to form matrimonial alliances with the social aristocracy of European nations suggests the possibility that, in the course of time, the social aristocracy in America will be an hereditary one in the same sense as it persists in the industrial countries of modern Europe. If this conjecture proves true, the ascendency of the middle class of the present time will be superseded, if it has not already been superseded, by a ruling aristocracy whose origin rests on the ownership of industrial wealth, rather than on jurisdictional claims over vast landed areas, which was characteristic of the feudal régime.

It is a well-known fact that the industrial aristocracy of America arose from within the ranks of the middle class, if not from the ranks of the working poor. Both of the latter social groups have contributed their quota of individuals to the so-called social *élite* of America, and this fact doubtless accounts for the unusual confidence in an unrestrained individualism which results in the selection for economic survival of the fittest, if not the best, of the human

elements. Indeed, it is only within the last generation that doubt seems to be entertained concerning the long-established faith that the hewers of wood and the drawers of water had an equal chance, — if not a superior one, — with the sons of fortune. So often has our attention been called to the fact that many of our wealthy men were newsboys in their early youth, or unskilled laborers in the pioneering days, that these early activities are often looked upon as providing distinct advantages when it comes to accumulation of a fortune.

But the industrial changes of the last century, while increasing the wealth of the wealthy class, have offered upon the whole no great boon to the middle class, if we accept the conservative estimate of wealth distribution in the United States made by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The contention that the rich are becoming richer and the poor more prosperous, in part at the expense of the middle class, suggests the future possibility of a new social alignment made up of two classes only, namely, the rich and the working poor.

The World War accentuated pre-war tendencies in the distribution of wealth. The increased cost of living bore most disastrously upon that portion of the middle class whose income was derived from salaries or small investments. The plane of living of the latter was necessarily, in many instances, far below the customary habits of consumption; while

the plane of living of the workers, for the most part, showed a decided rise. The immediate reaction on the part of the middle class resulted in a more or less concerted protest against the increasing concentration of wealth, and in demands for governmental supervision or ownership of the basic industries of the country. Some see the possible merger, in the near future, of the interests of the two classes — the middle class and the working class — in common political action. The labor government in England is given as a case in point.

The social evolution of the different classes has been largely a progressive ascent from the lower social classes to the higher and, at times, the social ascent of entire classes. For instance, the merchant invaded the social precincts of the landed aristocracy; the successful manufacturer next pressed his social claims. The higher groups of the middle class population were increasingly invading the social realm of the higher social classes; and within the middle class itself the different social strata tended to push upward in social gradation. The same changes were taking place within the lower class. The slave became a serf; the serf an independent workman; and the latter, if financially fortunate in his industrial undertakings, found himself within the ranks of the middle class.

Reverse conditions have taken place at times where social class lines run athwart the economic ones, and

social control fell to individuals whose chief claim to leadership rested on a new economic alignment in which intellectual training played little if any part. That is to say, the social aristocracy at the present time portrays a cultural inferiority in their appreciation of the higher intellectual life. They may possess more of the sterling qualities of character than their progenitors, and a higher standard of morality (this is debatable), but for the most part they do not cherish to the same degree as their social predecessors the higher intellectual and cultural life.

The general tendency of the leveling *up* of social gradations, through a rise in standards of living, has led to greater uniformity in educational opportunities. Men are becoming nearer alike in their mental training, and this has led to the assumption of a social equality with others. This is especially true with the wider diffusion of high standards of living. The pithy saying in America that, "every man is as good as every other man," suggests a more or less acknowledged social uniformity brought about through the comparative ease with which social barriers are overcome. To the European, America stands out as unique in its social democracy — a social democracy attained by the adoption of the standards of living of their recognized superiors. In other words, the Industrial Revolution in America revolutionized social class lines. The flexibility of the latter, resting as they do largely upon social

standards of living, gave considerable impetus to the tendency to climb the social ladder until a condition of affairs has been reached where one's social status and the accompanying standards of living are higher than economic gradations warrant. The social revolution has progressed at a greater pace than the economic, and, as a result, there has arisen a spirit of social unrest which demands a reconciliation between social standards of living and standards of real income. A more even distribution of incomes is demanded so as to make possible the realization of the cherished higher standards of living. This necessarily implies the lowering of the plane of living of the well-to-do, all other things remaining the same, and would be in direct contradiction to the theory that incomes should be so distributed as to make adequate allowances for the differences in appreciation and enjoyment of the higher cultural needs. For instance, many social scientists uphold gradations in standards of living on the basis that the hod-carriers' needs are necessarily confined to lower levels of culture than those of the so-called intellectual classes. This attitude is in "flat hostility to the ethics of modern life," says Professor Dewey. He is unwilling to concede that there are "two different aims of life located on different planes; that the few who are educated are to live on a plane of exclusive and isolated culture, while the many toil below on the level of practical

endeavor directed at material commodity. The problem of our modern life is precisely to do away with all the barriers that keep up this division."[1]

The conscious repression of one's social status, or the social status of an entire class, does not lend itself to a peaceful solution of the problem, but will add to the sum total of discontent with an economic and social order which, to many, offers apparent injustices. Nothing short of a redistribution of wealth, it seems, will satisfy the protestants. The question arises as to whether the class struggle will end here, or will be transferred to a new competitive field in which wealth inequalities will play a small part.

Men do not love social equality. While the masses of the people struggle to establish social equality with their recognized social superiors, they at the same time insist quite consistently on social inequality with their less fortunate brothers. The desire to excel has its basis in a love for emulation, and it proves to be a far stronger power for action than does a desire for universal social equality, which means lowering the social status of some, as well as raising the social status of others. An equality, implying a social loss to some and at the same time a social gain to others, will never receive undivided support. The winners in the new social alignment will undoubtedly erect new social barriers,

[1] Dewey, John, *The Educational Situation*, p. 98.

difficult to scale by their near competitors. This may necessitate the establishment of different standards of social valuation, but the latter will never be so far afield as to hazard the loss of an appreciative audience. For, after all, emulation requires a human background of understanding. In so far as this is true, the lower social classes influence the standards of social valuation upheld by their so-called superiors.

CHAPTER XV

NATIONAL ASPECTS OF CONSUMPTION

The pessimistic philosophy of Malthus, that the population tends to increase faster than the food supply, has received little credence in the modern age of industrial development. When Malthus formulated his law of population he had in mind the dietary habits of the English people, which fixed a minimum below which the budget allowance could not fall without bringing disaster in its wake.

But when we translate Malthus' law in the terms of modern budgets, we see its inevitable application in the pressure of standards of living upon the means of subsistence. The problem is met in part with a decrease in the birth rate, which tends to decrease in direct ratio to increasing wants. "Even with the aid of the millions of big family foreign-born in our midst," says Professor Ross, "the American mother's fruitfulness is only about a third of that of the French Canadians in the good old days, and a mere half of what you find among the Slavic people. Our excess of births over deaths is only 70 per cent. Our national growth of population is a little less than 1 per cent a year. Keeping this up for seventy-

eight years and ignoring immigration, we should come to the year 2000 A.D. with only two hundred and twenty-two millions of population."[1]

The control of the birth rate, and the importance attached to desires and aspirations in no way connected with sex life, have proved effective checks to the play of natural tendencies in the increase of population. Unlike India, where the population in the last century under British rule increased from two hundred to three hundred millions, letting out all the slack in income, we have in the United States a different source of limitation, for, as Professor Fetter says, "a people accustomed to a goodly income and to a large measure of comfort of surroundings is restrained from early marriage and large families by far different motives than the fear of starvation. When the increase of population ceases to be actually limited by objective restraints and is limited by psychic means, there is no telling how strong the new forces will become or where they will cease to operate."[2]

The birth rate in the United States will probably continue to decline as wants increase, or as standards of living rise, in the face of the present tendency. The concern felt by a nation because of a lowered birth rate, unless compensated by a lower mortality rate, rests primarily on the importance attributed

[1] Ross, Edward A., *The Necessity of an Adaptative Fecundity*, Publications of Am. Sociological Society, vol. xvi, pp. 182–183.

[2] Fetter, F. A., *Economic Principles*, vol. i, pp. 417–418.

to numbers and kind.[1] Numbers have been increased through immigration, but with the prospect that the future national type of American population will be of a southern and eastern European origin.

While numbers are important when engaged in international conflicts, the problem of the need for an increased food supply becomes significant with increasing wants.

The increase of national wealth during the last generation has led to the belief, on the part of many people, that the possibilities of wealth production of the future are so great as to preclude any misgivings that the food supply will not meet the growing needs of an increasing population. The disasters in the past, due to inadequate food supply, must be credited to ignorance of modern methods of production which have made inoperative the economic law of diminishing returns when applied to the nation as a whole. Wealth is held to be — if not unlimited in amount — at least of sufficient quantity to meet the needs of all, were it evenly distributed for consumption and not wasted in order to serve the selfish ends of a comparatively few.

[1] Ross, Edward A., *Th Necessity of an Adaptative Fecundity*, Publications of Am. Sociological Society, vol. xvi, p. 178. The United States "ha been tardy in collecting vital statistics. However, we have this most significant fact. In 900 the death rate in our 'registration area' was 17.6 per thousand of the population. In 1919 in a registration area which had expanded until it included three fourths of us, the rate was 13 — a reduction of a *fourth* in nineteen years!"

The productive yield of land is increased through the more scientific use of fertilizers and by the rotation of crops. Where once grew small crops large crops are harvested as a result of scientific analysis of the soil. The kind of crop to be planted is determined, to a greater or less extent, by the nature of the soil rather than by the agricultural habits of the farmers. It is true that among them are some farmers who are still guided by habits and customs in the planting of their crops, and who get in return for their labor only a bare living, but their number is steadily decreasing as more dependence is placed upon the advice of agricultural experiment stations and agricultural colleges.

The losses sustained by the farmers and the consumers because of cumbersome marketing facilities are receiving the attention of the economists, and although much progress has been made in the development of coöperative enterprises, the campaign against waste in marketing is only begun. "The American city still thinks corner-grocery-wise of its food supply," says King. "There has not even been adequate community action toward lowering costs to the middlemen and to the retailer to the end that ultimately there may be lower costs to the consumer. In food supplies, as in government, we are applying a country point of view to a twentieth century city."[1]

[1] King, C. L., *Lower Living Costs in Cities*, p. 7.

The extensive use of machinery in industry, division of labor in individual industrial plants, as well as territorially, has increased production many-fold, and freed nations from the necessity of producing their entire food supply, and allowed them to develop the industrial arts in which they possess some national advantage.

Small-scale production has been superseded by large-scale production. By-products, formerly classified as waste, have, in some instances, proved more valuable when measured in terms of wants satisfied than what was formerly the main object of production. Cotton seed, formerly put upon the land as fertilizer, later was fed to stock, and is now used as a human food. The numerous by-products in the meat-packing industry are well known, and scientists are entertaining hopes that many products now considered as inedible can be used in the future as substitutes for more expensive foods.

Indeed, it is thought by many people that the most serious economic problem of the present time is that of wealth distribution. Dr. Spahr estimated in 1896 that 88 per cent of the people of the country received 65 per cent of the national income. Fourteen years later the studies of Professor W. I. King led him to the conclusion that 88 per cent of the people received 62 per cent of the national income; a decrease of three per cent, lending weight to the argument that the bargaining power of the masses

diminishes with the advancement of capitalistic methods of production. The Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research states that in 1918 about "60 per cent of the national income was divided among 86 per cent of the gainfully employed who had incomes less than $2000 per annum."[1]

Spahr further estimated that 1.6 per cent of the richest families in 1896 secured 10.8 per cent of the national income. King found that in 1914 the same group received 19 per cent of the national income.[2]

"Poverty in a poor country," says J. A. Hobson, "is one thing; poverty in a rich country is another. Moreover, it is becoming more self-conscious, and consequently more restless. There is much in modern towns to account for this — the contrast of luxury, which mocks their misery; innumerable means of education, which sow the seed of new wants without supplying the opportunities to satisfy them. The difference between the number of felt wants and the power to satisfy them constitutes poverty in its present conscious state; and, though physiological or absolute poverty may be diminishing, their felt poverty is growing."[3]

There is a common conviction that the present uneven distribution of wealth implies an extrava-

[1] National Bureau of Economic Research, *Income in the United States*, p. 146.

[2] King, W. I., *The Wealth and Income of the P ople of the United States*, pp. 230–231.

[3] Hobson, J. A., *The Social Problem*, p. 13.

gant consumption of goods on the part of the wealthy, corresponding to the amount of wealth they control; and, if the claims to the world's wealth were more evenly distributed, the sacrifices involved would fall alone on the former wealthy classes. Such statements, however, are open to controversy.

The extravagance of the wealthy classes cannot be denied. The evidences of their wasteful expenditures and their unnecessary consumption of goods are constantly flaunted before the public eye. There are a few exceptions. For instance, there are wealthy families conspicuous for their frugality. They aspire to simple living as a means of attaining their desired ideals. But the economy of these few is offset manyfold by the conspicuous extravagance of others, and in the face of existing poverty leads to the belief that if wealth were evenly distributed there would be more than sufficient for all.

But if the wealthy classes were forced to adopt simple standards of living, and if the consumption goods so released were widely distributed among the poor, the well-being of the latter would not necessarily be considerably enhanced. Unsatisfied wants would still be legion. The difficulty involved is that most of the wealth concentrated in the hands of a comparatively few is in the form of production goods, and in spite of the luxuriant living of the possessors of great wealth, the goods consumed form a very small share of the controlled wealth.

That so much wealth takes this form rather than that of consumption goods is due to demand. The laws of competition direct the flow of the surplus wealth of a community into those avenues of production which promise the greatest financial returns. Capital goods are scarcer than labor power, and since the laborers are the principal consumers of the world's wealth, their comparatively low bargaining power precludes, under normal conditions, a markedly increased demand for consumption goods.

On the other hand, the demand for capital goods increases more rapidly than their accumulation. Were all industrial enterprises of a nation confined within its own geographical boundaries, the increase of capital goods would bring into operation the law of diminishing returns; for, unless new avenues of investment were found, — due to the discovery of new unexploited resources, or to a further development of the industrial arts, — the supply of capital, as the supply of labor, would be in excess of the demand when measured in terms of customary profits.

But the national consciousness of capital goods is largely opportunistic. It flows freely to the lands of unexploited resources and, if in jeopardy in a foreign land, seeks and demands political preferment for its protection and its security. The main obstacle to the development of many nations recently awakened to a new industrial consciousness,

is the absence of capital goods. Labor, although untrained, is abundant. It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that backward nations are willing to grant political and industrial concession, to the owners of capital of other countries.

Thus the surplus of wealth, produced over and above that which takes the form of consumption goods for home use, tends to drift into the lands of rich unexploited resources. Here new methods of production are introduced to supersede primitive ones. In the period of transition from the old industrial methods to the new, exploitation of labor is common, — including the labor of women and children, — and leads to the questioning of the new industrial order.

Again, the economic surplus seeks new avenues of investment, and undoubtedly results not only in the exploitation of undeveloped resources, but at the same time brings about a wider diffusion of industrial knowledge common to western nations. Primitive methods of production are rapidly superseded by modern methods, but the gains thus made do not necessarily fall to those workers who assist in the production of an excessive amount of capital goods; or to those who under a new industrial order work with modern instead of primitive tools. Their share depends upon their bargaining power, and in the southern and eastern lands is often pitifully low.

But there is another aspect of the problem. When the production of the wealth of a country has been enormously increased by the introduction of the modern capitalistic system, it is only a question of time when its wider distribution is demanded by those who have indirectly benefited, educationally, by the new order of things; while a low general production offers no possible avenue of escape from abject poverty.

The conclusion often presented, that the progressive industrial development of backward countries is at the expense of the uneven distribution of wealth in other lands, is tenable. But if the ideal of general well-being is international rather than national, the costs involved may be far less than the gains accruing to those peoples who have been in the recent past the victims, repeatedly, of a primitive poverty régime.

The object of those who control much of the wealth and income of the country is not the promotion of general welfare, which can be advanced only through a rational consumption of wealth, but to increase their own financial interests. To do so, they consider commodities only in terms of their money value, and, it is believed, curtail their supply when it is desirable to do so in order to increase their margin of profit. Food at times is left to rot or is destroyed for the purpose of keeping prices on a high level, or because the market price is not sufficiently high to

prevent an actual economic loss in bringing the commodities within reach of the consumer.

Conscious interference with the law of supply and demand is not restricted to capitalistic interests. In many instances labor organizations, too, find that it is to their advantage to restrict the output of the men employed as a means of creating an increased demand for labor, and by so doing increase labor's bargaining power in the fixing of wage rates.

If the industry in which the restriction is practiced is a competitive one, and the price of the product manufactured is determined by the cost of production, the burden of the restriction of output falls on the consumers, but the consumers are not necessarily the employees. The article produced may be wholly outside their financial reach, or it may belong to the category of goods used in the production of other products, such as steel products used in the making of implements or machinery, and whose increased cost is widely distributed among the various economic classes. Even when the product is one consumed by the workers, their wage gains are often in excess of the additional financial outlay they are compelled to make in its consumption.

If the industry in question is not subject to that degree of competition which brings the price of the product down to the cost of production, the burden of the increase will fall on the profits of the firm, if it cannot be shifted advantageously to the consumers.

When restriction of output is practiced either by voluntary action on the part of the organized workers or the employers, or through legislative action in order to protect the health of the workers, its significance in terms of production is negligible, for where overfatigue results from excessive hours of work, or excessive speed in production, the productive power of the individual worker is so effectively curtailed in the immediate future as to restrict his output below that which would prevail were moderation practiced.

Yet, in spite of present-day optimism as to the possibilities of future production, many economists believe that the problem of increased production of the means of subsistence is of far greater importance than that of its distribution. They do not minimize the desirability of a greater equality in the distribution of the national income in order to promote the general well-being of the people. But they realize the inevitableness of the law of diminishing returns when applied to natural resources, while a redistribution of the wealth produced can be effected when the people will it.

It is common knowledge that the greatest wars in history have been inspired by a desire for the possession of greater natural resources essential to an increased production. England, France, and Germany have provided themselves with raw materials by means of conquest. The United States does not stand out as exceptional, although her vast

geographical area has brought within her reach raw materials which have not only supplied her local demands, but fed in part the markets of the world.

The noted scientist and socialist, Dr. Steinmetz, remarked, "The vast natural resources made it possible to use what we have not produced, and thereby led to an average consumption, an average standard of living, beyond that of any other country. This is a rather serious problem, as it means that our nation has largely been living on its capital and not on its income, and thereby acquired habits of the spendthrifts. But our national resources are greatly depleted, and when it will not be possible any more to cut down for lumber the trees which we have not planted, to take from the soil as crops what we have not put in, and when every tree which we cut down will have to be planted and raised, as in other countries, when we shall have to put into the soil as fertilizer whatever we take out as crops, then under the present industrial organization of our country we will not be able to maintain our present standard of living."[1]

There are instances, it is true, where the law of decreasing returns has proved applicable. For instance, most of the soils of the Atlantic seaboard were early robbed of their natural fertility and the farmers migrated to the frontier. As the returns

[1] Steinmetz, Charles, *America and the New Epoch*, pp. 23–24.

became less attractive these lands in turn were deserted for the new frontier farther to the westward. The natural limitation to the west fixed by the Pacific Ocean directed the emigrant stream north and into Canada.

The coal easily accessible a century ago, like other desirable minerals, is calling for deeper and deeper shafting at an increasing financial cost. The forests, too, are receding farther into the background, and fuel and timber have become more difficult of access. Our streams, lakes, and even the oceans are being fished out, so to speak; at least to a degree where the national government feels the need of increasing the supply by artificial methods of propagation through fish hatcheries. The wealth of the country has been increased largely at the expense of new resources, and a more scientific system of production must now be applied to the old.

"If civilization," says Professor Carver, "should remain relatively stationary while population increases in density, there would be a smaller per capita production because of the law of diminishing returns. The terrible reality of this law is witnessed by the overcrowding of those populations where, as in the unchanging East, civilization has become stationary — enveloped in a 'crust of custom' which counteracts and destroys the enlivening effects of density. . . .

"Even under the conditions of modern civilization,

the operation of this law can be clearly observed with respect to any particular industry. Hunting and fishing still decline speedily in productivity when the number of hunters or fishers increases in any given area of land or water. Pasturage still conforms to the same law as it did in the days of Abraham and Lot. Agriculture becomes less remunerative under the same conditions, which alone accounts for the migration of the farmers from the more densely to the less densely settled areas of the same general fertility. Even manufacturing becomes less productive per unit of labor and capital employed, after the best situations have been occupied and the existing plants have reached the maximum economy of large-scale production."[1]

Where a country's prosperity depends primarily upon her unexploited resources, their use makes it evident that it is only a question of time when the people will be compelled to lower their habitual plane of consumption unless the depletion of the natural resources is accompanied by the development of others whose economic value is still undiscovered.

But the wants of an enlightened people are never stationary. New wants are constantly stimulated, and the demand for their gratification becomes increasingly more emphatic.

The luxuries of yesterday are the necessities of

[1] Carver, T. N., *The Distribution of Wealth*, pp. 97–98.

today, but their production, in many instances, is at an increasing cost. "There are many rare products consumed by the wealthier classes today which could not be produced in abundance for all, except at greatly increased cost. It would probably be impossible for every family to have maple syrup for breakfast even at fifty dollars a gallon. The rubber industry, at present, is one of rapidly increasing costs; hence, if every family demanded a touring car, the tire expense would be very high. The law of diminishing returns is, in many lines, an inexorable fact of nature."[1]

With the expansion of wants, then, it is evident that many commodities, now in the class of luxuries, would still be limited in their use, even were incomes equitably distributed. "Even if the common workingman could be guaranteed an income of five to ten thousand a year, he would still have to earn this income, in most cases, by strenuous, disagreeable, monotonous, and often dangerous work, and in the expenditure of this income he would be limited in many ways by new customs, ideals, and expenses and would be confined to a life of considerably greater simplicity and less luxury than that enjoyed by the man with a like income under the present status of society."[2]

[1] Ely, Richard T., *Property and the Distribution of Wealth*, vol. ii, p. 835.

[2] *Ibid.*

If the nation's total income were evenly distributed, and this distribution maintained for any length of time by legal devices, there is little doubt but that there would arise an immediate and increased demand for consumption goods. The newly acquired incomes would be spent for the purpose of enjoying the standards of living unrealized because of insufficient incomes. Under the circumstances there would be a tendency for savings to become impaired, and the amount of capital set aside as a replacement fund, or for the further development of industrial enterprises, to be considerably curtailed. Were this true, the production of consumption goods in the future would necessarily be less, and the plane of living of the people would reflect the relative decrease of economic goods.

The above premise was carried out to its logical conclusion during the World War. So great was the immediate need for consumption goods to carry on the war that the governments concerned sought to direct all production to promote this end. Much of the capital goods formerly set aside as a replacement fund took the form of consumption goods, and new industrial enterprises which called for capitalistic investments were discouraged, unless the immediate results promised an increased production of goods needed to promote the war.

The burden of an excessive consumption during the period was met in part by the sacrifices of those

people who cut their demands for goods to the lowest possible minimum. This was done under the stimulus of patriotism, and suggested restrictions in the consumption of certain commodities which were almost compulsory under the force of public opinion. But much of the burden of this consumption during the great conflict fell upon the immediate future. Prices sped upward. This was due, in part, to the inflation of money values and to profiteering, but of no little importance was the fact that a limited supply of consumption goods resulted from the scarcity of capital goods in the form of machinery and other instruments of production. This fact necessitated the continuance of a policy of directing the surplus wealth of the community into those industrial activities which would speedily promote the resumption of normal production. The demand for luxuries was discouraged, — such as the demand for automobiles, — so as to release the materials for the production of farm and industrial machinery. Were no restriction practiced, production would follow the line of greatest demand, and those products would be produced which would meet the demands of the newly rich anxious to reflect their new economic status in the realization of higher standards of living.

But many take the stand that the demands of war were far in excess of any possible demand under normal peace conditions. In the latter case, time

would allow for an economic adjustment to the new conditions. One of these adjustments would be a large increase in production, stimulated by the better living conditions of the workers, and the conviction that the increased production would redound to their benefit rather than to the benefit of the stockholders in business enterprises, as at present.

Many of the articles of consumption carry with them no social prestige, but reflect merely the customary habitual diet of a people. Under a conscious direction of consumption, as was done during the war, the same physiological needs could be met at a far less cost. That is, by the substitution of products of comparatively low cost of production for goods produced at an increasing cost, the consumable wealth of a community would be considerably increased. For instance, "a great increase in population could result from an essentially vegetable diet and the omission of animal raising. The ox that consumes as much as five men, lives at least two years, and will not produce over 750 pounds of meat. It is reported that the excessive amount of five pounds of meat per day is allowed for the Argentine cowboy. Thus, an ox represents 150 days' rations for the Argentinian *versus* 3,650 days' rations (ten years) for the Oriental — one of the many striking results produced by difference in the density of population."[1]

[1] Smith, J. Russell, *Industrial and Commercial Geography*, p. 76.

Professor Nourse suggests that "lands adapted to raising grapefruit will be likely to remain waste lands unless the public can be persuaded to increase their consumption of grapefruit. The same may be said concerning other sections. Wisconsin bog lands are unsuited to ordinary types of farming, but if the cranberry be made a more important item in the customary family diet, such lands become a productive resource, and our general agricultural efficiency is enlarged by so much."[1]

The use of fruits and vegetables out of season often results in satiety before the native crops come into the market. This means waste of the native crop and the consumption of the foreign product at a high cost.

A similar situation is described by Professor Fetter in relation to meat and fish. "While the cost of living is mounting steadily and beef is bringing Civil War prices, tons of fresh fish are being shipped daily from Fulton market to Barren Island to be made into fertilizer."[2]

While there are possibilities of a more intelligent consumption of products than at present, the educational task becomes difficult in face of the fact that many items of consumption are closely linked to the social life of the community. The food values of alcoholic drinks and of tobacco are negligible.

[1] Nourse, E. G., *Agricultural Economics*, pp. 79–80.
[2] Fetter, *Source Book in Economics*, p. 58.

As stimulants or as sedatives their social importance is great; so great, in many instances, as to give them precedence in many family budgets over essential foods. Any program adopted to restrict or to prohibit the use of intoxicating liquors or tobacco must come from the nonusers, so great is their tyranny over the people habituated to their use.

The economic aspect of the extensive use of tobacco and alcohol is significant. For instance, land used for the raising of tobacco cannot be used for raising of food materials. "If it takes fifteen bushels of wheat to make bread enough to last one man a year, and if an acre of land will raise only fifteen bushels, it is plain that if a man has only half an acre of land he must raise something more than wheat, or go hungry. So long as a community having land of this kind lives on wheat, we could say with certainty just how many persons this land will support. There could be only as many men as acres of land. If, without substituting a more productive crop for wheat, they should use one sixth of their land to raise tobacco, the number of people would be reduced by one sixth. Should they now acquire a love of beer and use a second sixth of the land to raise barley and hops, there would be one third less population than there was before these habits were formed."[1]

[1] Patten, Simon N., quoted in Nourse's *Agricultural Economics*, pp. 94–95.

Upon the whole, the only conscious direction given to consumption — outside of that offered by the departments of home economics in our public schools and colleges — comes from the producers who are interested only in the profit side of their goods. But often a policy pursued solely for financial gain results in social gain. For instance, the raisin campaign in California and the apple campaign in the state of Washington have undoubtedly resulted in a far wider consumption of the fruit than in former years.

But often a policy pursued solely for financial gain results in a community loss when, by skillful advertising, the producers or merchants succeed in persuading the consumers to substitute goods of less utility for those of a higher utility, and which can be purchased at a lower price. Such is true, as we have seen, of many breakfast foods, canned goods, and fancy staples. For this reason it is desirable for the government, through food experts, to resume its wartime policy of instructing the public in food values and their possibilities in the family menu.

The production and distribution of wealth are inevitably linked together in the consideration of the national aspects of consumption. A change in one or the other reflects itself positively or negatively in the relationship. Therefore the economists are justified in the emphasis they place on the need of considering the distribution of wealth in its effects

upon production. An apparently beneficiary policy may in time prove destructive to the end in view. Furthermore, the more effective and wider uses of the natural resources of a country does not refute the law of diminishing returns. That the efficacy of this law is questioned is due to the ingenuity of man in the promotion of inventions which make possible a wider range of substitutes for the depleted commodity.

Were all wants stationary, the pressure of population on the means of subsistence, if not met by the development of new economic resources or more effective use of the old, would still be inevitable, unless met by a decrease in the birth rate or by destructive wars and devastating epidemics. But wants are not stationary. Under the existing social conditions they multiply rapidly, and stimulate discontent among the small-income groups. The pressure of standards of living on the means of subsistence is apparent.

There are other possibilities in the consideration of the economics of consumption and standards of living. Were wealth evenly distributed, and the distribution maintained, social standards of living would likewise undergo a revolutionary change. There would remain little incentive for wasteful consumption as a means of displaying high purchasing power, and the conventional element in standards of consumption would be considerably mitigated.

"When we come to 'conventional' elements in standards of comfort, we enter a region which appears to admit of an indefinite amount of waste and error. The very term 'conventional,' set as it is in opposition to 'natural,' indeed, suggests an absence of organic utility. We hear of 'conventional necessaries' even in the lowest levels of working-class expenditures. I presume that the expenditure in beer, tobacco, upon sprees and funerals, or upon decorative clothing, would be placed in this category."[1]

There is so much wealth consumed wastefully, when measured in terms of its contribution to a fuller life, that, were the incentive removed for this type of consumption, the demand for consumption goods would speedily decrease, and leave a large margin of wealth to be used to satisfy the higher wants. The same end might be attained without any great change taking place in the industrial order. A new standard of social valuation may in time displace the old and make far less demand on the material wealth of the community in its realization.

[1] Hobson, J. A., *Work and Wealth*, p. 125.

CHAPTER XVI

THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN STANDARDS OF LIVING

The democratization of industrial standards of living is growing in spite of the uneven distribution of the nation's wealth, for with the wider diffusion of knowledge of the means and methods of flawless imitations in conspicuous consumption, it is becoming increasingly difficult to determine the economic status of individuals. As in the adulteration of foods, only trained experts can distinguish at all times the genuine from the substituted articles.

When substitutes in consumption goods in no way impair the general health of the community, as certain food substitutes do, and the deception is not practiced by the manufacturer or the merchant for the purpose of misleading the purchasers of the goods, there is little likelihood of drastic legislation to curb the practice. In fact, to regulate the production of inferior goods in such a way as to require them to confess their inferiority to all observers, would not only restrict the total volume of consumption goods produced, but would, at the same time, decrease the pleasure which these cheaper goods

afford. It is true that much of this pleasure is gratified vanity, but this fact does not make it less keen.

There is another aspect of the legal control of substitutes that concerns consumers. If legal control made it possible to determine at a glance the money value of all goods ready for consumption, it would be possible to emphasize class lines by erecting impassable barriers between the rich and the near-rich; between the near-rich and the comfortably well-to-do; between the near-poor and the poor. The imitation of the well-to-do by the poor would be out of the question, and class lines, as determined by economic status, would be almost as fixed and clear as those imposed in many countries of central Europe.

It is not an uncommon practice for the manufacturer and the merchant, as their skill in imitation increases, to foist the imitation upon the consumer as the genuine article at the price of the latter. Indeed, so common is this practice that the purchaser can no longer tell shoddy goods from the higher grades of materials until after a period of wear, when it is too late to insist on restitution. Much that passes as high grade silk goods is made of cotton fiber, and imitations of leather are equally deceptive in appearance. It does not necessarily follow that the substituted articles are inferior in their wearing qualities, for at times they display greater toughness of fiber. But the consumers resent

keenly if the deception is practiced by the manufacturer for the purpose of enlarging his profits. The National Consumers' League is urging legislative action to compel the manufacturers to label dress materials in the same way as the manufacturers of food products are compelled to print on the label the ingredients of the package. If such legislation could be made effective, it would be of considerable social import, for the manufacturers would be forced to share with the consumers more generally than formerly the economic advantages of substitutes, and the resulting lower prices would make possible a wider enjoyment of the articles in question.

There is little doubt that there is a growing uniformity in the dress of people when gauged in terms of social valuation. The poor may be just as poor as in the immediate past. They may be poorer in purse, but they have sensed the social importance of appearances, and by emphasizing clothing in their budgets, are able to overcome one of the most serious of the economic obstacles to their ambitions. "The working girl, whose family lives in a tenement, or moves from one small apartment to another, who has little social standing and has to make her own place, knows full well how much habit and style of dress have to do with her position. Her income goes into her clothing, out of all proportion to the amount which she spends upon other things. But if social advancement is her aim, it is the most sensi-

ble thing she can do. She is judged largely by her clothes. Her house furnishing, with its pitiful little decorations, and her scanty supply of books are never seen by the people whose social opinions she most values. Her clothes are her background, and from them she is largely judged."[1]

What applies to clothing applies with equal or greater force to other items of expenditure. When clothing can no longer be considered a safe criterion of the financial status of the wearer, it loses much of its social importance, and, in its stead, are substituted articles of consumption of less uncertain values. Clothes continue to play an important rôle as a means of expressing an individual's personality, but as an insignia of a class status — seen at its best wherever the caste system prevails — clothes tend to lose much of their significance as a social criterion. The substitutes are of less questionable value. For instance, the importance attached to the ownership of a high-priced automobile is apparent to all. But even this social criterion is not proving impregnable. It was at first met by the appearance on the market of cheaper grades of cars which were able to supply the desirable physical service possessed by cars of more expensive make, but from a social point of view they proved to be failures, for their appearance advertised their financial cost. They were *labeled.* Not labeled for the owner in

[1] Addams, Jane, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, pp.34–35.

order to protect him from financial fraud, but labeled for the public, which prevented social fraud from being practiced by the new owners. A self-evident social fraud invites the most satirical ridicule. This fact perhaps is the main reason why the peasantry of Europe show so little aptitude in imitating their social superiors in dress. They know they cannot, to any degree, shake the conviction of their neighbors as to their economic and social status, and in addition must submit to their jeers and ridicule. The low-priced car has had heaped upon it all the social abuse that ridicule could foster, and this ridicule has proved so effective that social aspirants forego the pleasures and conveniences which a cheap touring car affords when the ownership of an expensive car, carrying with it social prestige, is beyond their financial reach.

But there was soon found a way out of the dilemma. It was long ago discovered that the shabby coat of the gentility is more desirable than a new frock cut in true peasant style. The secondhand high-priced cars were purchased by the lower income groups in preference to the new cheap cars. They were given a new coat of dressing, and, with minor repairs, looked the part of newly purchased machines. That their wearing qualities had been impaired was of little significance in comparison with the social function they fulfilled.

An additional subterfuge has been found by the

socially ambitious of small incomes. New cars are purchased by making small payments at the beginning of the automobile season, — a payment sufficient to protect the agents from loss by the wear and tear on the car, — and monthly installments equal to a generous rental follow. The cars often revert to their original owners at the end of the automobile season, with a minimum amount of cost, having served their social as well as utilitarian purpose. The same process is repeated often by the purchasers the following season. The agents for the machines find their business a lucrative one, even though they are compelled to sell the used cars at a sacrifice when they ultimately dispose of them. The purchasers, on the other hand, without making any great financial outlay at one time, have enjoyed the distinction of ownership for a desirable period, and effectively screened the financial embarrassment incurred by new social standards. Homes are mortgaged, and unwonted economies practiced in the privacy of the household, in order to meet the pecuniary cost the adoption of new standards involve. These, in their inception, make unusual demands on the family purse, and in part explain their acceptance.

But high-priced cars are destined to become democratized almost to the same degree as clothing of elegant appearance. Only a short time ago "a waitress in a New York restaurant was arrested

by a traffic policeman for wrongly maneuvering her $4500 automobile at a street crossing." The incident was given national publicity. The American sense of humor appreciates keenly the daring onslaughts made by the proletarian upon the behavior of the *élite*. "Sophie," the waitress, would probably have remained *incognito* as far as her source of income was concerned if she had not been questioned by the police court judge. There are probably many Sophies in the automobile-owning class who crowd those of unquestionable social prestige upon the thoroughfares, and in so doing rob the upper classes of a comparatively recently acquired class equipment.

It is true such expenditures imply that there are no savings for old age; homes are rented instead of purchased, and the accoutrements of social prestige are assumed, even when their assumption mortgages all possible future earnings. Herein lies one of the serious and regrettable costs of the democratization of social standards of living.

Conventional usages, too, are becoming a common possession. The same aptness is shown in the imitation of conventional drawing-room conduct and in table manners as in the imitation of the material insignia of the higher social classes. They are no longer the exclusive accomplishments of an established *élite*, but are rapidly becoming the standardized conventions of the American people as a whole. But this is not all. The imitators are learn-

ing to confine their conversation to a range of topics common to the higher social group, and are schooling themselves to portray mental reactions born of leisure class habits. The social versatility of the American-born is unique.

The leveling up of the standards of the poor has a tendency to level down the standards of the rich. This is not brought about by a more even distribution of wealth, but rather by a growing appreciation on the part of the rich of the fact that their criteria of social valuations are only rough approximations. The rich are no longer safe behind their customary display of wealth. In other words, the appearance of wealth often rests upon a very weak economic foundation, and proves to be but a thin veneering over a plebeian status. This fact has led to the adoption of simple clothing on the part of many well-to-do people, and the acceptance of standards of consumption far less expensive than those formerly maintained. It is the newly rich or near rich who seem to carry the banner of the most costly standards of consumption. But even the leadership of the latter is in jeopardy, for there is a growing sense that social insecurity alone warrants sumptuous display; that sumptuous display is rapidly becoming the criterion of the so-called "cheap" and "vulgar."

This is undoubtedly the reason for the establishment of different standards of social valuation than have heretofore existed in the United States. With

the disappearance of free lands and cheap lands, attempts are made to establish European standards of social value measured in terms of landed estates. Landownership in the form of country estates — play farms, they are sometimes called — is becoming common among the well-to-do. The estates on Long Island Sound, and on the banks of the Hudson River, or on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean are representative of a social class which formerly accepted industrial standards of living as a means of emphasizing wealth.

This new standard reappearing in America, is a reversion to an earlier type transplanted to America in colonial times, and discarded to a marked extent because of the ease with which land might be possessed. There was a time when land was the cheapest economic factor in America. But free and cheap lands of desirable quality have disappeared. The ownership of valuable land which is held out of productive uses is prohibitive to all but the people of considerable financial means. Its ownership is clearly a luxury enjoyed by a relatively small group. But the social importance of landed estates in America cannot assume the same degree of importance which it holds in European countries, where the origin of fortunes made in industry has been lost sight of in many instances, and the lapse of considerable time has afforded a safe nucleus for a system of inherited social prestige symbolized in

royal titles. In America most wealth has been acquired in the present generation. In a few instances it can be traced back several generations, but the genealogy of the social *élite* in America shows, without doubt, a procession of sturdy farmers and tradesmen instead of a line of successful warriors and political rulers. This fact deprives the *élite* of America of a social security more or less common in Europe. Indeed, the successful tradesmen of the present time, even when of the most plebeian origin, cannot be prevented from purchasing large landed estates, and from trying to maintain a social footing of equality with their neighbors. Not long ago considerable chagrin was felt on the intrusion of a member of the colored race into an exclusive community of rich estates. All economic qualifications were successfully met, and the new home erected vied in splendor with those possessed in the community by members of the more fortunate race.

The acceptance of European standards of social valuation meets with an additional obstacle in America. Social exclusiveness loses much of its charm when viewed indifferently by people generally, and when the surrounding population is in no way dependent upon the owners of estates. The large landed estates of Europe, with their system of tenancy and farm laborers, are survivals of the feudal estates. The agricultural tenants or wage earners are still attached, to a surprising degree, to

the soil; not by the law of the land, it is true, but by a deep-seated custom, which is gradually giving way with the increasing demands on the part of the farm laborers for individual ownership or better wage and work conditions. As time progresses, Europe begins to develop migratory habits similar to those common in America.

The European economic and social relationship, existing in its most marked form on the continent, and in its decaying form on the landed estates in England, cannot be transplanted to American soil, for American traditions are strictly averse to any form of social relationship smacking of subserviency. The negroes of the South afford the only exception. These make an effective social background against which to exhibit the social superiority of the landlord. In the northern states the agricultural laborer is more likely to be an itinerant worker. He shifts from estate to estate to better his economic condition. Nor is he only a farm laborer. In the winter months he becomes a city man, and finds employment among the unskilled. Landed estates in America carry with them, it is true, the desired exclusiveness, but with this exclusiveness goes a degree of undesirable isolation not sought after by the socially ambitious.

As in Ireland, where the large estates were brought within the purchasing power of their tenants, the governments of England and of the continent of

Europe are making it increasingly difficult to maintain intact large landholdings, especially when these are withheld from cultivation.

A social reversion in America, far more widespread in its influence, threatened for a while the prerogative of the accepted *élite*. With the outbreak of the World War the social life of this country, as well as the industrial, was placed on a military basis. The man of the hour was in uniform, and his social importance was rated according to his official rank. American military custom is different from European, for here military rank is in no way a matter of inheritance. The officers in America were often men from the lower social strata, but their military rank admitted them into the most socially exclusive circles of European life.

Wealth became insignificant when compared with military prowess. Indeed, for a short time the democratization of the army to the extent of giving preference in military promotions to men of ability, rather than to men of desirable family connections, played havoc with old social barriers. Had the war lasted, social adjustments could have been made in time without creating any serious social disturbances; but it came to an end. Many of the officers went back to their pre-war occupations, not at all in harmony with the setting they acquired with their commissions. Former artisans were compelled to take up their old trades, and men without any

substantial economic footing, after the war found themselves possessed of a rapidly fading military glory; and in many cases, war brides, who, in the enthusiasm of the war's distinction linked their fate with men who before the war were outside their social sphere, were disillusioned. During the period of warfare these officers were often considered the social superiors of their chosen brides, and a marriage alliance with them proved a social event thought to be worthy of considerable publicity. Naturally, the men resented the necessity of returning to their pre-war occupations, especially when these in no way reflected a desirable social status, and carried with them a remuneration sufficient to allow but little more than subsistence.

A rapid ascent in social position generally proves to be a stimulating force in efforts made to climb higher, and often indirectly furthers industrial endeavors which lead to the production of greater wealth. But to descend the social ladder with equal rapidity engenders resentment and bitterness against an apparently unjust order of things, and is often given audible expression when the number of dissatisfied is sufficiently large. This is apparent in the attempts made to revive an appreciation on the part of the general public of the social importance of the military classes. The organizations made up of returned soldiers, who are in no way affiliated with the military life of the

community, suggest a possible reluctance to relinquish all claims to former desirable social moorings of a military nature.

Even if military social ranks were lasting, unless accompanied by wealth ownership their splendor would wane. The present is unlike the past in the fact that today to the individual victors do not belong the spoils of war, and military prowess seldom brings with it a claim to a sufficient amount of the world's economic goods to establish the social claims made. In specific instances nations reward military service with political offices or a direct money gift, but even these considerations seldom suffice to meet the demands made by the standards of living of their class.

The contention made that industrial standards of living are becoming rapidly democratized, will probably meet with the challenge of those who are most conscious of the growing economic inequalities, because the wealth of the nation is becoming more highly concentrated. A prevailing high standard of living does not necessarily imply an even distribution of wealth. It is generally conceded that the share of the wealth produced which falls to the lower economic classes is becoming smaller in comparison with the share which accrues to the few who already possess a disproportionate part of the country's wealth. We have seen instances where the workers have actually received less than in

former years; for the purchasing power of their wages has decreased faster than their money wage has increased. And yet, upon the whole, few will deny that workingmen of the present time generally enjoy higher standards of living than the workingmen of previous ages. It is true these higher standards are maintained at a great sacrifice. Marriage is often postponed until near middle age, and in a majority of cases families are restricted to one, two, or possibly three children, if there are any children at all. Often economies are practiced which place people in the ranks of the malnurtured, yet their general appearance in public conveys no suggestion of the personal sacrifices made. From the point of view of race survival, or from the point of view of national health standards, the sacrifices made in order to give the impression that a high standard of living is being enjoyed, may be out of all proportion to the social gains made, and ultimately prove inimical to social progress.

But it must be conceded, irrespective of the losses involved, that the universal adoption of high standards of living as a goal of endeavor has prevented the erection of permanent class lines.

We see this point repeatedly illustrated in the labor leaders' failure in America to line up the workers into a political class based on their economic interests. The absence of a class conscious feeling on the part of American workers, when exercising

their right of suffrage, suggests the fact that social lines have cut diagonally across economic lines, and the worker's appraisal of his social status, even though unreal, places him, he thinks, in the social ranks of those who are financially well-to-do, if not near wealthy. He tends to assume the point of view of the latter, which is reflected in his political as well as his social behavior. As long as social lines continue dynamic, there is little prospect of class warfare, and the battles will undoubtedly continue to be fought for some time in the economic field.

In Europe, social and economic class lines are similar if not identical, and lend themselves to a solidarity in action which has no counterpart in America.

Complete reversion to a former criterion of social valuation is hardly possible under present-day conditions. The social, the economic, and even the physical environment has changed, and the old order can no longer be adjusted to the new unsympathetic surroundings.

The attempts made to revive discarded social standards of living often meet with temporary success, but unless they are sufficiently changed to meet the new conditions to which they must be adapted in order to persist, they speedily lose their force and are replaced by social ideals in conformity with the environmental conditions. No one seems greatly concerned over the probability of the

establishment of European standards of social valuation in America. On the other hand, there exists a possibility that American standards of valuation will replace the European. There are nations in Europe which have preceded America several generations in industrial development, but social significance of the new industrialism has not been allowed as full play as in America, for in Europe old social ideals were so firmly entrenched as to suggest impregnable barriers against their democratization.

The transition from an old criterion of social valuation to a new one is always gradual. For instance, it took ages of barbaric culture to shift emphasis from feats of personal military prowess to hereditary ownership of the lands which were the main spoils of war.

The merchant classes forced themselves to the social front by sheer perseverance, and even at the present time in European countries they have not attained, upon the whole, a social footing approximating that of a hereditary landed aristocracy.

The large expanse of free lands in America, retained for the most part in small holdings, democratized a social standard transplanted from Europe and rooted in early New England and in the southern states.

The private ownership of great wealth gave greater social promise than landownership, but the invisibility of stocks and bonds or business

assets led to their materialization in high standards of living. But unlike land, material wealth has seemed at times without limit in its production. Falling to men outside the ranks of the social aristocracy, as it often did, class barriers proved indeed elastic. New recruits were constantly knocking for admission with their credentials — proofs of spending ability as reflected in their standards of living.

But this was not all. Thousands of aspirants for social honors were able to display convincing proofs of their spending power when, in reality, their incomes were embarrassingly limited. Their great allies were the manufacturer and the merchant who succeeded in democratizing the accoutrements of the social aristocracy.

We are rapidly approaching a state of affairs where the working people give not only the appearance of being as well dressed as their employers, but wear their good clothes with an equal degree of ease, an ease which comes alone with habitual good dressing.

The social scientists can fix the workingmen's family budgets as they will, but when the workingmen spend the income the social scientists' budget allowance demands, they tend to follow the dictates of their social aspirations more often than the suggestions of men and women interested primarily in the common welfare.

No social criterion is lasting when realized by

constantly increasing numbers. It breaks down under the weight of numbers, and in its stead is erected a new standard of social valuation. What this new standard will be is largely a matter of supposition. Much will depend upon the intelligence of the group vested with social leadership. But the new standards of social valuation erected cannot be far in advance of the intellectual appreciation of those whose admiration and envy is sought. The final arbiters of social class gradations are the people themselves, in the absence of an inherited aristocracy; an aristocracy implying, if not claiming, a spiritual design in its established superior class status.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SIMPLE STANDARD OF LIVING

That the progress of a nation can be measured by the general intelligence of its population is unquestioned, but that a wide diffusion of knowledge can be furthered only by the stimulation and the gratification of ever-increasing wants is emphatically challenged by the advocates of the simple standard of living. They are convinced that high standards of living thwart social progress rather than promote it; for energy, time, and wealth are consumed with the sole purpose of excelling others in conspicuous display of wealth and leisure. "American society is full of men and women who are loaded down with things which are of no possible use to them," comments *The Outlook* editorially. "Their houses are overcrowded with rich and heavy furnishings which betray no individuality of taste and afford no index to the character of the persons who possess them. They are often overcrowded with servants, so that which ought to bring relief from care and work increases responsibility and anxiety. Hosts of men and women are living in houses several times too large for their comfort, for their power of organiza-

tion, or for tastefulness and good sense. Everything runs to elaboration, to the piling up of things; and every bit of elaboration is gained at the expense of freedom and simplicity. In this general loading up with luggage of every kind, even those who are intent upon learning all they can on the journey of life and getting all they can out of it are in danger of falling into line and wasting time and strength on the things that encumber rather than the things that liberate."[1]

The importance given to high standards of living as a means of promoting the progress of a people, is, it is thought, out of proportion. The stimulating influence of creating wants spurred men on in the past to break away from their narrow environment, brought them in contact with different habits of life and new ideas, and broadened their spirit of tolerance for conditions essentially different from those common to their habitual surroundings. The widening of their social vision was a direct concomitant of their multiplying needs. But such a program is not now necessary. The opening up of new avenues of social contact through the expansion of trade and the universal exchange of national products, the democratization of education in modern countries of the world, and the multitude of social agencies which serve directly the end of bringing about a general diffusion of the world's knowledge

[1] *The Outlook*, vol. lxx, pp. 215–216.

have made possible the discarding of the primitive processes of extending the intellectual life. We have not only outgrown as a nation the beneficent effects of increasingly high standards of living, but the entire trend of their influence is becoming destructive of the higher spiritual life. "For the men enslaved to numerous and exacting needs, possession is the supreme good and the source of all other good things. It is true that in the fierce struggle for possession we come to hate those who possess, and to deny the right of property when this right is in the hands of others and not in our own. But the bitterness of attack against others' possessions is only a new proof of the extraordinary importance we attach to possession itself. In the end, people and things come to be estimated at their selling price, or according to the profit to be drawn from them. What brings nothing is worth nothing; he who has nothing, is nothing. Honest poverty risks passing for shame; and lucre, however filthy, is not greatly put to it to be accounted for merit."[1]

The real social value of wealth — beyond what is needed for physical well-being — does not lie in expenditures for luxuries, we are led to believe by Professor Lester Ward, but rather in the economic security which ownership implies. To be freed from the necessity of struggling for a living affords leisure for education and the expression of native

[1] Wagner, Charles, *The Simple Life*, p. 8.

abilities which promote the social achievements of the race. "The two principal forms of opportunity are leisure and education," says Ward. "Both are furnished by the economic and social environments, but more especially by the first."[1] Often a life of effort is expended to secure wealth whose utilization, when attained, creates greater discontent without furthering one iota the intellectual life or the usefulness of its owner to the community.

Charles Wagner was impressed by the growing selfishness and extravagance of the French people which seemed to him to contain the seed of their own destruction. With but one aim in life, — that of material display and the enjoyment of physical ease, — he saw the members of the well-to-do classes not only drifting away from the fundamental teachings of Jesus, but setting a pernicious example to the imitative masses which was destined in time to undermine the moral life of the nation. To direct all of life's efforts to the attainment of a social goal of expenditure seemed to him not only futile in the terms of social progress, but actually to afford neither peace nor happiness even when the desired end had been reached. "Let your needs rule you, pamper them — you will see them multiply like insects in the sun. The more you give them, the more they demand. He is senseless who seeks for happiness in material prosperity alone. As well undertake

[1] Ward, L. F., *Applied Sociology*, p. 242.

to fill the cask of the Danaides. To those who have millions, millions are wanting; to those who have thousands, thousands. Others lack a twenty-franc piece or a hundred sous. When they have a chicken in the pot, they ask for a goose; when they have the goose, they wish it were a turkey, and so on. We shall never learn how fatal this tendency is. There are too many humble people who wish to imitate the great, too many poor workingmen who ape the well-to-do middle classes, too many shopgirls who play at being ladies, too many clerks who act the clubman or sportsman; and among those in easy circumstances and the rich, are too many people who forget that what they possess could serve a better purpose than procuring pleasure for themselves, only to find in the end that one never has enough. Our needs, in place of the servants that they should be, have become a turbulent and seditious crowd, a legion of tyrants in miniature. A man enslaved to his needs may best be compared to a bear with a ring in its nose, that is led about and made to dance at will. . . . How many women have gone on and on, even to dishonesty, for the sole reason that they had too many needs and could not resign themselves to simple living!"[1]

Pastor Wagner devoted his life to an attack upon the materialistic ideals of the people. He flayed the extravagance of the rich without mercy, and

[1] Wagner, Charles, *The Simple Life*, pp. 75–77.

pointed out the weaknesses of character which their expenditures demonstrated. Gay Paris stopped long enough to listen. In fact, so effective were his sermons and lectures that a spirit of revival pervaded the community, and his influence spread even to the Western Hemisphere.

"Aspire to simple living? That means, aspire to fulfill the highest human destiny. All of men's agitations for greater justice and more light have been also movements toward a simpler life; and the simplicity of older times, in manners, art, and ideas, still keeps its incomparable value, only because it achieved the setting forth in high relief of certain essential sentiments and certain permanent truths."[1]

Wagner's followers in France called themselves, "A militant order for private and social duty." *The Outlook* said of them, "What these earnest men feel is that France needs today, not new ideas, new skills, the discovery of new paths of national progress, but a return to old, wholesome, simple ways of life."[2]

The American press devoted considerable space to the cause Wagner was representing, and Theodore Roosevelt commended his philosophy publicly. In fact, so far-reaching was the publicity given him that the movement toward simple standards of living gripped America for the time being. Society women crowded the halls where Wagner lectured and remote

[1] Wagner, Charles, *The Simple Life*, p. xliii.
[2] *The Outlook*, vol. lxx, 215.

sections of the country were stirred by the general discussion of his contentions. The movement contained many of the elements of a religious revival. The emotional fervor spent its force and an atmosphere of apathy followed, but Charles Wagner's influence on current thought was not wholly lost, for many of his disciples still retain much of the vision of their master.

History affords many similar examples of religious groups embracing simple standards of living as a means of attaining spiritual salvation. Some of these held that only by the denial of all material wants, over and above those whose justification is essential to minimum subsistence, could the teachings of Jesus be realized. Deprivation of all physical comfort finally merged into physical self-torture as a means of promoting a spiritual life. Excessive asceticism was a characteristic of early monastic life, and even today the garb of the monk and of the sisterhood of the Catholic Church conveys the idea of the absence of personal vanity on the part of the wearer, and at the same time conceals as far as possible any personal charm the individual might possess which directly or indirectly might detract from his religious bearing. Where an expenditure of wealth is made in connection with religious observances, "the sanctuary and the sacred apparatus are so contrived as not to enhance the comfort or fulness of life of the vicarious consumer, or, at

any rate, not to convey the impression that the end of their consumption is the consumer's comfort."[1]

Many religious groups which have detached themselves from the mother church and formed independent religious orders have as their principal tenet the necessity of eliminating all suggestions of luxuriant expenditures. The interiors of their churches are characterized by severe simplicity, as are all the personal expenditures made by the members of the respective religious orders. Frequently religious groups have sought isolation in the wilderness so as to be wholly free from the worldly influences of modern civilization.

"The Ephratists, the Dunkers, the Moravians, the Shakers, the Rappites, the Zoarites, and the Snowbergers were based upon the religious philosophy of withdrawing from the defilements of this world in order that their members might be permitted to make better preparation for their entrance into the next."[2]

A description of the Anana Community, established in Iowa in 1885, says, "Like the Quakers, they abhor 'steeple-houses,' and their church architecture is of the plainest."[3] All the houses are of uniform size excepting the cookhouses or prayer-houses. The household furnishings are of the sim-

[1] Veblen, Thorstein, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, p. 121.

[2] Commons, John R. and Associates, *History of Labor in the United States*, vol. i, p. 504.

[3] Nordhoff, C., *Communistic Societies of the United States*, p. 32.

plest. "The table is clean, but it has no cloth. The dishes are coarse but neat; and the houses, while well built, and possessing all that is absolutely essential to comfort according to the German peasants' idea, have not always carpets, and have often a bed in what New Englanders would call the parlor; and in general are for use and not ornament."[1]

Similar simplicity is recognized in the mode of dress. "The dress of the people is plain. The men wear in the winter a vest which buttons close up to the throat, coat and trousers being of the common cut. The women and the young girls wear dingy-colored stuffs, mostly of the society's own make, cut in the plainest style; and often short gowns, in the German peasant way. All, even to the very small girls, wear their hair in a kind of black cowl or cap, which covers only the back of the head, and is tied under the chin by a black ribbon. Also all, young as well as old, wear a small dark-colored shawl or handkerchief over the shoulders, and pinned very plainly across the breast. This peculiar uniform adroitly conceals the marks of sex, and gives a singularly monotonous appearance to the women."[2]

The manner of living of the Shakers is somewhat similar. The religious colonies, as a rule, adopted some form of communism which aimed at main-

[1] Nordhoff, C., *Communistic Societies of the United States*, p. 33.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35.

taining a fairly even distribution of wealth. This precluded a prestige based on individual claims to any economic surplus which might accumulate; and leaving out the religious factor, would naturally foster the elimination of those items of consumption whose intent is primarily to emphasize conspicuousness.

Isolated, upon the whole, from the markets of the world, and discouraging social contacts with communities outside their religious order, these communistic settlements were of influence only occasionally, as some investigator presented their case to a curious and at times a somewhat interested reading public.

No single individual stands out more conspicuously in the public mind as an advocate of simple standards of living than Leo Tolstoy. Born and reared in luxuriant surroundings, he turned his back on the sensual pleasures of the world and aimed so to direct his life as to make it consistent with his teachings. He not only advocated the simple life, but he lived it daily. The home of his adoption did not differ fundamentally from the homes of his poor peasant neighbors. The house was conspicuous for the absence of ornaments, and even the necessities therein took on an austere atmosphere of self-denial on the part of the owner. The clothes worn by Tolstoy were of coarse fiber and free in pattern from all suggestion of concessions made to style. Even his

shoes looked uncomfortably uncouth. He toiled with the peasants in the cultivation of the soil, thinking the physical work he performed of far more importance than his intellectual contribution to the world of literature.

Tolstoy, like Charles Wagner, was convinced that the only way to rid the world of its social burden was by awakening the moral sense of the individual. The organization of society was not at fault to the same degree as was absence of a social conscience on the part of the individual. For this reason he could not reconcile the habits of his early life with his latter day philosophy. His conscience led him to live according to his creed. "Town life," he says, "which had seemed strange and foreign to me before, now became so repulsive that all the pleasures of the luxurious life I formerly enjoyed became a torment to me. And in spite of all efforts to find in my soul a justification for our way of living, I could not without irritation behold either my own or any other drawingroom, nor any clean, elegantly laid table, nor a carriage with well-fed coachman and horses, nor the shops, theaters, and assemblies. I could not help seeing beside them, the hungry, cold, down-trodden people in Lyapinsky house. I could not escape the thought that these two things were somehow connected, and the one resulted from the other."[1]

[1] Maude, Aylmer, *The Life of Tolstoy*, vol. ii, p. 112.

Tolstoy visited Lyapinsky house — a free lodging house for the poor of Moscow. The poverty and degradation he saw there caused him to react against the life of the higher social classes of which he was a member. "At the sight of the hunger, cold, and degradation of thousands of people, I understood not only with my mind or heart, but with my whole being, that the existence of tens of thousands of such people in Moscow, — while I and thousands of others overeat ourselves with beefsteaks and sturgeon, and cover our horses and floors with cloth or carpets, — no matter what all the learned men in the world may say about its necessity, is a crime, and one not committed once, but constantly; and that I with my luxury not merely tolerate it, but share in it."[1]

The teachings of Charles Wagner and Leo Tolstoy insisted upon the establishment of a social order on earth conducive to the greatest spiritual development. Their program of action was not necessarily a preparation for a future state of life, but a mode of life which, in their minds, was essential to the elimination of the ills existing in current society. Wagner confined himself to an analysis of existing habits of consumption, the selfishness they involved, and their significance in a social order looking toward greater human perfection and human well-being.

Tolstoy was primarily a philosopher. He preached

[1] Maude, Aylmer, *The Life of Tolstoy*, vol. ii, p. 111.

through his writing the establishment of a new economic order from which competition should be eliminated and wherein the fundamental principles of communism would be established. He stressed the shortcomings of the present economic order, but held the individual morally responsible for the existing human suffering and misery. Only by the regeneration of the individual ideals could a better state of affairs be brought about. He tried to demonstrate to the world that high living and high thinking were not necessary concomitants, but rather were associated to the detriment of intellectual life.

It is impossible to draw a clear line between the strictly religious propagandists of the simple life and the strictly economic, so imperceptibly are the two blended. Tolstoy's teachings had their inception in his new religious life and yet were economic in character. So were all the religious communities established in America or elsewhere. The democratization of wealth, at least to a degree, was practiced as a means of diverting attention from the material to the spiritual.

In addition to the religious communities were the economic experiments in communism. The Association Movement of the nineteenth century, of which Fourier and Owen were a part, aimed through an equal distribution of wealth to develop a society free from artificial social restraints. Social grada-

tions — either up or down — it was held, rested largely upon existing inequalities in the distribution of property, and for this reason uniformity in planes of living must be encouraged, and expenditures made for the purpose of calling public attention to individual wealth were tabooed, if not actually prohibited.

The social group advocating simple standards of living, when not prompted by motives of religious or economic reform, is made up of individuals possessing more than average keenness of insight into social usage. They have analyzed the motives prompting people to struggle for more of the material goods of this world than is sufficient to maintain their physical efficiency, and have found the goal of endeavor not worth the effort. In fact, they see no intellectual justification for the existence of conventional standards of living, and see in their ascendency rather a demonstration of human weakness. High standards of living, they believe, are expressions of primitive social propensities.

The nineteenth century affords a unique figure in Henry Thoreau. He made a fetish of simplicity; for to him the simple life alone afforded the environment conducive to the expression of the higher spiritual life. He lived on the shores of Walden pond, near Concord village, and eked out a meager living by making lead pencils, and by giving occasional lectures. He says, "Most of the luxuries and

many of the so-called comforts of life are not only not indispensable, but a positive hindrance to the elevation of mankind. In respect to luxuries and comforts, the wisest have ever lived a more simple and meager life than the poor."

John Burroughs says of Thoreau, "He went to the woods for study and contemplation, and to indulge his taste for the wild and the solitary, as well as to make an experiment in the art of simple living. He proved to his own satisfaction that most of us waste our time in superfluities, and that a man can live on less than $100 per year and have two thirds of his time to himself."[1]

The greatest intellectual appeal made for simple standards of living has come from the pen of Professor Thorstein Veblen. With a keen insight into human motives of behavior, he has presented in his book, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, an historical analysis of present-day social ideals as exposed in expenditures and social and economic activities. Primarily a student of social economics, Veblen is in no sense a propagandist, but through his scholarly achievements has presented to the world of learning many indisputable facts which, when generally known, will make their direct appeal to intelligence and will undoubtedly remove, at least in part, the social props from current standards of living. There

[1] Burroughs, John, "Henry Thoreau," Warner's *Library of the World's Best Literature*, vol. xxv, p. 14,873.

are, indeed, few books written since the publication of Professor Veblen's study which do not acknowledge his scholarly contributions to this field of social research.

Bernard Shaw has approached the problem from a different angle. He, like Veblen, does not aim to play the rôle of a propagandist of the simple standard of living, but indirectly he has exerted considerable influence on the point of view of the general public. As an essayist and a dramatist he has popularized his social ideals in a way to reach groups of people who have proved deaf to intellectual or moral appeals. Shaw as a satirist and a humorist has exposed many human frailties, the least of which has not been by any means the propensity to ape the habits of life of accepted social superiors. He has delighted in stripping man of his material trappings. At times the object of his satirical humor is nothing but a social fraud of a type so common that we all recognize him instantly, and appreciate the inconsistencies and human foibles which are portrayed by a pen not lacking in bluntness. Shaw often shows men as beings who are morally, intellectually, and spiritually bankrupt when deprived of their social prestige whose foundation rests behind financial bulwarks.

In many instances conventional usages and social forms are the goal of all endeavor; and as an end in themselves rather than as a means to an end, they

illustrate the fact that high standards of wasteful expenditures, and leisure-class habits of life, are, after all, but thin veneerings over commonplace mediocrity. With increasing democratization of education to the extent that our higher institutions of learning are within the reach of growing numbers of young people, many see no connection between high standards of living and intellectual achievements. Indeed, the pendulum of opinion seems to be swinging in the direction that high standards of living expressed in conspicuous expenditures justify the conclusion that the spender is possessed of no more than average mental ability.

To define simple standards of living presents many of the same difficulties inherent in an attempted definition of minimum standards of living. There is such a long list of expenditures which are variously interpreted as necessities, comfort conveniences, and as luxuries that an attempted scientific interpretation would prove futile. "Some one objects," says Wagner, " 'Then you make wholesale condemnation of progress, and would lead us back to the good old times — to asceticism, perhaps.' Not at all. The desire to resuscitate the past is the most unfruitful and dangerous of Utopian dreams, and the art of good living does not consist in retiring from life. But we are trying to throw light upon one of the errors that drag most heavily upon human progress, in order to find a remedy for it; namely,

the belief that man becomes happier and better by the increase of outward well-being. Nothing is falser than this pretended social axiom; on the contrary, that material prosperity, without an offset, diminishes the capacity for happiness and debases character, is a fact which a thousand examples are at hand to prove."[1]

The advocates of simple standards of living not only concede but demand higher standards of living for the large army of the working poor. They decry those elements in their consumption which in no way add to their physical and spiritual well-being, and are often added to their budgets at the expense of the essentials. Expenditures are often made by the working poor in conformity with the law of imitation which impels the lower social strata to ape those on a higher rung of the social ladder.

Simple standards of living imply a social goal of a different import from the one that material display implies. It may be a religious one; it may be a purely economic one, and have as its motive security in sickness and old age. On the other hand, the simple standard may be accepted as alone affording that economic surplus essential to the expression of talents in some form of achievement.

It is interesting to note that, upon the whole, the advocates of simple standards of living are men of comparatively small financial means. Whether

[1] Wagner, Charles, *The Simple Life*, pp. 8–9.

they lack business instincts and are purely impractical idealists, or whether they are convinced that life is too short to spend such valuable time in the accumulation of material wealth, the individual possession of which has no attraction for them, is difficult to establish. The successful business man who accepts industrial standards of living will, in all probability, make the first explanation; the social idealist, on the other hand, will lend credence to the second.

Few will deny the fact that the advocates of simple standards of living are people of more than average intelligence. Many of them, like Tolstoy, have lived in affluence, and if high standards of living as expressed in sumptuous expenditures have any intellectual virtues, they have been able to glean them from the chaff, and have passed on successfully to the next stage of social advancement, which is in no way dependent upon the enjoyment of luxurious modes of living. "The spirit of simplicity is not an inherent gift, but the result of a laborious conquest. Plain living, like high thinking, is simplification."[1]

If we accept the evolutionary theory that the progress of peoples can be measured in terms of standards of living, material standards may be but one step in the evolutionary process of standards, which in their highest expression, as demonstrated by a superior few, become simplified. Crude

[1] Wagner, Charles, *The Simple Life*, p. 18.

methods of social expression, such as high material standards of living imply, have run their course in some few instances, and in so far as they no longer add to the fullness of life, become obsolete, having served their purpose and become now socially burdensome. If this conclusion is tenable, then the advocates of simple standards of living are the disciples of a new social order; despised and lauded in turn, as all standard bearers in advance of their time are, yet sounding a note wholly in accord with the spirit of a new and coming age. In this sense high social standards of living will no longer be material standards of living, but social standards demanding a higher spiritual life common at present only among the few.

CHAPTER XVIII

STANDARDS OF ACHIEVEMENT

According to Professor Veblen, people in the savage stage of culture were characteristically peaceful, and expressed their "instinct of workmanship" in the making of implements and in the "use of mechanical expedients."[1] Later, with the development of the institution of private property, the predatory proclivities of men came into play, and in time dominated and subordinated the importance of the industrial arts. Warfare became the most reputable employment, and activities associated with warfare, directly or indirectly, claimed social precedence over work having as its main purpose the satisfaction of the need for food, clothing, and shelter.[2]

Whether we accept Professor Veblen's premise or not, it is generally agreed that military achievements carried with them political, economic, and social power in ancient, medieval, and early modern times. It is equally true that the productive work activities of the poor were of low social repute. Much

[1] Veblen, Thorstein, *The Instinct of Workmanship.*
[2] Veblen, Thorstein, *The Theory of the Leisure Class.*

of the work performed by the slave, the serf, and members of the lower social castes was of a monotonous routine nature, and in no way allowed for the expression of creative work interests. Under the circumstances its performance would fall to those individuals whose freedom of action was most restricted by the ruling classes. But historical facts do not show that the lower classes were denied freedom to express themselves in such work as did not fall within the range of employments considered within the exclusive precincts of the higher social classes. The domestic arts, the handicrafts, and agriculture were the employments of the lower social classes. On the other hand, individuals of the upper social classes possessing marked talents for the handicrafts found this avenue of expression closed to them as a method of giving play to their "instinct of workmanship." Social usages restricting individuals to definitely prescribed employments inflicted great hardship upon the members of the upper social classes, as well as upon the members of the lower, for the so-called leisure class employments seldom allowed for the expression of creative work tendencies.

That men were more interested in maintaining their social class affiliations, when these were of an enviable nature, than in enjoying the pleasure coming from the performance of congenial work, when the chosen work was of low social repute,

suggests the conclusion that the desire to attain and maintain the esteem of social equals or social superiors has, in the past at least, been greater than the desire for creative expression. This was especially true when the creative expression called for a departure from the socially reputable employments.

Social emulation in ancient, medieval, and modern times has tended to grow out of achievements in warfare. The upper-class paraphernalia was indicative of this type of achievement, and social rating of the upper-class employments reflected class affiliation with them. Even in the realm of the fine arts, achievements showed a marked tendency to reflect the mental outlook of the ruling classes in their interpretation of the military, governmental, and religious institutional life. Higher learning likewise limited itself in its field of expression.

The achievements of the ancient Greeks are often cited as examples in which the achievements in warfare were subordinated to achievements in the arts and sciences. But it is also true that when a country has enjoyed a long period of peace, there is a tendency for added social prestige to fall to those upper-class employments not directly connected with military life, such as governmental, clerical, educational, and other pursuits concerned with the promotion of science and the fine arts. As long as social emphasis falls upon the recognized "leisure class" employments, and proscribes those employ-

ments which deal primarily with the production of the means of subsistence, one can hardly justify the assumption that the criterion of social valuation in ancient Greece, Crete, or Egypt differed fundamentally from those standards of social valuation characteristic of a military régime.

Ancient Greece was not democratic in its political, economic, or social organization. There was little opportunity for the expression of talents among the poor when these talents urged them to work in the field of the upper-class employments. There were exceptional cases, of course. And the same holds true of a well-organized military society. Leaders repeatedly arose from among the masses of the people, and were awarded the social repute and position that their achievements merited. In ancient Greece the achievements which carried with them high social repute were confined — with exceptions — to the upper leisure classes. They had the leisure and the economic leeway to acquire dexterity in any of the chosen fields of work, if gifted with special ability. The poor when possessed of similar talent had to seek patronage, — a patronage not commonly accorded to members of the working classes whose status was that of slavery or that akin to slavery. On the other hand, individuals of mediocre ability often held positions of social importance which suggested a high degree of skill for their successful performance of the work in hand. Yet,

it was considered more vital to fill the positions with men whose birth and training fitted them well for the social duties involved. These men were often poorly equipped by nature for the performance of the more serious obligations the work implied. But they were, most generally, given the preference over those who belonged to the lower social classes, yet who possessed a natural aptitude for the work. Ancient Greece, therefore, differed from military countries in its standards of social valuation in that it emphasized the achievements of the upper classes in times of peace. These were relegated to a secondary position in a military state.

Wherever the standards of social valuation rested on military prowess, it was only a question of time — with growing political stability — until social emphasis shifted from acts of prowess to the symbols of prowess, and hereditary titles were looked upon as being more reputable than the emblems of recent success on the battlefield. Jurisdiction over large landed estates implied military prowess, and inherited landownership, with its intimated military prowess, carried with it social titles which in themselves became standards of social valuation.

When social emphasis shifted from specific activities to the symbols of these activities, the way was paved for the establishment of new standards of social valuation. Most wealth in the ancient and medieval régime consisted of land. Landownership tended

to be the goal of the socially ambitious who found that the old social barriers were crumbling. The development of commerce and trade brought into the foreground a new group, who challenged the social as well as the political prerogatives of the landowning classes. In the course of time the merchants were conceded social privileges, and in modern times we find that commercial wealth secures social titles so readily that it is difficult to determine whether social titles rest on inherited landownership or on success in trade.

A similar change took place in the standards of achievement. At first the source of wealth — when not associated with military prowess — was concealed. When feasible, wealth acquired in trade was converted into extensive landownership. In the course of time, with the growing importance of industry in the economic life, the source of wealth became a matter of indifference, and all vestige of ill repute formerly attached to the pursuit of trade or industry was removed. This resulted in a widening of the limitations on the so-called reputable employments, and likewise, in the lowering of standards of social valuation. We are assuming that the social standards of valuation of the inherited landed aristocracy presupposed a cultural education which stressed the development of the appreciation for the higher arts. This did not hold true of the merchant classes as a whole. Their education did

not necessarily imply the training essential to an appreciation of the finer arts. The higher arts lost their patronage to a considerable extent with the rise in social power of the merchant and tradesmen class. And in time the taboo was removed from those occupations which had proved the source of new and desirable wealth. But at the same time the standard of achievement underwent an evolutionary change.

When wealth was measured by its volume rather than in the light of its origin, there resulted a shifting of entire classes in the scale of social importance. We saw how some of the professional classes, engaged in the so-called leisure class employments, found themselves at times outside their accustomed social precincts, and with incomes in no way commensurate with the standard of expenditure called for by their social position.[1] While the social standard of achievement had not undergone any great revolution, socially important occupations lost considerable prestige when their remuneration fell short of their social requirements.

The widening of the range of upper-class occupations has proved a boon, in many instances, to men and women who feel strongly the urge to engage in some form of constructive work. Shut off at an earlier period from most avenues of work expression because of their social status, they now feel able to

[1] See Chapter XIII, "Evolution of Social Classes in Europe."

assert their "instinct of workmanship" even when no financial incentive exists, for "there is in most people a fairly well-defined impulse to engage their energies upon some project which will grow under their hand — a delight in creation or at least in activity to which some use is imputed."[1]

The lower class work activities were still outside the pale of the so-called reputable employments. Their low remuneration was evidently at fault. The wage earners could claim no previous social recognition as a justification for a status higher than their earning power suggested. Clearly, the individual worker had to seek more remunerative employment before he could hope to reach the social precincts of the lower tier of the middle class. This he often did, successfully.

Before the Industrial Revolution was well under way in England, the workingmen realized that there was little prospect of ever changing their social status. Born within the working classes, they expected to remain there. Nor did they entertain any hope for a change in the social status of their children or grandchildren. But they undoubtedly found considerable compensation in the work they performed when it enabled them to express their interests in creative workmanship. They fashioned the product on which they worked with the simple tools they owned, and their achievements were a

[1] Tead, Ordway, *Instincts in Industry*, p. 44.

constant source of gratification. Life was not unduly strenuous, and, although poverty was common, a considerable degree of freedom in work was enjoyed. With the introduction of machinery and the division of labor in industry, new wealth was in the process of production and accumulation. Social class barriers were considerably weakened by the newly rich, and the increasing possibility of shifting from lower social levels to higher offered an additional incentive to exploit the poor. The workers' bargaining power was impaired now that women and children could bid for their work, but there was frequently denied — with the introduction of new industrial processes — the opportunity to express their "instincts of workmanship." Little wonder, then, with the lapse of time, that they no longer associated their work with the definite end of accomplishing a pleasurable task. Their new goal was associated with their pay envelopes alone. When the wages offered called for a new adjustment to a lower plane of living, the degradation of the workers was well under way.

John Ruskin and William Morris gave expression to their appreciation of the social and economic situation when they pleaded for a return to the domestic stage of industry. They really hoped that the time would come when an economic organization would make possible the enjoyment of creative artistic work for all. They thought all men were essen-

tially artists, and to shut off this avenue of expression was to impoverish the life of mankind. A similar idea has been recently exploited by Professor Veblen and his disciples. While they do not claim that all men show artistic tendencies, they hold that the "instinct of workmanship" is common; that its expression is essential to the realization of a full life. Ruskin and Morris were artists themselves, rather than men of practical tendencies, and their disciples were found largely within their own class — the social aristocracy.

Later, François Fourier and Robert Owen initiated different plans for an economic order which would allow an expression of the individual's interest in his work. Fourier held that under an ideal economic order men would love their work. "His ambition was to see men work for the love of work, hastening to their tasks as they do to a gala. Why should not labor become play, and why should not the same degree of enthusiasm be shown for work as is shown by youth in the pursuit of sport?"[1]

Ruskin, Morris, Fourier, and Owen were in advance of their times, for little appreciation was shown for the human losses sustained by a community in the shutting off of important avenues of expression. What really did happen was that with the shifting of emphasis in social valuations, the social importance of the workingmen's standard of

[1] Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines*, p. 252.

living was stressed. He began to aspire to better living because of its growing social significance; and like the merchants, his attention centered on his income rather than on his work output. To promote this end he resorted to group action to force the employer to divide his profits with his men. The standard of social valuation of the employers became that of the employees. But there is little doubt that the employers, as well as the employees, in their pursuit of their social ends diverted their inclinations into avenues out of harmony with their native aptitudes. This has always been more or less true of the upper social classes.

But the breaking down of long established social barriers acted as an incentive to change one's social status, even if in so doing one sacrificed the pleasures of creative workmanship that former occupations made possible. The change was not always a matter of individual choice. Parents, whose life's work had always been closely associated with the industrial or agricultural arts, deliberately directed their children into occupations whose social prestige was higher than that of the more humble ones. These desirable occupations, either directly or indirectly, were associated in the minds of the people with the upper-class occupations, or were suggestive of leisure. Thus a fundamental avenue of expression was deliberately shut off to meet the demands of the higher social life. Were this the only influence

cutting off the more direct methods of expression of the "instinct of workmanship," the number affected would still be comparatively small. But when in addition to this influence we include the changes in the working-class occupations brought about by the evolution of the industrial arts, the opportunities of self-expression decreased rapidly. With the introduction of machinery in industry, the workingmen tended to be subjected to a monotonous routine, and the ownership of the tools in industry was transferred to the men interested often only as speculative investors. The decreasing opportunities offered in modern industry as an outlet for the desire of achievement in workmanship is increasingly emphasized by students of labor problems.

The modern tendency toward large-scale production and the increasing application of the division of labor is inevitable. An appreciation of this fact is causing many people to direct the arguments formerly made for a return to the handicraft to a plea for a shorter workday. It is thought that a shorter workday will allow leisure for the expression of work interests in activities outside of the factory. But the development of the modern tenement house has eliminated garden space, and made more difficult the individual ownership of the homes occupied. There is little opportunity for self-expression in the congested homes of our large industrial centers. An appreciation of this fact has led to demands for a

greater degree of self-government in industry. That is, men, according to the newer ideas of democratization, are to have a voice in the management of the industry in which they are engaged, and are to share with their employers the pleasures of constructive leadership. It is believed that when the men become familiar with the industry's organization, through participation in management, they will experience the same degree of satisfaction in their work that they did when by their individual efforts they turned out the finished product. Social recognition of achievements in leadership will not only afford the individual greater satisfaction than large wealth could possibly bring him, but at the same time will further the national well-being by the contributions made to the country's wealth and happiness.

In many cases where the division of labor and the use of machinery have been applied to practically the entire craft, there are a few individuals within the crafts who refuse to terminate their connection with their chosen field of work. The tailor, often none too skillful, insists on fashioning the entire garment even though his wage falls below that of his fellow workers who have entered the factory; the shoemaker plies his trade in the mending of shoes, apparently under conditions of poverty; and the Swiss watchmaker finds his principal compensation in repairing the factory-made product. Many a cabinetmaker and wood carver is eking out a miserable

existence because there is little demand for his services, and yet he refuses to enter more remunerative occupations which do not afford the same outlet for the expression of his native talents.

The workers are not alone in their appreciation of the losses of desirable avenues of expression in their work. It is not uncommon to hear wealthy men who have devoted their lives to the accumulation of this world's goods express themselves regretfully that they did not follow in their youth their natural professional bent. They are convinced that if they had followed their inclinations of workmanship, rather than sought wealth in the pursuit of remunerative occupations, life would have afforded them greater satisfaction than they have attained. Some few find compensation in a vicarious achievement. They apply their wealth to uses which make it financially possible for others to follow their natural bent. Universities are established for the promotion of scientific research; social agencies are organized; investigations, both social and economic, are made; recreational facilities are offered, and institutions established to minimize human suffering and to promote human happiness.

The classing of two standards of living, especially when they have little in common, often promotes the acceptance of a third, especially when the guiding force leading to a choice is an intelligent one. A situation of this kind was effectively bridged

by Jane Addams as a part of her work at Hull House. "It seemed to me that Hull House ought to be able to devise some educational enterprise," she says, "which should build a bridge between European and American experiences in such wise as to give them both more meaning and a sense of relation. I meditated that perhaps the power to see life as a whole is more needed in the immigrant quarter of a large city than anywhere else, and that the lack of this power is the most fruitful source of misunderstanding between European immigrants and their children, as it is between them and their American neighbors; and why should that chasm between fathers and sons, yawning at the feet of each generation, be made so unnecessarily cruel and impassable to these bewildered immigrants?" The desired inspiration came to her when she saw an "old woman with her distaff, sitting in the sun on the steps of a tenement house. She might have served," says Miss Addams, "as a model for one of Michael Angelo's Fates, but her face brightened as I passed and, holding up her spindle for me to see, she called out that when she had spun a little more yarn, she would knit a pair of stockings for her goddaughter. The occupation of the old woman gave me the clue that was needed."

As a direct result of this episode, a labor museum was established at Hull House and every Saturday evening an exhibit of workmanship in the textile

industry was made. The skill shown on the part of some of the exhibitors challenged the admiration of the spectators, and in several instances children saw the work of their mothers — mothers of whom they had been ashamed because of their European costumes — singled out for special commendation. The admiration shown for the skill of craftsmanship transferred the feeling of chagrin on the part of the children to one of pride when they realized their mothers' superiority as measured by the standards of achievement. Miss Addams cites the case of an Italian girl who "left her mother at the front door because she did not wish to be too closely identified . . . with an Italian woman who wore a kerchief over her head, uncouth boots, and short petticoats." She got a different social perspective of her mother when she saw her surrounded by a group of visitors from the School of Education who were admiring her skill in spinning. She gathered from the conversation that her mother was "the best stick-spindle spinner in America." After that, "she openly came to the labor museum by the same door as did her mother, proud at least of the mastery of the craft which had been so much admired."[1]

Women have been restricted in their work within narrower limits than have men. For instance, the women of the upper social classes have been shut off from the broader environmental influences common

[1] Addams, Jane, *Twenty Years at Hull House*, pp. 243–244.

to the men of their families, and, in addition, they have found educational barriers erected against them. These barriers have made it impossible for them to receive the training necessary to the successful pursuit of the higher cultural arts, were these pursuits actually open to them. It is true that women's work instincts found an outlet in the handicrafts, provided they possessed aptitudes for these occupations, although the products of their efforts were often of little practical importance. The social demand for an appearance of leisure, or the "nonproductive consumption" of time and goods, prevented most women of the upper social classes from departing widely from their traditional occupations.

The women among the poor were more fortunate in their choice of work. Their handicap consisted largely of a lack of leisure to pursue the work for which they had a decided inclination and which was classified as "feminine work." As long as the industrial arts were confined within the home, they lent themselves readily to the expression of a desire to do creative work. But the care of the children and the performance of necessary routine work connected with the home left little leisure and less energy for the pursuit of occupations affording an outlet for the "instinct of workmanship."

The introduction of the factory system removed many of the household tasks from women's sphere

of work. This should have increased their leisure, and did so in time, when women were not compelled to follow the work into the factory. But the work removed from the home included many of the handicrafts, and left unimpaired the monotonous routine tasks of little or no creative value. Thus, new industrial processes — while increasing the leisure of women — decreased their limited avenues of expression. In communities where modern industrial methods have been developed to the highest degree, the home tends to be primarily a social institution wherein the economic activities of women are largely in the nature of personal services.

When the social precepts of a class forbid the women to follow their work into the factory, or to enter the professional activities, — when there is no pressing financial need to do so, — the environmental influences to which they are subjected diverge from those surrounding men more markedly than they did in the era when industry was still in the domestic stage.

The World War helped to break down social barriers between the different occupational groups. The need of increasing production in the face of the depleted labor force, when many of the working men were called into military service, prompted the government to call upon the upper classes to lend their services in the production of war materials. The apparent social sacrifice was in many instances

a financial boon. Struggling bank clerks, lawyers, real estate men, journalists, etc., who occupied the lower financial rungs of the professional ladder, found themselves for the first time recipients of incomes sufficient to meet the demands of their long-cherished standards of living. Under the guise of patriotism it was possible for them to break away from the social restraints imposed upon them. The presence of the members of the so-called middle classes in the factories and in the workshops removed the social ill repute formerly attached to the work performed. *Idleness* was divested of its prestige, and manual work was extolled as next in worth to military action. Indeed, the conscription of labor for the government workshops carried with it considerable honor reflected from the implied military service. Many of these conscripted men wore military uniforms and were subjected to regular military régime, although the army was a labor army engaged in felling timber to be used in the making of airplanes. Under the circumstances, it would be illogical to expect these men to assume again the subservient attitude characteristic of them before instructed as to their importance in promoting the common well-being. Also it was impossible to impose again upon certain types of work, calling for little skill, the old badge of social ill repute. The occupations were raised for all times to a higher social level, although they were unable to hold

the social importance attributed to them during the war.

Of far greater importance than the calling of the upper social-class men into war industries was the calling of all idle women — upper-class and middle-class. For the first time in their lives many women were not only emancipated from upper-class social restraints, but from economic restraints as well. They were allowed to enter industrial occupations formerly considered beneath their social sphere. Many of them had in the past endured a condition bordering on poverty. Their incomes were too small to allow them to live comfortably. Their poverty, however, was easier to endure than the social ostracism of their class, which might follow if they engaged in employments of low social repute. The World War converted many of the lower class employments into socially reputable employments. Women of leisure and without wealth were now urged to enter the factories with the working girls of the lower social classes. Many of them after the war refused to return to their former life of leisure and poverty. Women of wealth, too, finding their work more congenial than their former life of idleness, often chose to remain in industry for no other reason than that their work afforded them an avenue of self-expression.

The removal of economic restraints meant that women could now enter many employments once

considered the industrial precincts of the men. Kept out of these employments either by trade union restrictions or social usages, they were formerly forced to confine themselves to the low paid and low skilled occupations. In fact, any discussion of the admission of women into men's customary occupations would have met with the challenge that, physically and mentally, they were not adapted for the work. The war emergencies broke down this opposition, and in many instances women have become so well intrenched in their new fields of work as to be effective competitors of men, in some instances displacing them entirely from their former industrial strongholds.

There is another possible reason why many women have remained in industry when there seems to be no immediate economic need for doing so. The increasing social importance attached to expensive standards of consumption, and the removal of the social ill repute attached to the families where the women folk were wage earners give added weight to the social importance of a recently enlarged family income.

The social importance attached to work when its performance was credited to a patriotic motive was destined to decline unless some new factor was injected into the situation to nullify this tendency. This was shortly forthcoming. The increased incomes of many working-class families allowed for

the expression of new and higher standards of living. A standard of living once enjoyed is given up reluctantly. Hence, when the war came to an end, it was not uncommon to find men decreasing their output as a means of making work for themselves and their competitors who were seeking employment. Clearly the men were interested only in their pay envelopes and were little concerned with the problem of increasing cost of production. It seemed therefore of the utmost importance to awaken the interest of the men in their work. This was attempted by making the work conditions more attractive, giving the men a voice in management of the industry in question, and by giving the work a social recognition. Various devices were used to break down social class barriers. The employers often assumed a more democratic attitude toward their men. They associated with them on a footing of social equality in the workshops and in the various community social organizations. As a result, there tended to grow up a consciousness that the social differences between the various social classes were more superficial than real, for many interests were found in common. A recognition of the competitive achievements of the men by various types of awards is not unusual. In some establishments visitors are shown enlarged photographs of workers in the plant who have made some contribution to the industry either in length of service, efficiency

in output, or in helpful suggestions in the productive or the managerial work. These photographs are hung, not in the workshops, but in the reception hall or main offices of the plant. They suggest a "hall of fame" in their setting.

When employers seek to direct their employees' interests from their pay envelopes to their work achievements, they are giving effective support to the recent tendency to look upon all work with social approval. The former social status of the work is disregarded so long as the remuneration is sufficient to allow the enjoyment of a comparatively high standard of living.

When the employers succeed in raising the social status of the work of their employees, they at the same time will increase the precariousness of their own social positions, in so far as the latter rest upon the superior reputability of their work over that of their men. Like the employers who seek to keep the wages of their employees from rising, and at the same time use every conceivable method to stimulate their wants as a means of creating a new market for their products, the advocates of the democratization of the status of the work of their employees do not realize the ultimate effect of an apparently wise immediate policy.

The democratization of the social status of work achievements will undoubtedly increase happiness, for not until all work has been freed from social ill

repute will the individual be able to choose his life's work with the main end in view — of finding expression for his so-called "instinct of workmanship." If this time eventually comes, the routine, monotonous work will possibly command relatively higher wages. Especially will this be true when the democratization of high standards of living calls for new standards of social valuation.

CHAPTER XIX

CONCLUSION

An historical and analytical study of social and economic standards of living indicates that these standards are the result of an evolutionary development. They have their origin in human instincts and in environmental conditions. One has reacted upon the other over long periods of time. The elementary instincts remain the same from one generation to the other, but through the process of selection certain human characteristics become predominant at one time and less conspicuous at others. Peoples in primitive stages of civilization are conscious of the pressure of population on the means of subsistence. The weaker men, in the struggle for food, succumb with their offspring, while the best food getters transmit their qualities of character to future generations. They are the successful hunters and warriors. They are the fittest in the struggle for survival under existing environmental conditions. Such is not the case in modern industrial society. Economic success and propagation are not necessarily correlated.

In the lower stages of civilization the desire for

emulation took the form of personal adornment, and had as its primary object the attraction of the opposite sex. The motive force, which was sex, lent itself directly to the promotion of propagation.

In early historical times the desire for display assumed a far wider range of expression, for, instead of being prompted by a sex motive alone, it assumed an importance far in excess of its original intent. It sought to attract, primarily, the admiration of all mankind, and became in time one of the chief motives of human endeavor instead of being merely one of the means of attaining a definite biological end.

Success in primitive times implied biological survival. Success in early historical times stressed social survival, even when social survival proved to be at the expense of progeny. Men possessing traits of character leading to success in warfare, and later in trade, often left few children, if any, to carry their parents' characteristics down through a long line of descent. The surplus wealth was quite generally used in expressions of personal display and power. The desire for display and for power became ends in themselves, rather than means of promoting propagation.

The avenue for expression of the desire for emulation was the standard of living of the upper classes. It is true that the standards of living of the upper classes were influenced markedly by environmental

conditions because the geographical conditions, as to climate and the flora and fauna of the country, fixed definite limitations on the form of expression social standards could assume. These were in time overcome, in part, by the development of the industrial arts which increased the freedom from the control of the natural limitations. Industrial changes were reflected in the prevailing methods of social expression.

Changes in environmental conditions called for new types of economy. Wealth at one period took the form of extensive landownership, and political and social jurisdiction were inseparable from the land. Naturally, social usages were an outgrowth of an economy which placed a premium on military prowess, the chief source of extensive land acquisitions. The rise in importance of industrial wealth shifted economic power to the hands of the merchant class. Slowly this power became reflected in the political life of the community; and finally, social recognition was forthcoming, and the accoutrements of the landed aristocracy were transferred to the shoulders of the industrial aristocracy. Truly, the economic evolution of a country is reflected in its standards of social valuation.

The social standards of living of the past, — and of the present as well, — are undemocratic in their very nature. They seek to establish social gradations which imply the superiority of the few over

the many. The desire for emulation itself implies a desire for exclusiveness. The people who live on the higher social levels seek to keep them as narrow as possible. Their widening suggests their democratization, and naturally defeats the end in view. Little wonder then that every effort is made to thwart the attempts of the socially ambitious to scale the social heights above them.

Imitation of superiors or assimilation of them was first forbidden by law; then, with the failure of the law to accomplish this end with the growing financial strength of the different economic classes, refuge was sought in the bulwark of custom and tradition. But to no avail. Slowly, but surely, the old aristocracy, representing military prowess reflected in political and social autocracy, was superseded by men whose prowess was won in the world of trade. In so far as they were able to do so, they assumed the mental outlook of their predecessors with the same degree of cheerful willingness as characterized their assumption of the class paraphernalia. Their greatest handicap lay in their traditions.

The social evolution of the lower financial classes shows similar tendencies. The development of the resources of newly exploited lands not only caused the shifting of the forms of wealth, but transferred these new expressions of economic strength to men whose ancestry was not only of unquestioned plebeian origin, but they themselves had not estab-

lished any claims to the higher and more desirable social levels. They and their descendants in time made up the aristocracy in America. Their outlook on life was more nearly a reflection of their present social status than of their social antecedents.

The evolution of social standards of living not only shows a shifting of social power, depending upon the changes made in wealth ownership, but the increasing democratization of the higher social standards themselves. This has been brought about, as we have seen, by an increase in general wealth, and by the breaking down of social barriers through successful imitation. In these, the lower social classes have had as their most effective allies the manufacturers and the merchants seeking new markets for their wares.

Here again we see the phenomena of the lower classes adopting the mental outlook of the upper classes of which they but recently became a part. As a result, their point of view becomes that of the so-called "propertied-man," and their reactions to the debated questions of the day are clearly social class reactions, with a tendency to take on the coloring of the social class ahead, rather than the class of which they were so recently a part.

When people adopt the mental outlook of the higher social classes, the significance of this adoption, in terms of progress, is far more important than the acceptance of their standards of dress. Leaving

out of consideration the artistic and cultural value of the paraphernalia of the upper classes, it must be conceded that in the recent past the upper social classes have been the real custodians of the higher learning. Their traditions called upon the inherited aristocracy to encourage and to preserve for posterity the cultural arts. The higher education was accepted as a necessary training preliminary to the assumption of the class responsibilities. Hence education was one of the distinctive marks of upper class affiliations, and was repeatedly used by men of humble origin as a means of gaining access to the higher social circles.

The shifting of the ownership of great wealth naturally precluded class traditions. It is true, they were adopted by the newly rich in so far as they came within the range of their understanding, but these traditions did not flourish when removed from their native moorings. They took on the coloring of their environment, and resembled the old in form but not in spirit. One of these forms called for the higher education of the upper classes. The content of that education was of little interest in comparison with the importance attached to the insignia of higher learning. Nevertheless, its importance cannot be overrated, for, as a social standard of valuation, the modern universities and colleges open up an avenue for the dissemination of knowledge. Even the most class-conscious work-

ingman hopes to send his son to college, not as a means of gratifying the youth's intellectual curiosity, but as an essential credential — where wealth is lacking — to admission into the higher social employments.

The democratization of higher education is progressing with the democratization of the paraphernalia of the higher social classes, although not at so rapid a rate. The one is a precursor of the other, and paves the way for the assimilation of upper-class ideas and ideals, when the superficial barriers that upper-class standards of living involve have been removed. Increasing consciousness of kind makes for a common outlook.

But as in the case of the adoption of the ideals of an inherited aristocracy by the merchant class, the working classes are an important factor in the shaping of future educational policies. They will attempt to preserve, as the merchants did before them, the insignia of the upper-class educational traditions. In doing so, they will be unconscious of the fact that their higher educational institutions reflect the exigencies of their lives rather than those of the upper social classes.

Some people see in the development of the democratization of social standards of living, the establishment of a political and industrial democracy. This supposition meets with decided obstacles. While political and industrial democracy may be

attained, the realization of a social democracy will be effectively thwarted by the erection of new standards of social valuation. People do not want social democracy. The instinctive proclivity of men for emulation will cause them to seek new avenues of expression with the democratization of the old. The wider diffusion of knowledge will make new standards possible, for then an increasing number of people will be able to appreciate human achievements.

The standard of human achievement, as a measurement of social values, will be subject to various gradations. For the time being there will be a tendency for those lines of achievement which call for large money expenditures to assume an importance wholly out of proportion to their contribution to society. As a result, the members of the social aristocracy of the future will be recruited largely from among the well-to-do.

It is not outside the range of possibility that the youth of the land will have free access to the halls of higher learning, and that poverty will no longer prove an obstacle to the ambitious. If this time should come to pass, and people become sufficiently enlightened to value human achievements in the promotion of the common weal, a social aristocracy would still persist, for nature in the bestowal of her gifts is not democratic.

A somewhat similar evolution will take place in the development of economic standards of living.

We have seen how low standards were upheld as a means of promoting the greatest possible output in production goods. Next came the recognition of the need of feeding, clothing, and housing men and their families adequately to maintain, or to increase, their physical efficiency. At the present time the mental needs of the workingmen are taken into consideration. The motive force is the desire for profits. There are exceptional cases, it is true, where men are prompted by a desire to promote a greater degree of distributive justice, but in a competitively organized industrial society they constitute a minority.

Economic standards of living have been set up, for the most part, by the employing classes, and the social scientists have coöperated with them in so far as they saw prospects of bettering the wage and working conditions of the working people. As economists, they were forced to acknowledge the importance of an increased production in order to make possible a fuller and better life for all, and when consumption of certain commodities whose significance was wholly social — using social in its narrower sense — implied decreased work efficiency, they realized that the productive loss was of national concern. For in its last analysis the promotion of the general welfare rests directly on the productive capacity of the nation. When a surplus is attained over and above what is necessary to maintain the physical efficiency of the people, two fundamental

problems present themselves. The first calls for the distribution of the wealth produced; a distribution which will make possible the maintenance of the individual's work efficiency; and second, the distribution of the surplus so as to promote the greatest possible well-being.

How is this to be brought about? In countries where the political power rests primarily in the hands of an hereditary governing class, a program for social betterment of the conditions of living of the people calls only for the enlightenment of the few who impose their will upon the many. A benevolent paternalism is thus attained.

But where the political power is widely diffused among the people, a program of action to be effective must rest on the will of the people. The history of social legislation, having as its goal the regulation of work conditions, the protection of the weak in their various social relationships, and the setting up of educational standards, clearly shows the evolutionary development of a public mind. This is led, it is true, by the few who are most sensitive to the socially negative forces in the community or in the nation, but nevertheless reserving to itself the final effective sanction of the program proposed or enacted.

With the increasing diffusion of social control, — effective control rather than nominal, — there will be an apparent temporary lowering of social stand-

ards, using the term now in its broader sense of including only general well-being, rather than the standards of emulation of a class. This will naturally follow as a result of the inability of the lower classes in society to reflect, unimpaired, the broader social ideals of the upper classes in the same way as they fail to reproduce the narrower social ideals of the group they seek to imitate. In so far as their failure in imitating the higher social class ideals is due to the absence of a traditional conception of personal superiority resting on wealth ownership, — which is reflected in the conventional life as well as in the educational ideals, — the gains are greater than the losses, as there has been an escape from some of the obstacles to the realization of a broad social program.

But when it comes to the question of a wide range of knowledge essential to the intelligent direction of the ideals of a people, — the absence of wide social contacts, the lack of information and of an appreciation of the problems involved in the carrying out of a program, as well as of an appreciation of the possible losses to be sustained in the promotion of a new line of action, — the new control will necessarily reflect a lower level of intelligence. For a time the trial and error method may prevail, to be superseded later by a delegated control to a new social leadership — the leadership of those who by virtue of their achievements are accepted as guides in the attainment of the common goal.

APPENDIX I

Table I. — Average expenditure and the distribution of the average expenditure for the different groups of articles classified according to use including value of goods furnished by the farm and goods purchased for the year just preceding date given among farm families of Delaware County, Ohio, selected localities of Iowa, and selected localities of Alabama.[1]

	Delaware Co., Ohio Oct. 1, 1923		*Selected localities of Iowa July 1, 1923*		*Selected localities of Alabama January 1, 1924*	
	Cost per yr.	*Proportion of Total*	*Cost per yr.*	*Proportion of Total*	*Cost per yr.*	*Proportion of Total*
Groups of articles	*Dollars*	*Percent*	*Dollars*	*Percent*	*Dollars*	*Percent*
(*Number of families*)	(*383*)		(*472*)		(*187*)	
Food inc. groceries	569.6	37.0	621.7	37.3	749.9	48.1
Clothing	237.5	15.4	242.6	14.5	216.7	13.9
Rent (10% val. house)	255.3	16.6	256.1	15.3	133.0	8.5
Furniture & furnishings	49.6	3.2	35.0	2.1	46.5	3.0
Operating expense	221.1	14.4	235.6	14.1	181.0	11.6
Maintenance of health	55.6	3.6	85.2	5.1	50.4	3.2
Advancement	75.7	4.9	107.9	6.5	98.2	6.3
Personal	47.9	3.1	26.6	1.6	40.3	2.6
Insurance, life & health	26.7	1.7	58.0	3.5	41.6	2.7
Unclassified	1.8	.1	.4	.0	.7	.1
Total	1,540.8	100.0	1,669.1	100.0	1,558.3	100.0

Clothing. — Costs for clothing amount to $237.50 per family and come to 15.4 per cent of the total expenditures. The percentage of all costs for clothing for the Ohio families is 14.5 per cent higher than for the Iowa families, and 13.9 per cent higher than for Alabama families. The average cost of clothing for individuals of the different sex and age groups of Delaware County is given in Table IV.

[1] "Living Conditions and the Cost of Living in Farm Homes of Delaware County, Ohio. 1924." Preliminary report of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture.

Table II. — Average expenditures as shown by value of material furnished by the farm and purchased by 861 farm families in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas, for the year ended January 1, 1920.[1]

Kentucky	Owner families, 115			Tenant families, 93			Cropper families, 33			Combined, 241		
	Furnished	Purchased	Total	Furnished	Purchased	Total	Furnished	Purchased	Total	Furnished	Purchased	Total
Food	531.7	308.4	840.1	481.5	356.2	837.7	280.0	385.7	665.7	477.9	337.4	815.3
Clothing	....	284.1	284.1	....	255.4	255.4	....	229.5	229.5	....	265.6	265.6
Rent	274.5	....	274.5	163.3	0.9	164.2	111.8	...	111.8	209.3	.3	209.6
Furnishings	....	19.0	19.0	....	41.9	41.9	....	24.6	24.6	....	28.6	28.6
Operating	10.4	260.8	271.2	10.3	208.8	219.1	7.6	128.0	135.6	10.0	222.5	232.5
Health	....	91.0	91.0	....	86.8	86.8	....	71.7	71.7	....	86.8	86.8
Advancement	....	155.7	155.7	....	75.2	75.2	....	27.3	27.3	....	107.1	107.1
Personal	....	13.5	13.5	....	14.9	14.9	....	9.7	9.7	....	13.5	13.5
Savings	....	47.2	47.2	....	36.9	36.9	....	14.2	14.2	....	38.7	38.7
Unclassified	....	7.0	7.0	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	3.3	3.3
Total	816.6	1,186.7	2,003.3	655.1	1,077.0	1,732.1	399.4	890.7	1,290.1	697.2	1,103.8	1,801.0
Tennessee	*Owner families, 194*			*Tenant families, 52*			*Cropper families, 52*			*Combined, 298*		
Food	339.7	149.0	488.7	285.6	150.0	435.6	191.7	149.0	340.7	304.5	149.2	453.7
Clothing	....	232.3	232.3	....	173.9	173.9	....	97.6	97.6	....	198.6	198.6
Rent	165.5	.5	166.0	83.8	12.6	96.4	42.3	....	42.3	129.7	2.5	132.2
Furnishings	....	24.7	24.7	....	8.6	8.6	....	11.0	11.0	....	19.5	19.5
Operating	29.2	132.3	161.5	24.9	48.1	73.0	21.9	25.2	47.1	27.1	99.0	126.1
Health	....	68.3	68.3	....	18.7	18.7	....	22.7	22.7	....	51.6	51.6
Advancement	....	124.4	124.4	....	54.7	54.7	....	15.3	15.3	....	93.2	93.2
Personal	0.4	16.5	16.9	0.7	13.3	14.0	.8	6.3	7.1	.5	14.2	14.7

Savings	....	41.5	41.5	....	24.1	24.1	....	6.7	6.7	....	32.4	32.4
Unclassified	....	0.8	0.8	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	.5	.5
Total	534.8	790.3	1,325.1	395.0	504.0	899.0	256.7	333.8	590.5	461.8	660.7	1,122.5
Texas	*Owner families, 102*			*Tenant families, 176*			*Cropper families, 44*			*Combined, 322*		
Food	477.7	272.5	750.2	367.0	263.9	630.9	254.8	308.1	562.9	386.7	272.7	659.4
Clothing	....	381.8	381.8	....	263.8	263.8	....	243.4	243.4	....	298.4	298.4
Rent	120.8	.8	121.6	81.2	3.9	85.1	69.5	2.3	71.8	92.1	2.7	94.8
Furnishings	....	66.1	66.1	....	23.7	23.7	....	20.5	20.5	....	36.7	36.7
Operating	7.3	229.2	236.5	7.6	145.3	152.9	6.4	88.7	95.1	7.3	164.2	171.5
Health	....	68.8	68.8	....	69.9	69.9	....	44.7	44.7	....	66.1	66.1
Advancement	....	112.9	112.9	....	37.2	37.2	....	23.8	23.8	....	59.4	59.4
Personal	....	21.3	21.3	....	21.3	21.3	....	21.9	21.9	....	21.4	21.4
Savings	....	48.3	48.3	....	40.7	40.7	....	17.1	17.1	....	39.9	39.9
Unclassified	....	1.5	1.5	....	6.4	6.4	....	9.7	9.7	....	5.3	5.3
Total	605.8	1,203.2	1,809.0	455.8	876.1	1,331.9	330.7	780.2	1,110.9	486.1	966.8	1,452.9

The average total expenditure by the 241 farm families of Kentucky was $1,801 for the year ending Jan. 1, 1920, as compared with $1,122.50 for the 298 families of Tennessee and $1,452.90 for the 322 families of Texas. This average for Kentucky ($1,801), was approximately $200 above the average for 360 farm families of Mason Co., Kentucky ($1,614), for the year ending July 1, 1923, and about $200 below the average for 402 families of Livingston Co., New York ($2,012), for the year ending September 1, 1921. About three fifths of the total living costs represent purchased goods in the Kentucky and Texas areas, and two thirds of the total costs represent purchased goods in the Tennessee areas. Both the Kentucky areas and the Texas areas are similar in this respect to the Mason Co., Kentucky area, 1923, where three fifths of the total expenditures represent goods purchased. Tennessee areas are similar to the Livingston Co. 1921 area.

[1] "Cost of Living in Farm Homes in Several Areas of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas. 1924." A preliminary report of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture.

Table III. — Average expenditures per family for the different groups of items for the year ending January 1, 1920, as shown by value of materials furnished by the farm and materials purchased, 154 colored farm families in comparison with average expenditures for 861 white families of selected localities of Kentucky, Tennessee and Texas.[1]

Size of family	Colored Families											
	All families, 154			*Owner families, 35*			*Tenant families, 47*			*Cropper families, 72*		
	4.8 persons			*4.8 persons*			*4.9 persons*			*4.7 persons*		
	Furnished	*Purchased*	*Total*	*Furnished*	*Purchased*	*Total*	*Furnished*	*Purchased*	*Total*	*Furnished*	*Purchased*	*Total*
Food	178.6	148.1	326.7	225.8	132.4	358.2	216.8	151.5	368.3	130.8	153.5	284.3
Clothing	....	107.1	107.1	....	122.1	122.1	....	123.6	123.6	....	89.1	89.1
Rent	41.0	....	41.0	56.5	....	56.5	33.9	....	33.9	38.2	....	38.2
Furnishings	....	4.5	4.5	....	.3	.3	....	4.7	4.7	....	6.3	6.3
Operating	20.1	35.7	55.8	22.2	38.8	61.0	23.0	35.4	58.4	17.0	34.7	51.7
Health	....	24.8	24.8	....	16.2	16.2	....	28.9	28.9	....	26.2	26.2
Advancement	....	28.3	28.3	....	49.3	49.3	....	27.6	27.6	....	18.6	18.6
Personal	....	8.9	8.9	....	6.8	6.8	....	12.4	12.4	....	7.6	7.6
Insurance	....	14.0	14.0	....	12.2	12.2	....	14.7	14.7	....	14.3	14.3
Unclassified	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Total	239.7	371.4	611.1	304.5	378.1	682.6	273.7	398.8	672.5	186.0	350.3	536.3

Size of Family	White Families											
	All families, 861			Owner families, 41			Tenant families, 321			Cropper families, 129		
	4.6 persons			4.4 persons			4.8 persons			4.9 persons		
Food	383.8	248.0	631.8	427.6	224.3	651.9	387.0	272.2	659.2	235.8	263.8	499.6
Clothing	....	254.7	254.7	....	283.9	283.9	....	246.8	246.8	....	181.1	181.1
Rent	137.9	2.0	139.9	184.9	.4	185.3	105.4	4.4	109.8	69.3	.8	70.1
Furnishings	....	28.5	28.5	....	33.4	33.4	....	26.6	26.6	....	17.7	17.7
Operating	14.9	158.0	172.9	18.6	192.3	210.9	11.1	148.0	159.1	13.0	73.2	86.2
Health	....	67.0	67.0	....	75.0	75.0	....	66.5	66.5	....	42.7	42.7
Advancement	....	84.3	84.3	....	130.1	130.1	....	51.1	51.1	....	21.2	21.2
Personal	.2	16.7	16.9	.2	16.9	17.1	.2	18.1	18.3	.3	12.5	12.8
Insurance	....	36.9	36.9	....	44.7	44.7	....	36.9	36.9	....	12.2	12.2
Unclassified	....	3.1	3.1	....	2.7	2.7	....	3.5	3.5	....	3.3	3.3
Total	536.8	899.2	1436.0	631.3	1003.7	1635.0	503.7	874.1	1377.8	318.4	628.5	946.9

[1] "The Cost of Living Among Colored Farm Families of Selected Localities of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas. January 1925." A preliminary report of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture.

Table IV. — Variation in the percentages of the average expenditures for the different groups of articles and in the proportion of total family living furnished by the farm for families classified according to total expenditures; 154 colored farm families, in comparison with 861 white families, for the year ending January 1, 1920. Selected localities of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas.[1]

	Colored Families													
	Total expenditure groups													
	Below $300	*$300 599*	*$600 899*	*$900 1199*	*$1200 1499*	*$1500 1799*	*$1800 2099*	*$2100 2399*	*$2400 2699*	*$2700 2999*	*$3000 3299*	*$3300 3599*	*$3600 and over*	**All Expenditures**
Number of families	*12*	*85*	*35*	*16*	*3*	*2*	....	*1*	....	....	....	....	....	*154*
Average size of family (persons)	3.4	4.3	6.1	5.3	7.3	5.5	....	2.0	....	....	....	....	....	4.8
Average size of household (persons)	3.4	4.5	6.5	5.4	7.7	6.0	....	4.0	....	....	....	....	....	5.1
Average of total expenditures ($)	*261.5*	*461.5*	*750.1*	*991.2*	*1380.3*	*1647.0*	....	*2185.0*	....	....	....	....	....	*611.1*
Proportion of total for food, pct.	53.2	55.3	52.8	52.9	47.9	58.9	....	34.6	....	....	....	....	....	53.5
Clothing, pct.	14.8	16.1	18.9	20.1	19.2	12.1	....	18.3	....	....	....	....	....	17.5
Rent, pct	7.2	7.1	5.9	6.0	8.4	6.7	....	11.4	....	....	....	....	....	6.7
Furniture and furnishings, pct.	.5	.8	.5	1.1	.0	1.5	....	.0	....	....	....	....	....	.7
Operating expenses, pct.	11.8	9.0	10.1	7.8	12.6	5.9	....	3.3	....	....	....	....	....	9.1
Maintenance of health, pct.	2.4	4.2	3.9	3.1	5.7	9.1	....	1.2	....	....	....	....	....	4.1
Advancement, pct	3.4	3.6	4.7	4.7	4.3	3.3	....	26.3	....	....	....	....	....	4.6
Personal, pct	2.0	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.1	.2	....	.0	....	....	....	....	....	1.5
Insurance, life and health, pct.	4.7	2.1	1.8	3.0	.8	2.3	....	4.9	....	....	....	....	....	2.3
Unclassified, pct	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	....	.0	....	....	....	....	....	.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	....	100.0	....	....	....	....	....	100.0

Proportion of living furnished, pct.	38.7	43.0	37.0	35.0	31.7	44.9	....	35.7	....	....	....	....	....	39.2
Proportion of living purchased...	61.3	57.0	63.0	65.0	68.3	55.1	....	64.3	....	....	....	....	....	60.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	....	100.0	....	....	....	.. ..	....	100.0

White Families

Number of families	*7*	*69*	*128*	*191*	*138*	*104*	*87*	*55*	*34*	*10*	*15*	*8*	*15*	*861*
Average size of family (persons)	2.9	3.4	4.2	4.1	4.7	5.0	5.3	6.1	6.0	5.9	4.9	4.9	5.7	4.7
Average size of household	2.9	3.5	4.2	4.2	4.9	5.1	5.4	6.3	6.3	5.9	4.9	5.0	5.7	4.8
Average of total expenditures	*268.9*	*489.1*	*760.9*	*1048.9*	*1346.9*	*1643.6*	*1927.3*	*2230.9*	*2529.9*	*2863.6*	*3128.0*	*3464.6*	*4437.7*	*1436.0*
Proportion of total for food, pct.	61.0	57.0	53.2	50.0	46.5	45.1	43.3	41.6	36.6	35.3	34.8	34.7	25.3	44.0
Clothing, pct	12.2	16.0	17.2	17.0	17.9	17.3	19.5	18.8	18.6	15.8	17.7	12.6	17.6	17.7
Rent, pct	9.0	8.7	9.8	10.4	8.9	9.2	9.4	10.4	8.5	11.0	12.7	16.5	7.9	9.7
Furniture and furnishings, pct.	1.1	.6	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.1	3.4	1.6	.9	.5	6.3	2.0
Operating expense, pct	10.0	9.0	9.0	10.2	12.2	12.4	13.9	12.1	13.3	13.7	13.6	12.0	14.0	12.0
Maintenance of health, pct	2.9	3.3	3.7	3.5	4.3	4.3	3.2	5.3	7.4	3.7	4.2	7.6	10.8	4.7
Advancement, pct	1.7	2.7	2.9	4.2	4.7	4.7	4.9	5.2	7.6	12.6	12.2	9.8	15.6	5.9
Personal, pct	2.1	1.7	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.0	1.1	.8	.8	.8	1.2
Insurance, life and health, pct.	....	1.0	1.5	1.7	2.5	3.8	2.4	3.1	3.2	5.2	1.4	5.2	1.7	2.6
Unclassified, pct	....	....	....	.1	.2	.4	.1	.2	.4	....	1.7	.3	....	.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Proportion of living furnished, pct.	58.3	50.1	43.7	42.7	39.1	36.9	35.5	35.1	30.9	34.1	32.9	37.9	23.1	37.4
Proportion of living purchased, pct	41.7	49.9	56.3	57.3	60.9	63.1	64.5	64.9	69.1	65.9	67.1	62.1	76.9	62.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[1] "The Cost of Living Among Colored Families of Selected Localities of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas. 1925." A preliminary report of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture.

APPENDIX II

Table I. — Annual Quantity of Clothing for College Girl. Department of Home Economics, University of Washington, 1922.

"This is not an ideal budget, neither is it a minimum budget, since it must be modified to meet individual needs. No two budgets are exactly the same nor is it essential that they should be.

"Some girls will require additional garments, some will spend more for certain garments . . ."

Articles	*Quantity*	*Cost*
Underclothing		
Outing flannel gowns or pajamas	1	$2.00
Cotton gowns	2	3.00
Knit vests	3	
Sateen bloomers	3	9.00
Camisoles	3	
or		
Union suits	3	7.50
Chemises	3	
Silk vest	½	1.25
Silk bloomers	½	2.00
Corsets or girdles	1	3.00
Brassiers	2	1.50
Light silk petticoat	⅓	1.33
White cotton petticoat or slip	½	1.00
Dark petticoat	½	2.00
Bath robe (warm)	¼	1.25
Kimona	½	1.00
Outer Garments		
Wool dress	½	17.50
Wool skirt	⅓	3.33
Sweater or jersey jacket	⅓	2.68
Wash blouses	2	5.00
Dark blouse	½	5.00
Light silk or wool sport skirt	½	5.00

Articles	*Quantity*	*Cost*
Outer Garments—Continued		
Suit	½	$25.00
Heavy coat	⅓	15.00
Campus coat	¼	6.25
Coverall apron	½	1.00
Light cotton dresses	1	15.00
Gingham dress	½	4.00
Afternoon dress	1	30.00
Evening dresses	½	17.50
Hose		
Cotton (white or black)	1	.65
Dark silk	4	6.68
Shoes		
Dark Oxfords	1	7.50
White Oxfords	½	2.50
High shoes	⅓	3.00
Pumps	1½	3.50
Party slippers	½	4.25
Bedroom slippers	½	.75
Rubbers	1	.75
Hats		
Winter hat	1	10.00
Spring hat	1	10.00
Sport hat	1	5.00
Gloves		
Street gloves	2	4.50
Dress gloves	1	3.50
Accessories		
Umbrella	½	2.50
Gymnasium suit	¼	2.87
Handkerchiefs	6	1.50
Cleaning	*	8.00
Shoe repairs	*	8.00
Miscellaneous	*	8.00
Total		$281.54

* Lump sum of money equal to about 9.1 per cent of the total cost of girl's clothing.

Table II. — Annual Quantity of Clothing for Working Girl, Seattle, Washington, 1921. Department of Labor and Industries of the State of Washington.

Clothing	*Quantity*	*Cost*
Suit	1	$25.00
Coat	1	17.50
Cotton skirt	1	5.00
Waists	3	6.00
Aprons	2	2.50
Dress shoes	1 pr	5.00
Work shoes	1 pr.	5.00
Oxfords	1 pr.	5.00
Hose	6 pr.	3.00
Corsets	2	5.00
Union suits, heavy	2	3.50
Union suits, light	2	2.00
Petticoats	2	4.00
Nightgowns	2	3.00
Straw hat	1	5.00
Winter hat	1	5.00
Gloves	1 pr.	2.00
Gloves	1 pr.	1.00
Umbrella	1	2.50
Handkerchiefs	12	1.00
Rubbers	1 pr.	.85
House dress	1	2.00
Corset waists	2	2.00
Shoes repair	—	6.00
Chemises	4	3.00
Bloomers	2	2.00
Total		$123.85

Table III. — Annual Quantity of Clothing for a Girl Working in a Manufacturing Establishment. Presented at a Minimum Wage Conference by an employers' representative, Olympia, Washington, 1920.

Clothing	*Quantity*	*Cost*
Suit	½	$16.25
Coat	½	12.50
Cotton skirts	2	13.00
Waists	2	4.70
Aprons	3	4.95
Shoes	2	16.00
Hose	8	4.00
Corsets	2	6.00
Union suits	4	6.00
Chemises	3	5.25
Petticoats	2	5.00
Nightgowns	3	7.50
Straw hat	1	5.00
Winter hat	1	7.50
Gloves, kid	1	2.50
Gloves, silk	2	2.00
Bloomers	3	6.00
Handkerchiefs	12	2.40
Umbrella	½	1.50
Rubbers	½	.63
Shoe repairs, etc.	—	12.00
Total		$140.68

Table IV. — Annual Cost of Clothing for Girls in Public Housekeeping Employments. Presented by employees at a Minimum Wage Conference, 1921.

Articles	Waitress Cost	Waitress Cost	Checker Cost	Cashier Cost	Pantry girl Cost	Captain Cost
Shoes and rubbers	$35.00	$30.00	$20.00	$20.00	$20.00	$21.00
Repairing shoes	3.00	5.00	5.00	7.00	3.00	3.00
Stockings	15.00	15.00	4.00	8.00	7.00	3.50
Underwear	18.00	10.00	10.00	15.00	15.00	5.00
Petticoats	8.00	10.00	5.00	10.00	12.00	2.50
Suit	75.00	60.00	35.00	50.00	60.00	.....
Coat	50.00	45.00	———	50.00	50.00	40.00
Dresses and aprons	75.00	35.00	50.00	25.00	.....	32.00
Shirt waists	25.00	37.00	15.00	3.00	5.00	5.50
Handkerchiefs	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.50	.75
Corsets	8.00	7.50	12.00	12.00	12.00	7.00
Corset waists	3.00	.....	3.00	3.50	6.00	5.00
Gloves	6.00	13.00	4.00	3.75	3.50	3.50
Neckwear	.....	.....	3.00	2.00	.....	.....
Hats	20.00	28.50	10.00	20.00	20.00	5.00
Umbrella	5.00	1.50	6.00	.....	2.50	3.00
Repair of clothing	.....	.....	...	10.00	7.50	6.00
Total	$349.00	$299.50	$185.00	$241.25	$226.00	$142.75

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